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ABSTRACT
THE LOGIC OF CONTINGENT EXISTENCE
SEPTEMBER 1997
DANIEL M. KERVICK, B.A., TUFTS UNIVERSITY
Ph . D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Edmund Gettier III
Among modal claims, claims that involve the notions of
broadly logical possibility and necessity, one that seems
almost trivial is this: that if some proposition is
possible, then it is possibly true. However, there is an
argument, due in its essentials to the medieval philosopher
and logician Jean Buridan, to the effect that this seemingly
trivial claim is, in fact, untrue.
Briefly put, the argument is this. Let Q be the
proposition that Quine does not exist. Since Quine's
existence is contingent, Q is possible. But, propositions
are ontologically dependent upon their constituents, and
Quine is a constituent of Q. So, necessarily, were Quine
not to exist, neither would Q exist. And, a necessary
condition of a proposition's being true is that it exist.
Hence, there are propositions, such as Q, that are possible,
but not possibly true. I call this conclusion, together
with certain other similar claims, 'Buridanism'
.
My main topic is the evaluation of the argument for
Buridanism, and the exploration of the consequences of
Vll
Buridanism for modalist theories of possible worlds and for
modal logic. I begin by examining the two crucial premises
in the argument for Buridanism : N-dependency, according to
which propositions expressed by sentences containing proper
names are singular propositions that depend ontologically
upon the referents of those names, and Buridan's Thesis,
according to which a proposition can be neither necessary,
nor possible, nor true, unless it exists.
Robert Adams has argued that accepting Buridanism
forces us to revise the modalist conception of possible
worlds as maximal and consistent propositions or sets of
propositions. I show that this is not the case, and provide
an analysis of a proposition's being true relative to a
world that allows us to maintain the modalist account while
embracing Buridanism.
Standard systems of quantified modal logic are prone to
several related problems that I refer to as the problems of
contingency. These systems often include as theorems
formulas that seem to presuppose that everything that
exists, exists necessarily. I develop a system of modal
logic, BML
,
based upon Buridanism, that is able to overcome
viii
these difficulties.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What follows is an examination of metaphysical, logical
and semantical issues concerning broadly logical modality
and the interpretation of modal discourse. The inquiry
focuses on a particular question:
Actualism + Singular Propositions = ?
and a particular answer to the question that I call
' Buridanism '
.
Actualism is the thesis that there is nothing that does
not actually exist, or equivalently, that there is nothing
save what exists in the actual world. Singular
propositions, as described in the work of David Kaplan, are
the semantic contents of sentences containing a directly
referential singular term. With regard to the individuals
that they are about, they may be said to involve those
individuals directly rather than by way of some individual
concept. It is the individual itself and not some
corresponding property or concept that is the relevant
propositional component.
Buridanism is a family of related, and somewhat
unorthodox, modal claims. One of these claims is that there
1
are propositions that are possible but not possibly true;
and another is that there are propositions that are
necessary, but not necessarily true. Buridanism includes
some other important results: that there are propositions
that are possible, but not necessarily possible; that there
are propositions that are necessary, but not necessarily
necessary; and that there are propositions that are true,
but not necessarily possible. Readers acquainted with the
standard systems of modal logic will recognize that these
last three claims amount to a denial of the validity of the
characteristic axioms of the familiar modal systems S5, S4
and B. Those axioms are:
S5 : OP d OOP
S4 : DP => COP
B: P 3 OOP
It must be admitted at the outset that many
philosophers, and probably most philosophers, would find
Buridanism to be a highly counterintuitive doctrine. So
perhaps, before proceeding, something of an apology is
required. Why is Buridanism worthy of an extended
examination?
The foremost reason is that, with all due respect to
initial intuitions, there is an interesting argument for
2
Buridanism. And, while I acknowledge that some may not find
the argument entirely compelling, when taken as a whole, I
believe that each premise of the argument, taken
individually, is at least as reasonable as its negation.
The present study
,
then, should not be viewed as a defense
of the argument for Buridanism, but rather as a sympathetic
examination of the argument. I hope to convince the reader
only that Buridanism is at least a live option in the
philosophy of modality - that it might be true.
This is important. If Buridanism is true, the
consequences for modal logic and the philosophy of modality
are significant. I have already indicated that Buridanism
impugns the correctness of each of S5, S4 or B as the logic
of modality. It will be shown that even the minimal system
T is defeated on Buridanian principles. While the
characteristic axiom of T,
T: DP ^ P
is upheld, there is a failure of the metatheoretic principle
of necessitation
:
Nec : i-$ - i-Do
.
N is common to all normal systems of modal logic 1 , including
T. Of course, not every instance of necessitation will
3
fail, but one crucial instance that does fail is the one in
which 'O' is replaced by the familiar duality principle:
D: OP = nQ-nP.
While D will still turn out to be a theorem of propositional
modal logic, its necessitation will not. An important
consequence of this failure is that, unlike the case with
standard modal logics, in Buridanian modal logic the
following formulas are not equivalent, respectively, to the
axioms S5, S4 and B:
CS5 : ODP o DP
CS4 : OOP => OP
CB: ODP 3 p.
In the course of this study, I will develop a modal
logic - called 'Buridanian Modal Logic', or ' BML ' - in which
D, T, CS5, CS4 and CB are theorems, but in which S5, S4, B
and the rule of necessitation fail.
A second reason for examining Buridanism is that it
provides an exceptionally good point of entry for the study
of many issues of fundamental importance in metaphysics and
philosophical logic. As will be seen, the evaluation of the
argument for Buridanism requires at least some discussion of
a number of related issues - Actualism and Possibilism, the
4
nature of propositions and possible worlds, de re and de
dicto modality, and the semantics of singular reference to
name just a few of these issues. In addition, attention
must be paid to certain more technical issues in modal and
intensional logic and in possible worlds semantics. Because
consideration of the argument for Buridanism requires the
consideration of so many important related issues, I believe
that the examination that follows is valuable, no matter how
the case for Buridanism itself ultimately turns out.
This thesis may be seen in part as offering what Harry
Deutsch, following Arthur Prior, has called a logic for
contingent beings . 2 Such a logic is required in order to
avoid commitment to the claim that if something exists, it
necessarily exists. Despite the obvious invalidity of this
claim, it is one that certain classical systems of modal
logic do not manage to avoid. There are some additional,
and related, problems with classical modal logics - problems
that I refer to collectively as the problems of contingency.
The manner in which BML solves the problems of contingency
will be contrasted with the solutions put forward by Arthur
Prior, Saul Kripke, Chris Menzel and Deutsch himself.
Finally, a third reason for examining Buridanism is
that Buridanism and related issues have already generated a
sizeable amount of discussion in contemporary philosophy,
5
although so far as I know the term 'Buridanism' has not been
used before
. In addition to the philosophers mentioned in
the previous paragraph, Buridanism has been discussed
directly or tangentially by G. E. Moore, Arthur Prior, Alvin
Plantinga
,
Robert Adams, John Pollock, Graeme Forbes, Alan
McMichael and Nathan Salmon among others. 3 Much of this
discussion has been penetrating, but much more needs to be
done to clarify just what is at stake, to compare
alternatives, and to decide who might be right.
I wish to emphasize that Actualism will be presupposed
in this thesis and not defended. Chapter Two will be
devoted to an explication of Actualism and to a
clarification of just what it does and does not entail, but
no defense will be ventured. While I do strongly incline
toward Actualism, the absence of an argument for Actualism
is not meant to suggest that I take it to be obviously true,
or to disparage alternative possibilist views. Indeed, much
of the most important contemporary work on the philosophy of
modality takes a possibilist approach. It is only the
necessity of setting manageable bounds to the inquiry that
is responsible for the lack of a more ambitious defense.
1 . 1 Overview
The remainder of Chapter One is concerned with general
philosophical background and technical preliminaries. The
6
key doctrines of Buridanism are introduced informally, and
compared with the earliest form of Buridanism, as found in
the work of the medieval philosopher and logician Jean
Buridan, from whom the thesis takes its name. The language
of first order modal logic is presented along with an
explanation of some of the techniques of possible worlds
semantics. A technique is presented for passing from a
particular possible worlds semantics to a corresponding
extensional world theory by sifting out metalinguistic
elements. A brief sketch of a modalized version of ramified
type theory will be presented in outline. Finally, some
preliminary points are raised concerning the relationship
between modal discourse and different kinds of talk of
possible worlds.
Chapter Two is devoted to a presentation and
explanation of Actualism and its contradictory, Possibilism.
Actualism is defined, and shown to be incompatible with two
interesting, but distinct, varieties of possibilism:
Meinongian Possibilism, which takes possibilia to be certain
kinds of nonexistent things, and Lewisean Possibilism, which
takes possibilia to be existing things inhabiting other
concrete universes - universes that are causally and
spatiotemporally isolated from ours. In the last section of
the chapter, a question is raised about the compatibility of
7
extensional world theories and Actualism. I argue that
there is a serious problem here, and that the Actualist
should be skeptical of standard possible worlds analyses of
modal discourse.
In Chapter Three, the notion of a singular proposition
is introduced. Singular propositions are initially
identified as the contents of sentences containing directly
referential singular terms. An examination of the writings
of David Kaplan, to whom my use of the term 'direct
reference' is due, reveals two different notions of direct
reference. One of these, which I call 'prior reference', is
selected as the basis for the ensuing discussion of singular
propositions. The chapter concludes with a proposal for
identifying singular propositions, and the constituents of
those propositions, in a way that is language- independent
,
but which does not presuppose that they are structured
entities
.
In Chapter Four, one main question is addressed:
whether sentences containing proper names express
propositions that are ontologically dependent on the
referent of that name. This question prompts two subsidiary
questions: whether sentences containing proper names express
singular propositions in which the referent of the name is a
constituent, and whether singular propositions depend
8
ontologically on their constituents. The first subsidiary
question is, I believe, more tractable, and the bulk of the
chapter is devoted to the arguments for treating names as
devices of direct reference. The second question raises
issues about the ultimate nature of propositions, issues
that can not all be addressed within the scope of the
present study; but, it will be argued that intuitive
considerations about the way propositions represent the
world suggest that singular propositions are structured
entities, and that it is plausible, then, that they are
ontologically dependent on their constituents.
Chapter Five deals with the crucial premise in the
argument for Buridanism - that for any proposition it is
necessary that if that proposition is necessary, or
possible, or true, then it exists. I call this premise -
which is really a conjunction of three distinguishable
premises - 'Buridan's Thesis'. I first discuss what I take
to be the metaphysical consequences of accepting Buridan's
Thesis, that is, the cluster of views that I call
'Buridanism' . I then turn to issues having to do with the
relationship between Buridanism and modalist accounts of
possible worlds. I argue that there is a very simple and
straightforward account of possible worlds that is
compatible with Buridanism, and I show that modalists need
9
not adopt a more complicated account, due to Robert M.
Adams. Finally, I turn to the evaluation of Buridan's
Thesis. The most popular way of defending the thesis is via
a doctrine that Alvin Plantinga has called 'Serious
Actualism 1 - for any property P and individual x, it is
necessary that if x has P, then x exists. There are two
major problems with this approach. First, the problem of
formulating Serious Actualism in a way that is not subject
to counterexample. Second, the problem of showing that
Buridan's Thesis, or one of the three components of
Buridan's Thesis, is an instance of such a formulation. I
conclude the chapter with a consideration of these problems.
If Buridanism is false, a defense of S5 as the modal
logic of broadly logical possibility and necessity can be
given by appealing to the idea that propositions have their
modality essentially. If Buridanism is true, things are
more interesting. Chapter Six outlines a system of modal
logic - Buridanian Modal Logic, or BML . I describe certain
problem sentences for standard modal logics that I call
collectively the "problems of contingency", and I show how
BML is able to avoid these problems. Finally, BML is
contrasted with four other logical approaches to the
problems of contingency: the free logical approach, Arthur
Prior's system Q, Harry Deutsch's Logic for Contingent
10
In each case, IBeings and Chris Menzel ' s True Modal Logic,
argue that the solution offered by BML is superior.
In an Appendix, BML is developed formally. An
axiomatization is produced for propositional BML. Also, a
modified possible worlds style semantics is given, and
soundness and completeness relative to the semantics are
proven. The semantics is held to be of instrumental value
only. I believe that BML should be generated as a sub-
theory within a more comprehensive intensional logic, and
that an adequate account of its real semantics will depend
on whatever the best semantics of intensional logic turns
out to be
.
1 . 2 Buridanism - Historical Background
Buridanism is named after the medieval philosopher and
logician Jean Buridan. It is a modern counterpart of views
that Buridan presented in his Sophismata as a solution to a
certain sophism or logical puzzle 4
,
so I will begin by
describing some aspects of Buridan’ s presentation of the
puzzle, and of his attempted solution. Buridan’ s discussion
is both interesting and ingenious, and serves as an
excellent introduction to the contemporary version of
Buridanism that I will introduce in the next section.
In chapter eight of Buridan’ s Sophismata, the chapter
on insolubles, Buridan considers the following sophism.
11
1.1) Every proposition is affirmative, so none is negative.
The question is whether or not the above is a valid
consequence
. To understand the problem posed by the
sophism, it is necessary to appreciate some characteristic
features of medieval logic 5
.
According to most medieval logicians, propositions come
in three varieties. A propositions is either a thought, or
a visible or audible expression of a thought. Another way
of putting this is that every proposition is either mental,
spoken or written. The medievals did not regard a written
proposition as a type of sentence that could be inscribed on
separate occasions, but as the inscription itself: what we
would call a sentence token. It is an individual that has a
localized, temporary existence. Similarly, spoken
propositions were taken to be particular token events with
definite temporal boundaries. A mental proposition was a
also an event token, a temporary "modification of the
intellect". It was thought to involve the coming into
existence of a token in the language of thought. All
propositions then are ontologically individual temporal
entities. They are individuals that first come into
existence and, afterward, cease to exist.
12
The doctrine that propositions are individual events or
inscriptions raises a number of difficulties, both
philosophical and interpretive, for Buridan's discussion.
How much change in the physical character of an inscription
is required to destroy its identity? What is involved in
the ascription of belief or desire? Just what does it mean
when Buridan asks whether "this sophism" or "the following
sophism" is a valid consequence? It seems that the question
being asked here will be different for each different copy
of Buridan's text. It is not my aim to address theoretical
issues in medieval logic, but only to illustrate Buridan's
thinking in an intuitive way. Still, in order to discuss
this thinking with some degree of precision, let us assume
that the subject of Buridan's inquiry is some particular
written inscription S of a (Latin) sentence that translates
sentence (1.1) .
A consequence is a proposition that asserts that one
proposition follows validly from another. A sentence token
such as S was regarded as making such an assertion, not as a
mere material conditional. A proposition is a valid
consequence if the consequent of that proposition follows
validly from its antecedent. Since part of the problem
raised by the sophism is just what one proposition's
13
following validly from another consists in, I will postpone
discussion of this issue for now.
Buridan holds S to be valid, and he begins his
discussion with a presentation of some simple arguments
designed to show this. The first argument is this:
"It is proved, first, by the argument from
contraries, for just as it follows that if every
man is ill, then no man is healthy, because it is
impossible for the same person to be healthy and
ill, so it follows in the proposed [case] that it
is impossible for the same proposition to be both
affirmative and negative at once." 6
Traditionally, two terms G and H are said to be contrary
just in case it is impossible that something fall under both
G and H. Buridan' s point is simply that, for any contrary
terms G and H, and additional term F, the consequence
1.2) Every F is G, so no F is H
is valid, and that S is just such a consequence. Indeed,
Buridan appears clearly right about S. It does seem to be
valid
.
After presenting two more arguments purporting to
establish the validity of the consequence, Buridan then goes
on to point out certain difficulties with the view that the
consequence is valid. One of the difficulties is set out in
this passage:
14
"The opposite is argued, because from a possible
proposition there does not follow an impossible.
And yet the first proposition is possible, namely,
"Every proposition is affirmative"
. For God coulddestroy all negatives, leaving the affirmatives.
Thus, every proposition would be affirmative.
But, the other is impossible, namely, "No
proposition is negative", for in no case could it
be true. For whenever it is not, it is neither
true nor false, and whenever it is, then some
[proposition] is negative, namely it. Hence, it
is false to say that none is negative." 7
Let's use E to designate the antecedent of S and 'N' to
designate the consequent of S. Remember that E and N are
themselves particular sentence tokens, just as is S.
Reorganizing just a bit then, I think that the following,
call it 'argument A', is a fair rendering of Buridan's
argument
:
la)
2a)
3a)
4a)
5a)
6a)
7a)
8a)
9a)
E is possible.
Necessarily, if N exists, then some negative exists,
Necessarily, If N some negative exists, then N is not
true
,
Necessarily, if N exists, N is not true. (from 2a
and 3a)
Necessarily, if N does not exist, N is not true,
Necessarily, N is not true. (from 4a and 5a)
It is impossible that N is true. (immediately, from 6a)
For any proposition P, if P is possible then it is
possible that P be true,
N is impossible, (from 7a and 8a)
15
10a) No impossible proposition follows validly from a
possible,
11a) N does not follow validly from E. (from la, 9a, 10a)
Buridan then describes a second problem with the assertion
that S is a valid consequence:
"Likewise, a consequence is not valid, if the
antecedent could be true without the truth of the
consequent. But so it is in the proposed case
since from the fact that the antecedent could be
true and the consequent could be not true, it is
apparent that the antecedent could be true without
the truth of the consequent. And this is clear
also because this is true: "Every proposition is
affirmative", granting that God should destroy
negatives. And then that consequent would not be
true, because it would not be. Hence, it is
manifest that the antecedent could be true without
the consequent. So the consequence is not
valid.
"
8
The argument is quite straightforward. We can spell it out
as follows:
lb) It is possible that E be true,
2b) Necessarily, if E is true, then N does not exist,
3b) Necessarily, if N does not exist, it is not true,
4b) Necessarily, if E is true, then N is not true, (2b and
3b)
5b) It is possible that E be true and N not true, (lb and
4b)
16
6b) If an inference is valid, it is not possible that thepremises be true while the conclusion is not true.
7b) N does not follow validly from E. (5b and 6b)
Call this 'argument B'
.
In the course of providing a solution to the sophism,
Buridan considers three competing accounts of validity. He
finds the first two accounts wanting, and presents
counterexamples to show this. He then goes on to affirm a
number of modal theses, in the context of which his own
solution emerges.
Before discussing the rejected accounts of validity, I
will jump ahead to Buridan' s own solution. The
presentatation of the solution is preceded by a preliminary
section containing a list of "conclusions" 9
. There are five
conclusions in this section, each a part of Buridan 's own
position
.
Buridan 's first conclusion is that there are valid
consequences in which it is possible that the antecedent is
true while the consequent is not true. There are also valid
consequences in which the antecedent could be true while the
consequent does not exist. In fact, it is the truth of the
latter claim that makes room for the truth of the former,
because Buridan holds that, for any proposition P, it is
necessary that P is true only if P exists. This is one of
17
the components of the view that I have called "Buridan's
Thesis". The supporting example Buridan gives in this
context involves (tokens of) the sentence
1.3) A man runs, so an animal runs.
He says that this is a valid consequence even though the
antecedent could be true while the consequent is, at the
same time, destroyed. The upshot of this conclusion is that
Buridan can reject (6b) in the second argument while
accepting all of the remaining premises.
The second conclusion is a strengthening of the first.
Not only is it possible, according to Buridan, that there
are valid consequences in which it is possible that the
antecedent be true while the consequent is not true, there
are also valid consequences in which it is possible that the
antecedent be true, and it is not possible that the
consequent ever be true. This is the case, he says, with S.
The antecedent of S is possible, but the consequent, N, is
not possibly true, since to be true a proposition must exist
(Buridan's Thesis), and whenever N exists there is at least
one negative proposition, so N is not then true.
Additionally, N itself is possible according to
Buridan. God could destroy all negative propositions. So,
there is some proposition that is itself both possible and
18
not possibly true. This is Buridan's third conclusion, and
it mandates the rejection of (8a) in the first argument.
Buridan accepts all of the remaining independent premises in
that argument
.
Note, once again, premise (6b) in the second argument.
It states a purported necessary condition for validity. In
fact, it seems to be one half of a standard modal account of
validity
:
Df i : A consequence C is valid if and only if it is not
possible for the antecedent of C to be true while the
consequent of C is not true.
In rejecting this premise, a revised account of validity
must be proposed. According to the first revised account of
validity considered by Buridan a valid consequence is valid
because the antecedent "
. . could not be true without the
truth of the consequent formed at the same time as [the
antecedent] . " Relying on the particularized notion of a
proposition described earlier, we can say that two
propositions are "formed at the same time" just in case they
both exist at that time. So, we can put the proposal like
this :
Df 2 : A consequence C is valid if and only if it is not
possible that: (i) both the antecedent and the
consequent of C exist, (ii) the antecedent of C is
true and (iii) the consequent of C is not true.
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Buridan finds this proposal unacceptable. Its
inadequacy is a consequence of the conclusions we have
already discussed. Consider some token C of the following:
1.4) No proposition is affirmative, so a stick is in the
corner
.
There seems to be no reason at all to say that C is a valid
consequence. Yet Df 2 , together with the conclusions, yields
the result that it is. Necessarily, if both the antecedent
and consequent of C exist, then there is at least one
affirmative proposition, namely the consequent of C. So, it
is impossible that (i) both the antecedent and consequent of
C exist, and (ii) the antecedent of C is true. But, by the
familiar rule of modal inference:
1.5) -iOP => -iO(P & Q)
it then follows that it is impossible that (i) both the
antecedent and consequent of C exist, (ii) the antecedent of
C is true, and (iii) the consequent of C is not true. Thus,
Df 2 is satisfied, to its discredit.
The problem for Buridan, then, is to provide an
acceptable account of validity. I will not discuss his
proposal here, because it involves issues that do not have
counterparts in the contemporary version of Buridanism which
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is my main topic. I would like, now, to turn to that
contempory version.
1 • 3 Buridanism - The Contemporary Clasp
Buridan's views, while interesting in their own right,
may seem to depend in an essential way on the particularized
notion of the proposition found in medieval logical theory.
In contemporary logic, it is customary to distinguish
between sentences, their tokens, and abstract propositions
which are expressed by those sentences on occasions of
utterance. Propositions are often seen as abstract objects
par excellence and as such exempt from the vicissitudes of
contingent temporal existence.
Things are not quite so neat, though. Under the
influence of David Kaplan, Saul Kripke and others, many
philosophers now take seriously the idea of a singular
proposition - a proposition in which ordinary mortal
individuals are somehow involved as constituents, "trapped
in the proposition" in Kaplan's phrase 10 . And, if some
constituent of a proposition is a contingent being, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the proposition is itself a
contingent being.
This highly impressionistic picture needs to be
sharpened. Such will be the aim of Chapters Three and Four.
For now, though, I would like to offer a preliminary account
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of singular propositions and tins way in which their
existence may lead to a contemporary version of Buridanism.
What follows here is not an attempt at a rigorous account of
the nature of singular propositions, nor a defense of their
claim to existence. It is just an initial sketch.
Kaplan has argued 11 that names and indexical pronouns
function semantically as devices of direct reference. A
directly referential singular term is perhaps best
understood as a term whose semantic value is simply its
referent. Directly referential singular terms may be
contrasted with other singular terms, such as definite
descriptions like "the current Attorney General", whose
semantic value seems to be more closely akin to a property.
If we regard the semantic value of a term as the
semantic input provided by that term, on a given occasion of
its use in a sentence, toward the determination of a
proposition, then we may picture the difference between
singular propositions and other propositions by appealing to
a structural model. The proposition expressed by "Reno is
smiling" may be represented by the ordered pair:
<S
,
r>
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where r is Janet Reno, the woman herself and not a
representation of her.
How the proposition expressed by "The current Attorney
General is smiling" is to be represented depends on the
correct semantic analysis of definite descriptions. Here is
one currently popular account. Words like 'the', 'an',
'many', 'few', 'all', 'some' etc. are determiners. Their
semantic values are functions from properties to functions
from properties to propositions. So, the definite
description in the given sentence may be thought of as
determining a complex:
<3, F>
in which F is the property of being the current Attorney
General, and S is a function, of the kind described above,
and that is the semantic value of 'the'
.
The whole
sentence, then, expresses a proposition with the structure
«$, F>, S>.
In this proposition, the components are all properties or
fuctions of some kind. No individual plays any role.
Singular propositions seem to be required, not just for
the semantic analysis of sentences containing names and
indexical pronouns, but also for the analysis of sentences
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scope of
involving quantification over variables within the
modal operators and other operators. We often have need to
distinguish claims like the first de re claim below from
those like the second de dicto assertion:
1.6) The current Attorney General could have failed to be an
Attorney General
1.7) It could have been that the current Attorney General
was not
an Attorney General.
On a strict reading, the first says of the person who in
fact is Attorney General, Janet Reno, that she could have
failed to be Attorney General. Many philosophers, myself
included, would accept this claim. The second sentence
attributes possibility to a circumstance that is logically
impossible, and the sentence is thus false.
The difference between these two can be represented
structurally as the difference between
1.8) <<$, F>
,
G>, and
1.9) <0, «S, F> , H»
where G is the property of possibly not being an Attorney
General, and H is the property of not being Attorney
General. Now, it seems as though there is some relationship
between G and H. If we take possibility to be a property of
propositions and extend the structural metaphor to cover not
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just propositions, but properties as well, then we might
represent G as the structure
<0, <H, x>>
in which <H, x> is a structure that determines a singular
proposition when the placeholder x is replaced with an
individual. Then the proposition (1.8) above may then be
said to be true partly in virtue of the fact that the
singular proposition <0, <H, r>> is true.
Consider now a proposition such as the proposition that
Quine does not exist (this particular proposition will be
prominently featured in what is to come)
. If the above
story of singular propositions is roughly correct than this
proposition is a singular proposition representable as
something like:
<N0T
,
<EXISTS
,
Quine>>
where the second term of the ordered pair that is the second
term of the main pair is Quine himself. Now surely Quine is
as contingent as you or I, and so could fail to exist. If
that were the case, it seems plain that the embedded ordered
pair, and thus the whole ordered pair, would also fail to
exist. (How could the embedded pair exist, if Quine did
not?. Would it be an ordered pair with a different second
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element? That seems counterintuitive. Would it be an
ordered pair with no second element? - Surely a
contradictory notion. Would it be an ordered pair with a
second element that does not exist? - Not an actualistic
notion)
.
Since Quine is contingent, though, this proposition is
one that is possible. But, if we assume that a proposition
cannot be true if it does not exist then it seems that this
proposition could not be true. It would be true only if
Quine did not exist. But, if Quine did not exist, it would
not exist, and so would not be true. We can use these ideas
to generate an argument against a modernized version of (8a)
in Section II, that is, an argument that shows that there
are propositions that are possible, but not possibly such
that they are true:
Argumen t C
(lc) That Quine does not exist is possible,
(2c) Necessarily, if Quine does not exist, then that Quine
does not exist does not exist,
(3c) Necessarily, if that Quine does not exist does not
exist, then that Quine does not exist is not true,
(4c) Necessarily, if Quine does not exist then that Quine
does not exist is not true, (from 2c and 3c)
(5c) Necessarily, if Quine exists, then that Quine does not
exist is not true,
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not exist is not true,(6c) Necessarily, that Quine does(from 4c and 5c)
(7c) It is not possible that that Quine does not exist is
true, (from 6c)
(8c) That Quine does not exist is possible, and it is not
possible that that Quine does not exist is true,
(from lc and 7c)
(9c) There is a proposition P such that P is possible and it
is not possible that P is true. (From 8c, by EG)
Very similar arguments can be given for the conclusions
that there are propositions P such that P is possible, but
it is not necessary that P is possible, and that there are
propositions P such that P is necessary, but it is not
necessary that P is necessary. At this point, I will leave
the detailed construction of these arguments to the reader,
although they will be presented less formally in Chapter
Five; they involve modified versions of premise (3c)
,
making
reference to possibility and necessity rather than truth.
What are the controversial independent premises in the
above argument? I believe that only premises (2c) and (3c)
are seriously open to doubt. Premise (3c) is an instance of
one component of what I have called 'Buridan's Thesis’ . The
three components are as follows:
BT X : Necessarily, for any proposition P, necessarily, if P
is necessary, then P exists,
BT 2 : Necessarily, for any proposition P, necessarily, if P
is possible, then P exists,
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BT 3 : Necessarily, for any proposition P, necessarily if pis true, then P exists,
These claims will be the main topic of Chapter Five. The
other controversial premise, (2c), may be viewed as a
consequence of two distinct claims:
Q. That Quine does not exist is a singular proposition
with Quine as a constituent.
DEP : Necessarily, for any singular proposition P with
constituent c, necessarily, if p exists then c exists.
The latter claim, which I call the Dependency Thesis, may be
taken as saying that singular propositions are ontologically
dependent on their constituents. The former claim, Q,
follows from the thesis:
DRN : Necessarily, for any sentence S containing a use of
some proper name N, the proposition expressed by S,
in a context of use in which N refers to some thing x,
is a singular proposition with x as a constituent.
And, DRN and DEP have a further consequence which I will
refer
to as N-dependency
:
N-DEP : Necessarily, for any sentence S containing a use of
some proper name N, the proposition expressed by S,
in a context of use in which N refers to some thing
x, is ontologically dependent on x.
These claims will be the focus of Chapters Three and Four.
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1 • 4 Technical Preliminaries
Much of the following discussion will make reference to
the formal language of first order quantified modal logic,
ML, and the standard semantics for that language, usually
referred to as possible worlds semantics
.
Actually,
possible worlds semantics is not a single interpretive
technique, but a family of closely related techniques. Here,
I will adopt a method essentially due to Kripke 12
,
but I
also will use the Kripke-style semantics as a basis for
comparison with other semantic frameworks. I will then go
on to show how to generate a sort of object language
representation of possible worlds semantics by translation
of the sentences of ML into the classical first order
language of extensional world theory.
1.4.1 The Language of ML
Syntax
The vocabulary of ML consists of:
a) proposition letters
b) truth functional connectives
>
/ & , V, o.
c) predicate letters
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d) terms
i) constants
a, b, c, a
x , b x , c lt a 2 , b2 , c 2/ ...
ii) variables
^
' y* ^i' yi / ^ 1 , x2 , y2; z 2/ . .
.
e) quantifiers
V, 3
f) modal operators
,
0
g) parentheses
(, )
An expression of ML is any finite sequence of symbols drawn
from the vocabulary of ML. An expression E of ML is a
formula of ML if and only if E is an element of the smallest
set F such that:
1) every proposition letter is an element of F,
2) for every predicate letter ^ with superscript i, and
any terms t lf t 2 , ..., t ±/ t 2 ... t ±] is an element of
F,
3) if A is an element of F, then [->A] is an element of F,
4) if A and B are elements of F, then [(A & B)~|, ["(A V B)~|,
f (A => B)] and [(A = B)] are elements of F,
5) if A is an element of F, then [Da] and [~0a] are elements
of F
,
6) if A is an element of F, and v is a variable, then |~3vA]
and [VvA] are elements of F.
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An expression of the form [3v] or [Vv] is called a quantifier
phrase (or just a quantifier, for short), and v is called
the variable of that phrase. If A is a formula, then for
any occurrence of the formula [3vA~\ or [VvA], the occurrence
of A within that occurrence of the formula is called the
scope of the corresponding occurrence of quantifiers [3v]
and [Vv], respectively. An occurrence of a variable v is
bound if and only if it is either the variable of an
occurrence of a quantifier, or it lies within the scope of
an occurrence of a quantifier and v is the variable of that
quantifier occurrence. An occurrence of a variable that is
not bound is said to be free. A sentence is a formula that
contains no free occurrences of any variable.
Semantics
In what follows, let F be the set of formulas of ML, C
the set of constants of ML, P the set of predicate letters
of ML and Z the set of variables of ML. T, the set of
terms, is then C u Z. We set A = F u C u P, and r = A u Z.
Let an ML-model be a sequence <W, a, R, D, d, V> such
that W and D are non-empty sets, a is a member of W, R is a
subset of W X W, d is a function that assigns a subset of D
to each element of W, and V is a function such that: (a) the
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domain of V is A X w, and (b) V satisfies the following
further conditions:
i) For every formula A of ML and every w in W V(A w )
1 or V (A, w) = 0.
, y , , -
ii) For every predicate letter ^ and w in W, V(Jri
, w) is
a subset of D 1
,
and for all w' in W, V(Jri w) =
V(J^, w' ) ,
iii
)
For every constant c, and w in W, V(c, w) is a member
of D, and for all w' in W, V(c, w) = V(c, w').
Define a V - completion to be a function v such that (a)
the domain of v is r X W, (b) v(5, w) = V(5, w) for all 5 e
A and (c) v(z, w) e D, for each variable z in Z
. Two V-
completions v and v' are z-variant if and only if v(y, w) =
V (y, w) for every y e r save perhaps the variable z. V-
completions are required to meet the following requirements
iv) For every predicate letter ^rL
,
terms tj,....,^, and
world w, v{\^ t^.-.ti], w) = 1 if and only if
<v(t 1( w ) . . . , v ( t i
,
w) > e v (&
,
w)
,
v) For all formulas A and B of ML and every w in W:
v([->A], w) = 1 if and only if v(A, w) = 0,
v([A&B~|, w) = 1 if and only if v(A, w) = 1 and
v(B, w) = 1,
v([aVb], w) = 1 if and only if v(A, w) = 1 or v(B, w)
= 1
,
v([A=>B~|, w) = 1 if and only if v(A, w) = 0 or v(B, w)
= 1
,
v([~A=B], w) = 1 if and only if v(A, w) = v(B, w)
,
vi) For every formula A in ML and every w in W,
(a) v([Da], w) = 1 if and only if for every w' in W
such that <w, w’> e R, v(A, w') =1, and
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(b) v([OA], w) = 1 if and only if for some w' in W
such that <w
,
w'> 6 R, v(A, u) = 1,
vii) For every formula A and variable z, v([3zAl, w) = 1 if
and only if there is a V-completion v* such that v and
v' are z-variant, and v' (z, w) e d(w) and v 1 (A, w)
1 /
viii
)
For every formula A and variable z, v([VzA~], w) = 1 if
and only if for every V-completion v' such that v and
v' are z-variant and v'(z, w) e d(w), v 1 (A, w) = 1.
Finally, we incorporate one last requirement, relating the
valuation function V to its V-completions
:
ix) For every formula A and world w, V(A, w) = 1 if and only
if, for each V-completion v, v(A, w) =1.
We now define the following terms: For any ML-model M
with value assignment V and actual world a, a sentence A is
true in M if and only if V(A, a) = 1. A sentence A of ML is
valid if and only if it is true in every ML-model M.
Very often, presentations of possible worlds semantics
are accompanied by a remark such as: "The set W is to be
regarded intuitively as the set of possible worlds". Yet,
it is important to notice that any non-empty set may be the
first term in a model.
To add identity to our language, we introduce the
symbol '=' to our stock of two-place predicates, to be
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written between two terms. We add to the semantics the
following interpretation rule:
x) V(=, w) = the set of ordered pairs (x, y) such that
X and y are in D and x = y.
1.4.2 World Theory
I will be addressing questions concerning the adequacy
of possible worlds semantics in providing a truth-functional
semantics for modal discourse. In arriving at a clear and
precise formulation of these questions, it will often be
helpful to have an alternative method for representing
possible worlds semantics, the method provided by
extensional world theory (EWT) . Rather than giving truth
conditions for ML in a metalanguage, it is possible to give
translations of ML sentences into a first order language.
We arrive at essentially the same account, purified of
extraneous metalinguistic elements.
The language of Extensional World Theory, LEWT , is a
classical first order language with a distinguished one-
place predicates 'I' and a distinguished two-place predicate
'R'. In addition, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the n-place predicate letters of ML and the n+1-
place predicate letters of Le^. It is assumed that the
proposition letters of ML are 0-place predicate letters.
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Finally, there are two sorts of variables: a set of
i n(^ividual variables V, and a set of world variables W
Translation from ML into Lg^ is accomplished by use of
the following rewrite rules. ML sentences are first mapped
to intermediate forms containing superscripts. Successive
applications of the rewrite rules results in all
superscripts eventually being purged.
A - ( A) a
(
-|A) w -» - ( A) w
(A & B) w - ( A) w & (B) w
(A V B) w - ( A) w V (B) w
(A ^ B) w - ( A) w o (B) w
(A = B) w - ( A) w = (B) w
(3vA) w - 3v ( Ivw & (A) w )
( VvA
)
w
- Vv(Ivw ^ ( A) w )
(OA) w - Vw' (Rww' o ( A) w )
,
where w
'
variable
.
is a new world
(0A) W - 3w’ (Rww 1 & ( A) w )
,
where w’
variable
is a new world
( Ft
x ,
... / tn )
w
- (Ft,, tn , w)
( A) w -» Aw, for atomic A.
It is easy to see what the intended interpretations of the
language of extensional world theory are supposed to be.
Every ML-model M generates a corresponding interpretation I M
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variables V
for world theory. The range of the individual
is the domain of the model M. The range of the world
vaiables W is the set of possible worlds of M. The
interpretation of a constant of L,^ is just that element of
D in M that is the interpretation of the corresponding
constant in ML. The interpretation of ' R' in EWT is the set
°f all ordered pairs in R in M. The interpretation of 'I'
in EMT will be the set of all ordered pairs <x, w> such that
w E W in M and x e d(w) in M. Finally, since for any
predicate letter Fn+1 in EWT there is a corresponding
predicate letter in ML, the interpretation of Fn+1 will be
the set of n+1 tuples <xlr ... xn , w> such that <xx , . . . xn> e
w) in M.
We can then say that a sentence of ML is true in an ML-
model M if and only if its LEWT translation is true on the
corresponding first order interpretation IM . An ML sentence
will be valid if and only if its LEWT translation is true on
every interpretation IM corresponding to a ML-model M.
1.4.3 Intensional Logic
At certain points, I will need to provide
formalizations in a higher order intensional language. In
fact, the ability to distinguish between a mistaken first
order claim and a similar but correct higher order claim
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will turn out to be philosophically crucial. it matters
little for the purpose of this thesis which higher order
intensional language is used. Current studies of
intensional logic, predication theory and property theory
have yielded a number of interesting candidates. I will
employ a version of ramified type theory developed by
Richmond Thomason 13 :
The vocabulary of the theory begins with ML, but adds a
set of predicate variables and a set of proposition
variables. In addition, we add the symbol 'X' and the
square brackets 1 [
' and ' ] '
.
We extend the formation rules
in the following way:
7) if A is a formula of MLRT, and X is any variable at all,
either individual variable, predicate variable, or
proposition variable, then [3XA] and [VXA] are
formulas of MLRT,
8) if A is a formula of MLRT, and X is any variable at all,
either individual variable, predicate variable, or
proposition variable, then |”(AX) [A]] is a formula of
MLRT.
Throughout this study, type distinctions will be suppressed,
so long as this leads to no confusion. The semantics for
the theory is briefly described in the Appendix.
1 . 5 Theories of Possible Worlds
Contemporary philosophical discussion of modality is
interwoven with commentary, speculation and theories about
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possible worlds. It often seems to be regarded as an
uncontroversial matter that there are possible worlds of
some kind, and that, without really settling the question as
to what they are, modal talk can be traded in
unproblematically for possible worlds talk. It is also
sometimes taken for granted that, whatever possible worlds
turn out to be, they will satisfy one version or another of
EWT
.
That the existence of possible is problematic will
emerge later. For now, I would like to raise the issue of
what is minimally assumed by the usual talk of possible
worlds. Among those who believe in possible worlds, there
is a small core of agreement about their relation to
modality. The most important elements of this core are:
MWl ) For every proposition P, P is possible if and only if
P is true relative to some world w.
MW2) For every proposition P, P is necessary if and only if
P is true relative to every world w.
MW3 ) For every proposition P, P is true if and only if P is
true relative to every/ the actual world.
These three theses give the desired results that every
necessary proposition is true, and every true proposition is
possible. They fail to capture a good number of fundamental
modal principles, though. For instance, we know that if a
necessary proposition strictly implies some other
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proposition, then that other proposition is necessary as
well. This principle corresponds to the axiom K from normal
systems of modal logic
:
K: D(A ^ B) 3 (Da 3 QB) .
We can account for this modal fact by adding the following
closure condition to the account of possible worlds:
MW4) For all propositions P and Q, if p strictly implies Q,
then P is true relative to a world w only if Q is true
relative to w.
Condition (MW4), along with the first three conditions,
requires that possible worlds be consistent: that no
possible world is such that some proposition and its
negation are both true relative to it. To see this, suppose
that, for some proposition A, both A and ->A are true
relative to some world w. The proposition A 3 (-iA 3 (a &
-|A) ) is necessary, and so by (MW2), it is true relative to
w. Then, by two applications of (MW4 ) , the proposition (A &
-'A) is true relative to w. But, (A & ~^A) is not possible
and so, by (MW1), it is not true relative to any world.
Contradiction
.
Condition (MW4) also gives us one half of each of the
two duality theses (Dl) and (D2):
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(Dl.l) For every proposition P, if P i s possible, then -p isnot necessary.
(D2.1) For every proposition P, if p is necessary, then ipis not possible.
To prove (Dl.l), suppose some proposition A is possible.
Then by (MW1) A is true relative to some world w, and by
consistency
->A is not true relative to w. So vA is not true
relative to every world, and by (MW2)
,
->A is not necessary.
The proof of (D2.1) is similar and is left to the reader.
The four conditions already specified will not yield us
the converses of (Dl.l) and (D2.1):
(D1.2) For every proposition P, if -.p is not necessary, then
P is possible.
(D2.2) For every proposition P, if -.p is not possible, then
P is necessary.
The simplest and most natural additional constraint to add
is the maximality condition:
(MW5) For every proposition P and world w, either P or -ip is
true relative to w.
Consider, now, (D1.2)
. Let A be an arbitrary
proposition such that ->A is not necessary. Then by (MW2),
for some world w, ->A is not true relative to w. But, by
(MW5), A is true relative w and so A is possible. Again,
the proof of the converse of (D2.1) is similar.
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It may escape notice that we do not need the maximality
condition to generate the full duality principles. We can
get by with these weaker conditions:
(MW6) For every proposition P, if, for every world w, P is
not true relative to w, then, for every world w, -ip is
true relative to w.
(MW7) For every proposition P, if, for some world w, P is
not true relative to w, then for some world w
' ,
-ip is
true relative to w '
.
Here is one way to see that (MW6) and (MW7), while jointly
weaker than (MW5), are strong enough to generate the full
duality principles: Let a world be any proposition that is
possible, and say that a given proposition is true relative
to such a world just in case the world strictly implies that
proposition. Then (MW1) through (MW4), (MW6 ) and (MW7)
hold, but (MW5) does not. Still, the full duality
principles follow.
Although (MW6) and (MW7) are together weaker than
(MW5), they are less natural. And, virtually all
metaphysicians who have defended the existence of possible
worlds have accepted the stronger condition (MW5 ) . Hence, I
will include it in my grouping of the most fundamental
principles about possible worlds.
I also will include one further assumption that is
widely accepted: the principles (MW1) through (MW5) are not
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just true but necessarily true. In fact I will adopt a
slightly stronger version of this claim. Rather than simply
including the claim that (MW1)
,
for example, is necessary, I
will adopt:
(MW1
' ) Necessarily, for every proposition P, necessarily
P is possible if and only if p is true relative to
some possible world w.
and similar reformulations of (MW2) and MW3 ) . To state
these revised versions of (MW1) through (MW5), it will be
useful to employ some symbolizations. We use the variables
w, w'
,
w' ' etc. to range over worlds, the expression 'Aw' to
indicate that w is actual, the expression 'TMP) ' to
indicate that P is true, and 'T(P,w)' to indicate that P is
true relative to w. Then we have:
(MWl
' ) DVPCKOP = 3wT ( P , w ) )
(MW2 ' ) VPD(DP = VwT ( P , w ) )
(MW3 ' ) DVpDCTMP) s T(P, ( ( lw) Aw) )
(MW4 ' ) VPVQ{D ( P =) Q) o Vw(T(P,w) 3 T(Q,w))}
(MW5 ' ) nVPVw(T(P,w) V T ( ~>P , w) )
I call the conjunction of (MWl 1 ) through (MW5 1 ) the
minimal theory of possible worlds (MWT) . We can compare the
minimal theory with a family of theories that go
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significantly beyond it, the extensional world theories of
the previous section.
Consider the sentence
1.10) It is possible that it is possible that 2+2 = 4.
We may symbolize this sentence as
1.10s) OOP.
From (1.10s), we get by an application of
(MWl )
:
1.11) 3wT( [OP]
,
w)
By (MW2
' )
,
OA is strictly equivalent to
1.12) 3w'T(P, w' )
.
We obtain from (MW4
'
)
that some proposition is true relative
a world, if and only if any strictly equivalent proposition
is also true relative to that world. So, (1.11) and (1.12)
yield
(1.13s) 3wT ( [ 3w ' T ( P , w ' ) ] , w
)
And, going back to English (1.13s) says
(1.13) There is a world w such that it is true relative to w
that: there is a world w' such that P is true
relative to w'
.
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Standard extensional world theories provide for a
further expansion of (1.13) and other formulas by specifying
a set of rules for translating the predicate 'T'. One such
set of rules is described in the previous subsection, if we
let ' T (A, w)
'
be interpreted as the expansion (A) w
.
Applying these rules to (1.10s) we get:
(1.14) 3w ( Raw & 3w' (Rww' & Pw)
)
and, since the language of WT is just a classical first
order language, (1.14) is equivalent to
(1.15) 3w3w
'
( Raw & ( Rww ' & Pw
' ) )
.
which implies
(1.15) 3w ' Pw
'
,
and, (1.15) is the EWT rendering of:
(1.16) 3w'T(P, w) '
.
So, by using the EWT to expand MWT
,
(1.16) turns out to be a
consequence of (1.13s)
We can see how strong extensional world theories are in
comparison to the minimal theory by considering one kind of
modalist interpretation of the two-place predicate ' T' of
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MWT. The sort of modalist account I have in mind takes
worlds themselves to be propositions, and interprets the
relation of a proposition being true relative to a world as
an entailment relation. More specifically, let a world be a
proposition Q with these features: (i) it is maximal - for
every proposition P, either Q strictly implies P or Q
strictly implies the negation of P, and (ii) it is
consistent - it is not the case that, for some proposition
P, Q strictly implies both P and its negation. Finally, we
interpret
' T ( A, w) ' as 1 (W 3 A) '
.
This version of Modalism seems to satisfy the minimal
conception of possible worlds, if we assume the existence of
maximal propositions. But, it does not by itself produce an
extensional world theory. Modalism gives the following as
its translation of ( 1 . 11 ), and thus, ( 1 . 10 s):
(1.17) 3WD(W => 3W ' (W ' 3 P) ) .
But, in no plausible higher order modal logic would it be a
consequence of (1.17) that
(1.18) 3W'D(W
'
o p) ) .
So, there is no basis in MWT alone for the claim that (1.16)
is a consequence of (1.13s). That there are possible worlds
of any kind is a problematic ontological claim. But, the
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lesson here is that the positing of the kinds of possible
worlds assumed to exist by standard extensional world
theories must be regarded as even more problematic.
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CHAPTER 2
ACTUALISM
In recent philosophical discussions of modality, one
encounters a variety of theses called "Actualism"
. And,
/
each version of Actualism stands opposed to a contrary
thesis called " Possibilism"
. The ways in which the
^ fsnent versions of Actualism and Possibilism are
louicQ-lly related are not always immediately evident.
Still, it is my contention that all of the many varieties of
Actualism are like branches of a single tree; each a logical
consequence, a natural extent ion or an alternative
formulation of a fairly small core of doctrine.
This chapter is concerned primarily with formulation
and clarification. The aim is simply to state the core
doctrine as directly as possible, and to clarify its
intended content by showing what it does and does not
entail. Actualism itself will be carefully distinguished
from some specific variants of Actualism, and compared with
its main possibilist alternatives. Some simple criticisms
of Actualism will be examined and rejected. Finally, I will
formulate a problem concerning the relationship between
Actualism and extensional world theories.
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2 . 1 What Actual i sm Ts
The core doctrine is what I will call Simple Actualism
:
ACT: Everything there is actually exists.
According to Simple Actualism, there are no things that do
not actually exist. It is an immediate consequence of ACT
that there are no possibilia - individuals that do not
actually exist but which could exist. Nor are there any
impossiblia - individuals that do not actually exist and
which could not exist. It is of course true in one sense
that there could have existed things - like golden mountains
- that do not actually exist. But, according to ACT, this
does not imply that there are certain things that possibly
exist, but which do not actually exist. Now, while I
suppose that it is logically consistent to believe in
impossiblia, but not in possibilia, no philosopher that I am
aware of in fact holds this view. In the remainder of this
discussion, the focus will be on whether or not there are
possibilia. The denial of ACT in conjunction with the view
that there are possibilia I will call "Simple Possibilism"
:
POS : There are things that possibly exist, but which do not
actually exist.
I will adopt the familiar technique of treating the
modal adverbs "possibly" and "actually" as sentence
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operators. To say, for example, that x is possibly F is
just to say that it is possible that x is F, or it is
possibly the case that x is F. So ACT says that everything
there is such that it is actually the case that it exists;
and POS says that there are things such that (a) it is
possible that those things exist but (b) it is not actually
the case that those things exist.
ACT is a logical consequence of two related doctrines:
ACTa: Everything there is exists
ACTb : Everything that exists actually exists.
If one is to deny ACT, one must reject at least one of ACTa
and ACTb. Possibilists who deny ACTa are Meinongian
Possibilists
,
1 and those who deny ACTb are Lewisean
Possibilists
. The motivation for this terminology will be
made clear shortly.
ACT is sometimes expressed by saying that there are no
things that are not actual. This is fine as long as one
attends to a possible source of confusion. Many actualists
say that there are propositions or states of affairs or
circumstances or situations that are not actual. They do
not mean that there are propositions etc. that do not
actually exist. Rather, they mean that there are
propositions that are not actually true, or states of
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affairs that do not actually obtain. "Actual" is being used
here to express a property of propositions or states of
affairs. In philosophical discussions of modality, though,
one more commonly finds "actual" used as a predicate of
individuals, so that to say that x is actual is to say that
x actually exists. In this sense, of course, the actualist
believes that all entities are actual.
Some otherwise actualistic philosophers hold a view
that one might call "mitigated platonism"
. They hold that
certain "abstract" entities - such as properties, sets,
propositions and states of affairs - do not exist, but that
there nevertheless are such things
.
2 These philosophers
differ on the one hand from Meinongian Possibilists in that
they do not believe in merely possible or impossible
individuals
. They would say that a modified version of ACT
is true: one that replaces the quantifier phrase
"everything" with "every individual". It is arguable that
such views are closer in spirit to contemporary Actualism
than to the usual forms of anti-Actualism
. To keep things
simple, I will ignore this complication. Most of the
actualist philosophers that I will consider, if they
countenance these abstract entities at all, regard them as
existing. But this issue of the status of abstract entities
cuts across the dispute about Actualism vs. Possibilism.
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If we accept the principle that some individual x is
actually F if and only if x is F in the actual world, then
ACT has an important additional consequence, which I will
call "Simple World Actualism"
:
ACTw : Everything there is exists in the actual world
.
3
Now, it would seem that ACT is an important
metaphysical thesis, and that, if it is true, it is not just
a contingent fact about this world. So its necessitation
must also be true. But, a strange thing happens when we
formulate this necessitation:
ACT: Necessarily, everything there is actually exists.
As already indicated, this claim may plausibly be
interpreted as false, for it is certainly the case that
there could have existed things that don't actually exist.
I could have had more children than I do, there could have
been more planets than there are, etc. Now, the actualist
is going to want to construe actualism as an important
metaphysical thesis, and hence as a necessary truth. So
this involves distinguishing (at least) two senses of
"actually". Let's use "actually!" for the sense on which
the actualist thinks QACT is true, and "actually2 " for the
sense in which it is not.
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There have been several different proposals for
formulating this distinction. Probably the most popular
actualistic treatment construes the first operator,
"actually! <£"
,
as meaning something like "that <D is true" or
"that $ obtains" and "actually2 0" as meaning "3> is true in
a" where 'a' is a directly referential indexical term
denoting, in any possible context of use, the world that
happens to be actual world. The actualist will regard ACT
as true no matter which sense is employed for "actually"
,
but will regard QACT as true only in the first sense.
We have a similar problem with the necessitation of
ACTw
,
which will be denoted QACTw. The correct treatment
of QACTw depends in part on the specific version of
actualism under consideration. This issue will be taken up
presently as part of the examination of Plantinga's modal
metaphysics
.
The various different logical and metaphysical views
regarding modality have tended to cluster around three main
alternatives. Two of these, Actualism and Lewisean
Possibilism, are associated with definite individuals -
Alvin Plantinga and David Lewis. Other versions of
Actualism and Lewisean Possibilism have tended to be
variations on the central themes of their accounts. (Recall
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that I am using the label "Lewisean Possibilism" to cover
all versions of possibilism that deny ACTb, and not just for
the views of David Lewis himself)
. Meinongian Possibilism,
on the other hand, is a more varied and imprecisely defined
doctrine. In the next few sections, I will outline the
views of Plantinga and Lewis, and then discuss what I take
to be the two most natural versions of Meinongian
Possibilism
.
2 . 2 Plantinga on the Nature of Necessity
Alvin Plantinga’ s book The Nature of Necessity* must be
regarded as the first major effort, following the renewed
interest in modal logic in the second half of this century,
to produce a comprehensive philosophical account of
modality. Plantinga' s account is marked by two important
features. First, he accepts a "platonic" realist ontology -
one that posits properties, abstract propositions and
abstract states of affairs in addition to individuals and
sets of individuals. Second, he is a modalist; he regards
modal notions as somehow fundamental and not in need of
further analysis. I will discuss each of these features,
beginning with the former.
Plantinga has never presented his ontological views in
anything like a formal system, but he has given some fairly
comprehensive informal accounts in a number of places. 5
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There would appear to be five fundamental categories:
individuals, properties (including relations), propositions,
states of affairs, and sets. States of affairs are the
sorts of thing that either obtain or do not obtain. if a
state of affairs obtains, then it may be said to be actual.
Some actual states of affairs are necessary, and all actual
states of affairs are possible, but, among those states of
affairs that do not obtain, some are possible while some are
not. All states of affairs exist, whether they obtain or
not
.
Every state of affairs S has a complement S* : the state
of affairs that is necessarily such that it obtains just in
case S does not obtain. S is necessary just in case S* is
impossible; S is possible just in case S* is not necessary.
Propositions are "the things that are true or false,
believed, asserted, denied, entertained and the like".
Plantinga expresses some hesitancy as to whether or not
propositions and states of affairs are just the same thing,
so that being true and obtaining are just two names for the
same property. He says that he inclines toward the view
that they are different . 6 In what follows one may, without
affecting the underlying ideas, interpret the phrase "that
O" indifferently as referring to either a state of affairs
or a proposition. The term "actual" in phrases such as
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"that 0 is actual" may correspondingly be interpreted as
attributing either the property of obtaining to states of
affairs, or the property of being true to propositions.
Many would consider Plantinga to be a sort of arch-
actualist. And, indeed, Plantinga calls himself an
actualist. However, Plantinga uses "Actualism" to refer
only to the necessitation of what I have called "ACTa"
,
and
he says some things that, on their face, appear to be
inconsistent with Simple Actualism. Specifically, he says
that not everything is actual, which is about as apparently
inconsistent as you can get. So, is Plantinga an actualist
in name only?
Plantinga is an actualist. As we have already seen,
when Plantinga says that there are things that are not
actual, he means that there are states of affairs that do
not obtain, or propositions that are not true. He accepts -
at least in an informal way - the definitions of "actually^ 1
and "actually2 " that I outlined in the previous section. To
understand Plantinga' s interpretation of the second
definition, we need to say something about Plantinga'
s
notions of a (possible) world, of existing in a world and of
having a property in a world.
Plantinga does not offer any analyses of the
fundamental modal concepts of broadly logical possibility
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and necessity. Most important, he does not take these
concepts to be properly analyzable in terms of the concept
of a possible world. Nor does he offer world- theoretic
reductions of properties, propositions or states of affairs
in terms of the basic notions of an extensional world
theory. Rather, he thinks that the notion of a possible
world, and the other notions of extensional world theory,
should be understood in terms of his basic ontological
and these fundamental modal notions
.
7
A possible world, for Plantinga is a kind of state of
a^^a ^rs *
-'- s a state of affairs that is both possible and
maximal. A state of affairs S is maximal if and only if,
for every state of affairs S*, S either includes S* or
precludes S*
. S includes S* if and only if it is not
possible that S be actual and S* fail to be actual
. S
precludes S* if and only if it is not possible that both S
and S* be actual. By elementary modal reasoning, if S
precludes S*, then it includes the complement of S*; so S is
maximal if and only if, for every state of affairs S*
,
S
includes either S* or the complement of S*
.
Plantinga also gives an account of what it is for
something to have a property in a world: x has a property P
in W if and only if, necessarily, if W were actual, then x
would have P. To say that an object x exists in W is to say
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that necessarily, if w were actual then x would exist. if
existence is a property, then to say that x exists in W is
the same as saying that x has the property of existence in
W.
In section III of this chapter, we will consider some
difficulties that arise for the actualist who wishes to
avail himself of the resources of extensional world
theories, or wishes to use standard possible worlds
semantics to generate truth conditions for modal discourse.
One of these issues is raised by Plantinga. The actualist
accept that there could have been things that do not
actually exist. This claim will be rendered in EWT (with
accessibility) as:
3w(Awa & 3x ( Ixw & ^Exa)
)
which entails
3x-iExa
.
This sentence is understood by Plantinga as saying
3x->D(@ => Ex)
where @ is a propositional constant designating the actual
world-
state or world-proposition. But @ includes everything
actual
;
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something exists in <3 if and only if it exists tout court.OO
we get
3x->Ex
.
Thus EWT, together with Plantinga's account of the nature of
possible worlds, seems committed to entities that do not
exist
.
Plantinga is able to provide an interpretation of LEWT
that circumvents this problem by appealing to individual
essences
. A property F is an individual essence just in
case it is possible that there is an x such that (a)
necessarily, if x exists it exemplifies F and (b)
necessarily, if F is exemplified it is exemplified by x
alone. An individual essence of me, for instance, is a
property that I have essentially, and that could not
possibly be had by anything else. Plantinga thinks I have
many such essences: one is the property of being identical
to Kervick . There are also the a- transforms of any
properties I happen to uniquely exemplify. (There are bound
to be some such properties) . The a-transform of a property
F is the property of being F in a, where a is the actual
world. Plantinga holds that, although I may have F only
accidentally, I have the property of being F in a in every
world in which I exist.
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Whether these properties are indeed individual essences
is a deep and intricate question. But, if they are
individual essences, then Plantinga can give an
interpretation of EWT consistent with actualism. For, while
there are no individuals that do not actually exist, there
are many individual essences that are not actually
exemplified. So, instead of saying that some non-actual
individual exists in W but not a, we can say that a
corresponding individual essence is exemplified in W but not
a. And instead of saying that some non-actual individual
has F in W, we can say that a corresponding individual
essence is co-exemplified with F in W.
The adequacy of Plantinga' s scheme will be taken up
again in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. But, we may now
turn to a comparison of these views with the possibilist
alternatives
.
2 . 3 Lewis on the Plurality of Worlds
David Lewis regards it as a virtue of his account 8 that
there are no primitive modal notions. Nor is there any need
for an intensional logic. We can recast everything modal
that we want say in a classical first order language, and
the basic primitive predicates of that language can be
explicated in terms of parthood, spatiotemporal relatedness
and overall similarity.
59
Lewis's views on modality differ dramatically from
those of Plantinga. But, in one important respect Lewis and
Plantinga agree: both hold that there are no nonexistent
objects. The failure to recognize that Lewis's modal
cosmology includes only existing things has lead some
philosophers (such as William Lycan 9 ) to a serious
misunderstanding of his views, and they have produced
criticisms of Lewis's views that simply miss the point.
Sometimes, however, this misunderstanding leads to a failure
to appreciate just how extraordinary Lewis's views are.
In order to understand Lewis's account of modality, it
is best to begin with the actual world:
The world you and I inhabit is a very inclusive
thing. Every stick and every stone you have ever
seen is part of it. So, are you and I. And so
are the planet Earth, the solar system, the Milky
Way, the remote galaxies we see through
telescopes, and (if there are such things) all the
bits of empty space between the stars and
galaxies. There is nothing so far away from us as
not to be part of our world. Anything at any
distance at all is to be included. Likewise the
world is inclusive in time. No long-gone ancient
Romans, no long-gone pterodactyls, no long-gone
primordial clouds of plasma are too far in the
past, nor are the dead dark stars too far in the
future, to be part of this same world. Maybe, as
I think, the world is a big physical object; or
maybe some parts of it are entelechies or spirits
or auras or deities or other things unknown to
physics. But nothing is so alien in kind as not
to be part of our world, provided only that it
does exist at some distance and direction from
here, or at some time before or after or
simultaneous with now ." 10
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We can begin with a primitive notion of spatiotemporal
connectedness: x and y are spatiotemporally connected just
in case x is some distance from y, or x exists at a time
that is earlier, later or simultaneous with the time at
which y exists, or x exists at a spacetime location that is
remote from the spacetime location of y by some definite
spacetime interval. We assume that this relation is an
equivalence relation.
The actual world consists of me and you, and everything
that is spatiotemporally connected to us
. A world in
general is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally
connected entities: something (a) all of whose parts are
spatiotemporally connected, and (b) that has as a part
anything that is spatiotemporally connected to any other of
its parts. The most provocative feature of Lewis's account
is his claim that the actual world is not the only world
that there is - it is one of an uncountable plurality of
worlds. Real worlds, as concrete and tangible as the
universe we inhabit 11
,
not abstract world propositions,
world properties, maximal states of affairs, consistent sets
of sentences in some ideal language, etc. For any way that
any world could possibly be, he says, there is some world
that is that way. And it is a consequence of the definition
of a world that the worlds are mutually isolated - no part
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of one is spatiotemporally connected to any part of any
other world. It is around this teeming collection of
isolated worlds that Lewis builds his modal metaphysics.
Lewis
' s original presentation employs the machinery of
extensional world theory, minus the accessibility predicate,
and with the addition of a two-place predicate 'Cxy', to be
read x is a counterpart of y"
,
and a one-place predicate
Ax to be read "x is actual". The term @ is treated not as
a name or as a directly referential indexical, but as an
eliminable singular term abbreviating:
ixVy(Iyx = Ay)
;
in English. the thing that has all and only actual things
as parts "
.
The predicate 'Ax', however, is given an indexical
treatment. To say of something that it is actual is to say
that it is in this world. "This" is used here as a
demonstrative expression, so that what "this world" refers
to depends on the context in which it is being used, and
ultimately on which world that context is part of.
A possible individual is, for Lewis, any part of any
world. Any possible individual is in the world of which it
is a part. It is a consequence of his notion of a world
that no possible individual is in more than one world, since
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if any possible individual x is part of two worlds w and w'
,
then for any part y of w, and any part z of w'
, y and z are
spatiotemporally connected to x, and since spatiotemporal
connection is an equivalence relation, y and z are parts of
the same world. So, w and w ' are identical. There are some
individuals that overlap more than one world. These are
mereological sums of possible individuals from different
worlds. But these entities are not in any world, since they
themselves have spatiotemporally disconnected parts.
Since possible individuals are confined to a single
world, there is no literal transworld identity. So, we
cannot understand a sentence such as "Fa & OGa" as saying
that the thing a is in the actual world and has F there and
that very same thing is in some other world and has G there.
This is where the notion of a counterpart comes in.
Intuitively, for any possible individual x, a possible
individual y is a counterpart of x in w just in case y is in
w and resembles x more closely than any other individual in
w. Additionally, y must also "sufficiently" resemble x.
The counterpart relation is not 1-1: x may have more than
one counterpart in some worlds and no counterparts in
others. It is not transitive: y in w2 may be a counterpart
of x in w1( and z in w3 may be a counterpart of y, while z
is not a counterpart of x. And it is not symmetric: y in w2
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may sufficiently resemble x in wx , and resemble it more
closely than does anything else in w2 , while there is some
individual z in w
x that resembles y more closely than does
x. So y is a counterpart of x, but x is not a counterpart
of y
.
/
In Lewis's original presentation in "Counterpart Theory
and Quantified Modal Logic" 12
,
he provides a translation
scheme very similar to the one for standard extensional
world theory (without accessibility)
,
but differing from it
in one important respect. In standard EWT
,
there is one
translation rule for atomic formulae, and separate rules for
sentences in which the main connective is a or a ’O'
.
Lewis treats these in a combined fashion, with one rule for
all open formulas governed by a and one for all open
formulas governed by a 'O' . I will simplify the statement
of these rules by dealing only with monadic formulas.
($a) w - VvV3(I£v Sc C3a) 3 (o) v (3
)
(00a) w - 3v33(l3v & C3a & (4>) v3) .
Since this thesis presupposes Actualism, and is not
concerned with arguing for Actualism and against
Possibilism, there is no need for any extended criticism of
Lewis's views. It is enough to understand their connection
with Actualism. But, I would like to make a few comments.
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Actualists have criticized Lewis's views in many
different ways. Some criticisms deal with inadequacies in
the proposed translation schemas 13
, some deal with set-
theoretic problems connected with the size of Lewis's
universe 14
. Some deal with epistemological problems
relating to whether or not Lewis's account allows for the
fact that we have modal knowledge. But, I believe the most
fundamental criticism is simple. It has been put forward by
a number of people, but most forcefully by Peter Van
Inwagen 15
. What follows is my own formulation of that
criticism
:
There are no (earthly) 300-story buildings, but there
could have been. It is possible that there exist an x such
that x is a 300-story building. On Lewis's account, this
assertion - call it "claim 1" - is in some sense equivalent
to the claim that, while there is no 300-story in the actual
world, there is a real, fully physical, 300-story building
in some other world - in some other real, fully physical,
universe that happens not to be spatiotemporally connected
to ours. Call this second claim "claim 2".
In what sense are these two claims equivalent? Lewis
would not say that they are equivalent just because his
translation schemae manage to generate translations with the
same truth values as the originals. The suggestion seems to
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be that the second is the reason why the first is true
Now, there are many ways in which things could have been
different from the way they are. But, for at least most of
these ways, it still would have been the case that it is
possible for there to be a 300-story building. And for
Lewis, claim 2 would still be the reason why this is true.
Claim 2 is the reason why claim 1 is true in part because
claim 2 would be true whenever claim 1 is true.
The criticism, then, is just this: it seems to me that,
whether or not there is more than one world - more than one
maximal spatiotemporally connected sum of things - it is
possible for there to be only one such world, one in which
there is no 300-story building. A world like ours for
instance. But even if that were the only world, it would
still be possible for there to be a 300-story building. So,
claim 2 cannot be the reason why claim 1 is true.
Lewis and his defenders would not be convinced. He
would say that I am confused about the scope of my
quantifiers 16 . "Possibly", says he, functions both as a
quantifier over worlds, and to restrict the range of
quantifiers in its scope. So, when I say "possibly, there
is only one such world"
,
then what I mean is that there is a
world in which there is only one such world.
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All I can claim in response to this is that, whether or
not my criticism is correct, I do know which quantifiers I
am using. I am using "there is" unrestrictedly. when I say
that it is possible that there is only one such world, I
understand myself to be asserting that the proposition I
express by "there is only one such world", is metaphysically
possible. To allow "possibly" to restrict the quantifier
would not be to assert the possibility of the same
proposition I express with the unrestricted quantifier in
"there is only one such world", so I don't allow it. And
the possibility that I am asserting is not the trivial one
that means something like: if a certain kind of concrete
universe were actual, there would only be one such universe
that is part of that universe; instead it means: if a
certain kind of concrete universe were actual, there would
(unrestrictedly) be only one such universe.
There is a certain tendency in philosophy to approach
suggested analyses as follows. A proposal is made that the
sentences of one body of discourse L
x
are to be analyzed by
translating them into sentences of another body of discourse
L 2 The logical properties and relations holding among the
sentences of L
x
are more or less agreed upon, as are the
logical relations holding among the sentences in L 2 . The
theory is then evaluated on the basis of whether or not
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these logical properties are preserved under the
translation. But, we also have intuitions about the truth
conditions of the individual sentences themselves, and
sometimes the main thing wrong with the analysis is that the
translations of the analyzed sentences just are not true
under the same conditions as the analyzed sentences
themselves
.
Before going on to Meinongian possibilism, it may be
useful to introduce a piece of terminology. Following Van
Inwagen, let us call worlds of the sort that Lewis upholds
"C-worlds "
.
('C' is for 'concrete'). And let us call worlds
that are more or less like the ones Plantinga employs -
maximal states of affairs or propositions or situations or
properties - "A-worlds". ('A' is for 'abstract').
2 . 4 Meinonaian Possibilism
We now consider those versions of possibilism that deny
ACTa, that hold there really are things that do not exist.
These views come in many varieties. Many Meinongian
possibilists do not come near to accepting the whole
Meinongian ontology. But, Meinong is the most famous
defender of non-existent objects. Hence the name seems
appropriate
.
Meinong held an extremely liberal ontology of
individuals. The motivating idea (which must ultimately be
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modified to get a consistent theory) is that for any
collection of properties, there is an object that has all of
the properties in the collection. Call this 'Meinong's
Principle'. Assume that for every property F, there is at
least one property F' which is complementary to F - it is a
property such that it is not possible for something x to
exist and to have both F and F'
. As a consequence of
Meinong s principle, there are objects that have both F and
some complement of F (although none of them exist)
. Such
entities are impossible
.
If an object does not have both
some property and some complement of that property, it is
possible. As a further consequence of Meinong's Principle,
there are objects x such that, for some property F and for
some complement F' of F, x has neither F nor F'. These
objects are incomplete
.
If an object is not incomplete it
is complete
.
Only objects that are possible and complete
have the privilege of existing, but there are also some non-
existent objects that are possible and complete.
Meinongianism has been beset with logical problems.
There have been various efforts to deal with these problems.
One of the most famous, due to Russell 17
,
concerns existent
round squares. If Meinong is right, and if existence is a
property, then there are many such objects. Since they are
round squares, they are impossibles, so they don't exist.
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But, if they don't exist, in what sense can they be said to
have the property of existing? One approach would be to
deny that existence is a property. Another, developed by
Terry Parsons 18
,
is to restrict the application of Meinong's
principle to only certain properties, of which existence is
/
not one. A third approach, defended by Ed Zalta 19
,
distinguishes between exemplifying a property and encoding a
property. We may then say that the existent round square
encodes but does not exemplify existence.
Now, Meinongian possibilists may avoid some of these
problems by holding a restricted Meinongianism. They may
hold only that there are only complete and possible non-
existents. There are, then, different options that might be
taken in formulating a modal metaphysics.
The simplest strategy might be to say that there is
only one existent C-world - the actual world - and that
everything that exists exists in the actual world. But, one
might then go on to hold that there are many non-existent
possibilia that exist in many non-existent C-worlds
. To
exist in a world would then be, as for Lewis to be part of a
world. A second strategy more in the spirit of Plantinga,
would be to regard worlds as A-worlds, and to treat
existence in a world by saying that x exists in a world if
and only if the world includes the state of affairs that x
70
are non-
exists. The Meinongian may hold that there
existent possibilia that are constituents of certain
possible states of affairs, and that therefore exist in some
of these worlds.
Whether or not the technical problems with
Meinongianism can be solved, I think it is fair to say that
the reason most philosophers reject Meinongianism is that
they just don't believe that in addition, for example, to
the computer I am writing on, there really are a thousand
other computers which currently occupy the same space but
which don't exist.
2 . 5 Actualism and Possible Worlds
Talk of possible worlds, in connection with possible
worlds semantics for modal discourse, seems on its face to
involve commitment to possibilia. It seems to imply that
there are things that do not exist in the actual world, and
so there are things do not actually exist. Many actualists,
justifiably attached to these semantic techniques on account
of their usefulness for a variety of purposes, have resisted
the conclusion that this prima facia commitment is, in the
end, unavoidable. They have sought to provide an
interpretation of possible worlds talk that would allow one
to reap the benefits of possible worlds semantics without
investing in an ontology of possibilia. 20
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I believe that there is a serious problem, for the
actualist, with possible worlds semantics. There are
reasons for thinking that if actualism is true, possible
worlds semantics cannot provide an adequate truth
conditional semantics for modal discourse. I will not be
•3^1® to make the full case for this claim here. But, I
would like to describe the apparent problem and say
something about the options open to the actualist.
2.5.1 Two Jobs for Semantics
Semantics is about meaning. Whatever else it does, a
semantic theory for a natural language, or for some fragment
of that language, ought to say something about what the
sentences in that fragment mean. It is often held that the
first task is not complete unless the theory yields certain
consequences about the truth conditions of the sentences in
the fragment, at least for those sentences in the fragment
that have truth conditions 21 .
What does it mean to say that the theory entails
consequences about the truth conditions of the sentences?
And how much must it entail? One minimal constraint is
this: for every sentence S that is either true or false, the
theory should entail a true sentence of the form
S is true if and only if
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the
where the blank is filled in by some sentence of
language in which the theory is stated.
This is a very minimal condition. Assuming that "if
and only if" expresses only a material biconditional, a
theory could meet this condition by entailing such things as
"Snow is white" is true if and only if 2+2 = 4.
A theory that entails a T-sentence for each sentence in the
object language is a truth-conditional semantics
,
and a
truth conditional semantics that entails only true T-
sentences is materially adequate
. So one thing we might ask
of semantic theory is that it be a materially adequate
truth-conditional semantics.
Another aspect of meaning is manifested in the logical
properties and relations of the sentences in the language.
An adequate semantic theory should entail things about
logical consistency and inconsistency, logical consequence,
logical truth etc. Since these logical properties are
generally taken to be interdef inable
,
we need only consider
one of them. Suppose, then, that for every set r of
sentences of the object language, and single sentence S, the
theory entails either that S is a logical consequence of r
or that S is not a logical consequence of r. And suppose
that all of these entailments of the theory are correct.
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such a theory is formally adequate. So another thing „e
might ask of a semantic theory is that it be formally
adequate
.
One popular approach to semantics, model- theoretic
semantics, seeks to encompass these two tasks within one
technique. For a given language we first specify a class of
entities called models, and a set of functions called
interpretations that associate the sentences of S with
structures drawn from an arbitrary model. We use these to
define a certain relation: S is true in model M on
interpretation I. We then say S is a logical consequence of
r if and only if, for every model M and interpretation I, S
is true in M on I whenever all of the elements of r are true
in M on 1
.
22
The hope, then, is that by selecting the appropriate
interpretation, or set of interpretations, we can turn a
formally adequate model- theoretic semantics into a
materially adequate truth conditional semantics. We can do
this if there is at least one model M and interpretation I
such that, for each sentence S, S is true if and only if S
is true in M on I
. Call these intended models and intended
interpretations
.
In Chapter One, I introduced a version of possible
worlds semantics, and described the relationship between
74
this style of semantics and the language of extensional
world theories. The restrictions on the models in the
semantics correspond to non-logical axioms in the theory
(this may involve the introduction of restrictions on the
interpretation of the predicate
' Rw^ 1 for accessibility
between worlds.) Then, corresponding to the selection of a
particular interpretation function defining truth in the
model, we provide a rendering function that associates each
sentence of the object language with a sentence of LEWT .
Lewt is a classical first order language. By an
interpretation of LEWT , let us understand simply some method
of segregating the sentences of LEWT into two classes - the
true sentences and the false sentences. A classical
interpretation of that language is the sort of
interpretation familiar from the study of first-order logic.
When I speak of a particular extensional world theory T, I
mean only to refer to some set of sentences of LEWT . Such a
theory may be specified by taking it to be the theorems or
first order consequences of some set of non-logical axioms
in Lewt , but it need not be.
So, the parallel between possible worlds semantics and
EWT works this way: A particular extensional world theory T
corresponds to a class of models in possible worlds
semantics; a rendering function taking sentences of the
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primary modal discourse into L^ corresponds to an
interpretation function in possible worlds semantics; and,
the intended models of possible worlds semantics correspond
to certain classical interpretations of the first-order
language LEWT . 23
Let me introduce one further, more informal, notion.
The language LEWT is generally taken to have a particular
sort of intended interpretation. The world variables range
over worlds, the term 'a' refers to the actual world, the
relation expressed by ' Ixw' is the relation x has to w if it
exists in w, and the individual variables and constants of
the Lewt stand for the same individuals as the variables and
constants they render. Let's say that an interpretation
that interprets the language in something close to this
intuitive way is a face-value interpretation
. If Simple
World Actualism is true, then everything exists in the
actual world. So, say that an interpretation of is an
actualistic face-value interpretation just in case it is a
face-value interpretation that makes ' (x)Ixa' come out true.
Now, I want to distinguish four different attitudes one
might have toward a proposed rendering of the sentences of
primary modal discourse into LEWT . That is, these are four
different claims that might be made in defense of
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extensional world theories. In the following, let 'MD'
stand for the primary language of modal discourse.
The First Claim
One account of the usefulness of extensional world
theory is that it takes logical truths of MD into truths of
some extensional world theory T. So, there will be an
isomorphism between the relation of logical consequence in
MD and material consequence, relative to T, in
la. there is a theory T such that, for every sentence S and
set of sentences r of MD, S is a logical consequence of r
if and only if t(S) is a material consequence in T of
t (D .
To say that t(S) is a material consequence of t(T) in T is
just to say that, if every element of t(D is in T, then
t (S) is in T.
Since an interpretation of T is just a segregation of T
into two classes of sentences, the true ones and the false
ones, then (1) is equivalent to:
lb. there is an interpretation I of Le^ such that, for every
sentence S and set of sentences r of MD, S is a logical
consequence of r if and only if t(S) is an I-consequence
of t (T)
.
where to say that t(S) is an I-consequence of t(D is just
to say that if all of the members of t(D are true on I,
then so is t(S). The requirement might be strengthened
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somewhat
.
One might require the interpretation I to be
classical
:
lc . there is a classical interpretation I of LEWT suchor every sentence S and set of sentences r of MD
a logical consequence of r if and only if t(S) is
I
-consequence of t (r)
.
that
,
S is
an
The claims in this first group are extremely trivial,
la and lb are automatically satisfied by letting T be
determined as the range of any 1-1 rendering function from
the logical truths of MD into LEWT . lc is slightly less
trivial, but it will be satisfied so long as the range of
logical truths of MD forms a classically consistent set.
The triviality can be lessened by making a stronger
claim. One might require truth preservation across the
fooard, so that all truths of MD, logical as well as non-
logical
,
go to truths of T:
The Second Claim
2. there is a theory T such that, for every sentence S of
MD, S is true if and only if t(S) is true in T.
This is equivalent to:
2a. there is an interpretation I of such that, for every
sentence S of MD, S is true if and only if t(S) is true
on I
.
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And, once again we have the strengthening to classical
interpretations
:
2b. there is a classical interpretation I of suchfor every sentence S of MD, S is true if and only
t ( S
)
is true on I
.
that
,
if
This is the usual benefit that is claimed for extensional
world theories. A sentence such as:
SI: It is possible that: there is a philosopher, but Quine
is not a philosopher.
is rendered as:
S2 : There is a world w such that: there is an x such that x
is in w and x is a philosopher in w and Quine is not a
philosopher in w.
it is claimed that both SI and S2 are true. But, notice
that claim 2 would also be satisfied, vis-a-vis SI, if SI
were rendered as
:
S3: There is a sequence of numbers S such that: there is an
x such that x is a term in S and x is the fifteenth term
in S and 17 is not a term in S.
This claim is obviously true. If all that is required of
the renderings is that it takes truths into truths, then S3
does just as well as S2 . This suggests that we might be
able to get a truth-preserving rendering by finding set-
theoretic surrogates for the individuals and properties
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referred to in modal discourse. We let the predicate
that renders "x is a philosopher" be "x is the fifteenth
term m S"
,
and we let individuals like Quine be denoted by
natural numbers
.
And again, on the assumption that the range of the
rendering forms a consistent set, there is bound to be some
interpretation that preserves truth, since every consistent
set has a model. One may then want to strengthen 2 to:
The Third Claim
3. there is a face-value interpretation I of such that,
for every sentence S of MD, S is true if and only if t(S)
is true on I.
This claim is vaguer than the others, but seems more
difficult to fulfill. Many philosophers seem to believe
something like the third claim. There is one stronger claim
that might be made
:
The Fourth Claim
4 . there is an actualistic face-value interpretation I of
Lewt such that, for every sentence S of MD, S is true if
and only if t(S) is true on I.
2.5.2 A Problem for Extensional World Theories
The claim I wish to defend is that the Fourth Claim
above cannot be fulfilled, given the usual sort of rendering
of MD into Lent. I hold:
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There is no actualistic face-value interpretation I ofW such that, on the usual rendering t, every sentenceof MD is true if and only if t(S) is true on I
In defending this claim, I will make one assumption:
A) There are counterinstances to the Barcan Formula: "if itis possible that there is an x such that Fx, then thereis an x such that it is possible that Fx"
One counterinstance to the Barcan Formula involves the
assumption that biological organisms are essentially members
of the species to which they actually belong, or at least
that it is necessary that they could not be members of some
other species. Let 'C' denote the class of all insects. I
claim
B) It is possible that there is an x such that x is a member
of a species of insect that is not in C, but there is no
x such that it is possible that x belong to some species
of insect other than those in C.
Here is the argument against the Fourth Claim. Let ' Fx
'
mean 'x is a member of a species of insect that is not in
C ' . Assume
:
6 . 03xFx
.
The EWT rendering of (6) is:
7. 3w(Raw & 3x(Ixw and Fxw) )
.
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It is a consequence of this that:
8. 3x3w(Raw &(lxw and Fxw)),
but, on an actualistic face value interpretation, we have:
9
. Vxlxa
so we get, from 8 and 9:
10. 3x ( Ixa & (3w) (Raw & Fxw)),
which is the rendering of
:
11. (3x)0Fx.
So, by conditional proof it follows that
12. 03xFx =3 3xOFx.
which is the Barcan formula, which I have argued is false in
this instance.
If there can be no adequate face-value rendering of MD
into Lewt , then the actualist must settle for something else.
There seem to be three plausible actualist responses here.
1. The first response, due primarily to Alvin
Plantinga, involves the use of individual essences: an
individual essence of an individual x is a property P such
that x is necessarily such that it has P, and P is
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necessarily such that if anything has it, that thing is x.
An individual essence is a property P that could be the
essence of some individual. The appeal to essences suggests
the following interpretation. Let the individual variables
°f Lewt range over individual essences. Continue to read
'Ixw' as saying that x exists in w. But, read 'Exw' (the
rendering of 'Ex') as saying that x is exemplified in w.
Plantinga believes there are unexemplified essences, so he
can accept both ’ 3x(Ixa & ^Exa)
’ and
’ Vxlxa'. We can still
understand 'a' as standing for the actual world.
I will consider Plantinga 's views on essences in
Chapter Four.
2. Another approach, which seems to be the approach of
Chris Menzel
,
is to fall back on the Second Claim above.
We can come up with a truth-preserving interpretation of
Lewt , and so a materially adequate possible worlds semantics,
by building models of different possible worlds which
include representatives of possible individuals. We give up
anything close to a face value interpretation.
Menzel regards this as a defense of possible worlds
semantics. But, I think it shows that possible worlds
semantics has only heuristic value for the philosophical
undrstanding of modality. There is no longer any sense in
which EWT or possible worlds semantics can be taken as
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providing us with some sort of conceptual or semantic
analysis of modality.
3
. A Third approach, defended by Kit Fine 25 is to
retranslate back into modal discourse. in effect,
Plantings ’s approach is a version of this. But, what makes
Fine's proposal different is that, in it, the quantifiers in
world theory do not correspond to the quantifiers in MD.
Fine begins by treating the world-theory quantifiers as
"possibilist
" quantifiers, intuitively ranging over all
possible entities. But, he then seeks to provide a
translation of sentences containing these quantifiers that
avoids the commitment to possibilia. The sentence:
ZxFx
containing the possibilist quantifier ' ^
' is translated
back into modal discourse as
:
03xFx.
In effect, the interpretation of LEWT here is not classical.
A sentence such as '£x£yFxy' will be rendered as
'03x03yFxy', while the sentence 'Xy^xFxy' will be rendered
as 03y03xFxy ' . But, while the first and third sentences
are equivalent on a classical interpretation of the
quantifiers, the second and fourth are not equivalent.
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Whether or not Fine's proposal works, I want to point
out two things: by giving a non-classical interpretation of
the language of extensional world theory, it is no longer
extensional world theory. Fine is giving up whatever
benefits might be supposed to accrue from giving a classical
first order rendering of modal discourse. Second, it should
be stressed that, since modal operators are reintroduced
into the retranslations, there is again no sense in which
the L ewt sentences can be thought of as providing an analysis
of modal discourse.
Notes
1. I thus use the expression "Meinongian Possibilism" to
cover a broad range of theories, not just for the precise
ontological views of Meinong himself.
2. See, for example, McTaggart in McTaggart (1921)
3. Paul McNamara has argued in McNamara (19) that, given a
modalist account of possible worlds as maximal possible
states of affairs, there may be more than one actual world.
If this is true then ACTw should be reformulated by
replacing the expression "the actual world" with the
expression "every actual world".
4.
Plantinga (1974).
5. See Plantinga (1974), (1976), (1985b) and (1987).
6. Plantinga (1979b), pp. 258-59.
7. These ideas are defended in Plantinga (1979b).
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14.
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24. Menzel (1990a)
25 . Fine (1977)
.
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CHAPTER 3
DIRECT REFERENCE AND SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS
According to Buridan's Thesis, it is necessarily the
case that no proposition is either possible, or necessary,
or true, unless that proposition also exists. And, Buridan
thought that there are propositions that exist only
contingently. Buridan's concept of a proposition, of
course, was very different from most of the popular views
about the nature of propositions that are held today. The
question then naturally arises as to whether there remains
any reason today to think that some propositions exist only
contingently
.
A number of twentieth century philosophers have thought
that this question should be answered affirmatively,
including G. E. Moore, Arthur Prior and Robert M. Adams 1
.
At the core of this position is the view that some
propositions are, as we would now say, singular
propositions
,
propositions that somehow involve certain
individuals in a very direct way. The individuals they thus
involve are sometimes said to be their constituents or
components
.
If there are singular propositions, then it seems
plausible that they depend ontologically on their
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constituents, that is, that it is impossible for the
proposition to exist if its constituents fail to exist.
And, since many of the constituents of these propositions
are contingently existing things, it is plausible that the
propositions that depend on these constituents are also
contingently existing things
.
The most prominant contemporary proponent of singular
propositions is David Kaplan, to whom my use of the
expression "singular proposition" is due. Singular
propositions, Kaplan says, are the semantic contents of
sentences containing directly referential singular terms.
They are what these sentences say.
I think there are singular propositions. My purpose in
this chapter is arrive at a clearer conception of their
nature: to give a reasonably precise account of just what
singular propositions are. In the next chapter, I will set
out the arguments for their existence and attempt to defend
the idea that they are ontologically dependent on their
constituents
.
There are two routes to an understanding of singular
propositions. The first is through semantics. One begins
by explaining what a directly referential singular term is,
and then takes singular propositions to be the semantic
contents of sentences containing such terms, whatever those
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contents turn out to be. The second is through intuitive
metaphysics. One begins with the intuitive pre-theoretic
notion of a singular proposition as an entity with elements
or parts organized into a structure, and then tries to argue
that there are such propositions, and that they are proper
subjects for modal and propositional attitude attributions,
whether or not there are any sentences that actually express
them
.
In this chapter and the next, the focus will be on the
first approach. By taking this route, the argument for the
existence of singular propositions is somewhat easier - one
need only argue that there are directly referential singular
terms. But, the argument for ontological dependence is
trickier than it would be if one began by assuming that
singular propositions had structure.
3 . 1 The Route toward Singular Propositions
Kaplan gives a preliminary account of directly
referential terms and their relationship to singular
propositions in the introduction to his influential
monograph Demonstratives . Directly referential terms are
singular terms that
"...refer directly without the mediation of a
Fregean Sinn as meaning. If there are such terms,
then the proposition expressed by sentences
containing such a term would involve individuals
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irectly rather than by way of the individual
concepts that I had been taught to expect. Let uscall such putative singular terms (if there are
any) directly referential terms and such putativepropositions (if there are any) singular
propositions .
"
2
Here we see Kaplan's twofold characterization of singular
propositions: Semantically, they are those propositions
expressed by sentences containing directly referential
terms; metaphysically, they are propositions that somehow
involve individuals directly. Since, as I have indicated, I
plan to take the semantic route toward singular
propositions, it is essential that we understand the notion
of direct reference.
Although I will be following the semantic route, the
intuitive notion of a singular proposition will play a
guiding role. One of my aims in this section is to show
that Kaplan fails to distinguish sharply between two
substantially different conceptionss of a directly
referential term. Since I plan to argue for the existence
of propositions that are the semantic contents of directly
referential singular terms, I need to specify to which of
the two concepts the argument applies. As it happens, I
think one can successfully argue for both kinds of directly
referential terms, but, since my ultimate end is to argue
for the ontological dependence of singular propositions on
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seems to
their constituents, I will focus on the notion that
correspond most closely to the intuitive notion of a
singular proposition as an entity with a structure of some
sort
.
In attempting to set out Kaplan's views, I am going to
accept, on a provisional basis, Kaplan's judgement that
proper names, pure indexicals and demonstratives are
directly referential singular terms. This is just so that
Kaplan's various remarks about direct reference and singular
propositions can be more easily interpreted, by relating
those remarks to concrete examples of singular terms that
Kaplan clearly thinks are (or are not) directly referential.
In the next chapter, I will attempt to defend Kaplan's
account of the correct semantics for these terms.
3 . 2 Content and Character
Kaplan's ideas about direct reference can be
illustrated by a consideration of some simple sentences
containing proper names, demonstratives and pure indexicals.
Consider the sentence:
(1) I am sitting down
Kaplan distinguishes two aspects of the meaning of this
sentence. One aspect, its content, is identified with what
is said by a use of this sentence in a particular context of
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utterance. The other aspect, its character
,
is what is
common to the meaning of sentence (1) in every context in
which it is used. 3
The content of a sentence is a proposition.
Propositions are taken to be things that are either true or
false relative to counterfactual circumstances, or what
Kaplan calls "circumstances of evaluation", or just
"circumstances". Circumstances are taken by Kaplan to
include at least a world and a time. 4
Contexts are, in a sense, more specific than
circumstances. A circumstance generally can be represented
by an ordered pair of a world and time. Contexts also
determine a world and a time, but they generally involve an
agent, a location and other things. A given circumstance is
embedded in more than one context. But, every context
determines a unique circumstance.
The character of a sentence is that aspect of the
meaning of the sentence that determines its content,
relative to a given context of use. Character can thus be
represented as a function from contexts to contents
. The
character of a sentence can be said to depend entirely on
the rules or conventions of the language. Content, however,
often depends on features of the context, features that may
be outside the speaker's ken.
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use
.
Consider sentence (1) in a particular context of
To be precise consider an utterance of (1) by me, Dan
Kervick, at 12:01 PM, on January 1, 1997. m the context of
utterance under consideration, the content of (1) i s the
same as that of
(2) Dan Kervick is sitting down
but the character is different, since the first sentence
would express a different proposition, a different
sentential content, in contexts of use in which I am not the
agent, while the second always expresses the same content. 5
A sentence like (2)
,
whose character always determines the
same content, is said to have stable character.
Not only sentences, but also the meaningful parts of
sentences, have content and character. In (1) and (2), in
the context under consideration, the content of 'I' and 'Dan
Kervick' is the same thing - me. But, the difference in the
characters of the two sentences is due to a difference of
character in 'I' and and 'Dan Kervick'. The character of
'I' determines a function that takes any context of use to
the speaker or agent of that context. The character of 'Dan
Kervick' is a constant function whose value is me in every
context. It has stable character.
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e, compare sentences
( 3 )
For a somewhat different exampl
and (4) below:
(3) If Kaplan exists, then he is Kaplan.
(4) If Kaplan exists, then Kaplan is Kaplan.
Let's interpret these sentences relative to some context in
which I produce a tokens of the sentences, while pointing
out Kaplan. in (3), the word 'he' functions as a
demonstrative. In order for its reference to be fixed in a
context, an associated demonstration must be provided. And
indeed, in the context described, I am pointing to Kaplan,
thus providing the demonstration. The proposition expressed
by (3) in the described context is a necessary one, it is
true in every circumstance of evaluation. Again, just as in
the case of (1) and (2), the second sentence in this pair
expresses the same proposition as the first in the context
under consideration. And once again, the second sentence
has stable character. In this case, though, the second
sentence is true in every context, and is a logical truth.
The first expresses falsehoods in other contexts.
One final example will suffice for now. Kaplan
discusses the sentence
(5) I am here now. 6
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It is a curious feature of (5) that, while it expresses a
contingent truth in every context in which it is used, it
never fails to express some truth.’ Thus, (5) is in some
sense analytic, but
(6) Necessarily, I am here now,
is not true in any context in which it is used. it is clear
that (5) does not express a necessary truth, given that no
one is ever necessarily at a particular spatial location. 8
There is an important feature of Kaplan's views on
content and character that ought to be noted. The content
of a complex expression, like a sentence, is a function of
the contents of its component expressions. Similarly,
Kaplan holds, the character of the complex expression is a
function of the characters of the component expressions. 9
So, we can think of the proposition expressed by the
sentence as determined in two different ways. The
characters of the components of the sentence determine
contents of the components, and these in turn determine the
content of the sentence. In addition, the characters of the
sentence components determine the character of the whole
sentence, and that character determines the sentence
content. I will refer to this aspect of Kaplan's semantics
as "polycompositionality "
.
95
I believe that there is a certain ambiguity in Kaplan's
thinking about the contents of the contentful parts of
sentences, an ambiguity that is partly responsible for the
difficulty in determining what Kaplan means by "direct
reference
. What, in general, is content?
One answer is that content is roughly the same thing as
intension
.
It is something that, combined with a
circumstance of evaluation 10
, determines an an appropriate
extension. This notion of content may be called the
intensional account of content. Indeed, Kaplan's formal
semantics seems to result from refinements of and
modifications to an older "Fregean" semantic scheme,
or9anized around the method of intension and extension.
Another answer to our question is that the content of a
contentful component expression in a sentence is the
contribution that expression makes to determining the
content of the whole sentence. This in itself is too vague,
since even the character makes some contribution to
determining the sentence's content. But, perhaps we can say
it is the context- independent part of that contribution. It
is that aspect of an expression's contibution that results
"after " 11 contextual factors make their contribution to the
determination of that meaning. On the second account, there
need be no requirement that the contents of the component
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expressions be the same sort of thing (such as an intension)
as the contents of sentences. For a given expression, there
need not be anything that is evaluated at a circumstance,
other thatn the content of the entire sentence. Call this
the denotational account of content
.
MY point is not that these two notions of content are
mutually exclusive - clearly, they are not - only that they
are logically distinct. And I believe that failure to
distinguish them is responsible for certain confusions
regarding the nature of direct reference, as we shall see.
3 . 3 Direct Reference
3.3.1 Names and Descriptions
A directly referential term is a kind of singular term.
In the next two sections, I will attempt to say what Kaplan
thinks a directly referential term is. I will assume that
the idea of a singular term is sufficiently clear that it
does not need defining. For my purposes, the class of
singular terms should be taken as including (at least) pure
indexicals, such as 'I', 'you', 'she', 'he', demonstratives
such as 'this' and 'that', proper names and definite
descriptions
.
As I have indicated, I believe that Kaplan's account of
direct reference sometimes conflates two different semantic
notions, and it is not easy to determine which, if any, of
97
are two main
them Kaplan intends as the primary one. There
reasons for the difficulty in interpreting Kaplan. First,
Kaplan's informal presentation alternates between two
'pictures" of propositions - a particular sort of possible
worlds picture, and a structured propositions picture.
Kaplan thinks of the notion of direct reference to be a
purely semantical idea" that presupposses neither picture
and is "expressible in terms of either ". 16 I believe that
each of these pictures fails to bring out an important
aspect of direct reference. The second reason for the
difficulties in interpretation is that Kaplan's own views
are most often set out as contrasting with a Fregean account
of singular term reference
.
17
I believe that this results
in a conflation of alternatives, whereby certain distinct
kinds of non-Fregean singular terms are assimilated to the
same model
.
As I just noted, Kaplan often appeals to a picture
(which he stresses is "really a picture and not a theory" 18 )
of a proposition as an entity with a structure that mirrors
the structure of the sentence that expresses it. An
expression's content, the contribution that the expression
makes to the determination of a proposition by sentences in
which it is contained, can then be thought of as a component
of the proposition. Kaplan's accounts of direct reference
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and its relation to singular propositions are thus often
couched in the language of propositional components. On the
structural picture that Kaplan seems to have in mind, the
contents of all of the contentful parts of a sentence show
up in the determined proposition
.
19
On now to direct reference. I think that all of
Kaplan s pronouncements concerning directly referential
singular terms can be placed in four main groups. First,
there is a claim about what the content of such a term is:
I a) the content is the referent
There are a number of statements about what it isn't:
II b) the content is not a Fregean Sense
c) the content is not a property
d) the content is not a complex
There are claims about how the referent and content are
determined:
III e) the content is determined by the referent
f) the referent is directly associated by the
semantical rules with the term.
Finally, there are claims about how the referent and the
content are not determined:
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IV g)
h)
the referent
the referent
or a complex
is not determined by the content,
is not mediated by a sense, a property,
Before continuing, some preliminary clarification of these
claims is required:
/
First, as I understand him, the term 'referent' is for
Kaplan an informal notion playing no technical semantic
role. The formal system makes use of the technical term
"denotation" and not "referent". Nevertheless, the informal
notion of the referent as the thing the singular term
"stands for" obviously plays an essential role in Kaplan's
many informal accounts of direct reference
.
20 Second, while
it is not crucial for Kaplan's account that we have a theory
about the precise nature of the senses of those singular
terms that have a sense, it is important to recognize that,
for Kaplan, senses are formally represented by individual
concepts : functions from circumstances to individuals.
Kaplan believes that pure indexicals, demonstratives and
proper names are devices of direct reference, but that
definite descriptions are not. So, in order to understand
direct reference, we ought to compare the semantic role of
descriptions with the semantic role of those other
expressions, at least as this difference is conceived by
Kaplan. The problem is that there are a number of
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differences, and it is not always clear which features
Kaplan is focussing on.
Let's look first at names and descriptions. m what
follows, I will go along with Kaplan in treating definite
descriptions as Fregean: having both a sense (intension) and
a denotation (extension)
.
Consider the three sentences
(7) Saul Kripke is a philosopher
(8) The author of Naming and Necessity is a philosopher
(9) He {pointing to Kripke} is a philosopher
The singular terms in these sentences all have the same
referent, but that referent is determined in different ways.
Kaplan would typically say that, in (7)
,
the content of the
name "Saul Kripke" just is Kripke. However, it should be
noted that in the formal system that Kaplan provides, the
content is not Kripke but the constant function that assigns
Kripke to every circumstance. So the content is one kind of
individual concept. The demonstrative 'he' in sentence (9)
has the same content as "Saul Kripke" has in (7) (in the
indicated context) . It differs from the name "Saul Kripke"
only in character.
What is the function of the definite description in
(8)? For ease of explication, I will adopt a slight
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modification of the technique Kaplan employs for
interpreting definite descriptions. I will assume that the
content of the word 'the' (which I will denote with the
expression 'THE') is a function that takes properties to
functions on circumstances
.
21 For a given property F, the
value of the THE function applied to F is the function that
takes an arbitrary circumstance to the thing that is F in
that circumstance
.
22 The meaning of the description, then,
is also an individual concept.
Now here the formal treatment of contents of names,
indexicals and demonstratives as constant functions causes
some difficulty. Let us restrict our attention to names,
for the time being. In the informal account of direct
reference, the difference between names and definite
descriptions is fundamentally a difference in semantic
content. The content of a name is supposed to be its
referent while the content of a description is a sense:
something that determines a referent relative to a
circumstance. But, in Kaplan's formal account, both of
these entities have the same sort of thing as their content:
an individual concept. In a complete semantic theory, then,
how would names be distinguished semantically from definite
descriptions? Kaplan explicitly rejects one account of the
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distinction. He insists that there is more to direct
reference than just rigid designation
.
What is the difference between a directly referential
term and a rigid designator? We need to focus our attention
on what Kaplan, following Nathan Salmon has called
obstinately rigid designators
.
Roughly put, an obstinately
rigid designator is a singular term that has the same
referent in every counterfactual circumstance. This does
not mean that indexicals like 'I* are not rigid because
their referents vary. The idea is this: if some singular
term a is an obstinately rigid designator, then in every
possible context of use, a determines a content that has the
same extension in every possible circumstance.
All directly referential terms are obstinately rigid
designators as well. But, the converse of this statement
does not hold. Consider the difference between the two
singular terms in:
(a) 6 is even, and
(b) The smallest perfect number is even
Informally, we can express the difference between these two
in Kaplan's vivid terminology of "proposition loading". The
content of '6' is just the number 6. At the context of use,
6 is loaded into the proposition expressed by (a)
.
When the
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proposition is then evaluated at a circumstance, 6 will
obviously show up at the circumstance. The content of 'the
smallest perfect number' is a function that assigns a
referent at every circumstance. In this case, it so happens
that the referent assigned is always 6. But the difference
seems clear. In the first case, the content is just the
number 6, in the second it is a function that always picks
out the number 6
.
Returning now to our problem, we cannot say that the
mark of a directly referential term is that its content is
not just any individual concept but a constant function. if
the contents of names are constant functions, then there is
no difference in content between obstinately rigid definite
descritions and directly referential singular terms. One
suggestion might be that the problem lies in the possible
worlds semantics that underlies Kaplan's theory. The
treatment of contents as intentions, functions on world-time
pairs, is not sufficiently fine-grained. 23 This seems to be
the primary motivation for Kaplan's occasional appeals to
the stuctured propositions picture. Here is what he says:
"If I may wax metaphysical in order to fix an
image let us think of the vehicles of evaluation -
the what-is-said in a given context - as
propositions. Don't think of propositions as sets
of possible worlds, but rather as structured
entities looking something like the sentences
which express them. For each occurrence of a
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singular term in a sentence there will be acorresponding constituent in the proposition
expressed. The constituent of the proposition
for each possible circumstance of
. .
the obiect relevant to evaluating theproposition m that circumstance. in general, the
constituent of the proposition will be some sort
of complex, constructed from various attributes bylogical composition. But, in the case of a
singular term that is directly referential, the
constituent of the proposition is just the objectitself
.
1,24
determines
,
evaluation,
So, we can represent the difference between the propositions
expressed by the two sentences (7) and (9), on the one hand
and '
(8) as the difference between
10) <<THE
,
A>
,
P>
and
11) <k, P>
What is the propositional component imported by the
description? If we appeal to the structure model, we see
that it is just the complex <THE
,
A> itself that is the
component. The content here is the complex, not the rigidly
fixed referent.
Now, since the structure picture is "really a picture,
and not a theory"
,
we cannot appeal to it directly to give a
strict answer to the question about the theoretical
difference between directly referential terms and
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obstinately rigid designators. But, one aspect of that
picture does carry over to the formal account. Say that an
expression in a language has derived content if its content
is (non- trivially) determined by the semantical rules of the
language as a function of the contents of its component
expressions
.
25 Then perhaps we can say that the
distinguishing feature of a directly referential singular
term is that it is an obstinately rigid designator with
underived content.
I do not think that this sufficiently captures Kaplan's
intentions though. If we adopt this approach, and if we
retain the treatment of the senses of singular terms as
individual concepts, we are forced to reject the idea that
directly referential terms do not have a sense as their
content. And, the suggestion seems to be incompatible with
some of Kaplan's statements:
"...The directly referential term goes directly
to its referent, directly in the sense that it
does not first pass through the proposition.
Whatever rules, procedures, or mechanisms there
are that govern the search for the referent, they
are irrelevant to the propositional component, to
content. When the individual is determined (when
the referent is fixed, in the language of Saul
Kripke)
,
it is loaded into the proposition."
Here Kaplan seems to say that it does not matter how, in a
given context, the referent is determined. What matters is
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that it is the referent itself that is the content, the
propositional component".
I believe that the true source of the difficulty here
is that Kaplan uses a formal technique that is incapable of
bringing out the intuitive semantic ideas. it would be
nice to provide a alternate semantic technique that respects
all of the informal intuitions at once, so that it turns out
that (i) names and indexicals do not have a sense as
content, their contents are underived and are their
referents, and (ii) definite description do have a sense as
content, and that content is derived.
It is easy to sketch such an approach. By modifying
the formal semantics, we can present a framework in which
all of these ideas are combined. To do this, we relax the
requirement that all contents be functions on circumstances,
that is, we reject the intentional notion of content in
favor of the denotational account. Specifically, we will
allow names and indexicals to have as their contents just
the individuals to which they refer.
The guiding idea will be Kaplan's proposition loading
metaphor. After the characters of the sentence's contentful
component expressions determine the contents of those
expressions, these contents are combined to form a sentence
content, or proposition. But, the proposition is the only
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That
thing that is "taken on a round-the worlds journey",
is, only propositions are evaluated at a circumstance
The account I give will be restricted to sentences of
the form [s is F]
,
where s is a singular term and F a
simple predicate expression. We make the following
stipulations about content:
i) the content of a sentence is a proposition - afunction from circumstances to truth values,
ii) the content of a definite description is an
individual concept: a function from circumstances toindividuals
.
iii) the content of a name or indexical is an individual
member of the domain,
iv) the content of a predicate expression is a function
from circumstances to subsets of the domain.
v) the content of 'the' is function THE that takes
predicate contents to individual concepts. Xt obeys
the following rule:
If j is an predicate content, then THE ( j ) is the
individual concept i such that, for any circumstance
c, i ( c
)
= the unique member of j (c) that exists in c
If there is no such element, i(c) = 0.
vii) If F is a predicate expression with content j, the
content of the singular term [the F] is THE
( j )
.
viii ) For any predicate expression F with content j, and
singular term a, the content of the sentence S =
[a is F] is given by the following two rules:
If a is a name or indexical, with content a, the
content of S is the proposition p such that for any
circumstance c, p(c) = T iff a is an element of i(c)
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If a is a definite description with content k, thenthe content of S is the proposition p such that forany circumstance c, p(c) = T iff k(c) is a member of
V C / •
Now we have a way of representing the difference
between obstinately rigid definite descriptions and directly
referential names and indexicals. The content of a directly
referential term is an individual, its referent, and is
underived; the content of an obstinately rigid description
is an individual concept and is derived.
/ if should be noticed that while these two features
of directly referential singular terms - the content is not
a sense but the referent, and the content is underived
- go
together in our language fragment, there is no essential
connection between them. Indeed, there seems to be no
reason that a language not have non-complex singular terms
that have senses as their contents, nor is there any reason
that a language not have complex singular terms that do not
have senses as their contents, but individuals instead.
This latter possibility plays a role in the discusssion in
the next section.
3.3.2 ' Dthat
'
The issue of what exactly Kaplan means by "direct
reference" is illuminated to some extent, but not entirely,
by his discussion of his homemade demonstrative 'dthat'.
109
Kaplan describes this word and its intended use in
Demonstratives
:
"Now why not regard descriptions as a kind of
emonstration and introduce a special
demonstrative which requires completion by adescription and which is treated as a directly
referential term whose referent is the denotation
of the associated description? Why not? Why notindeed! I have done so, and I write it thus:
dthat [a]
where a is any description, or, more generally,
any singular term. 'Dthat' is simply the
demonstrative that' with the following singular
term functioning as its demonstration ." 26
In Afterthoughts
,
Kaplan notes that his original account of
'dthat' is ambiguous between two uses.
"...On one interpretation, "dthat" is a directly
referential singular term and the content of the
associated description is no part of the content
of the dthat-term. On another interpretation,
"dthat" is syntactically an operator that requires
syntactical completion by a description in order
to form a singular term. " 27
Let's call the first use of 'dthat' refered to in the above
passage the demonstrative use and the second the operator
use. I want to focus here on the operator use of 'dthat'
.
But, first I will try to clarify Kaplan's remarks concerning
the demonstrative use.
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Suppose I utter the sentence "she is a philosopher",
while holding up a placard on which an arrow has been drawn,
and I hold it up in such a way that the arrow is
unambiguously pointing to a certain woman in the corner of
the room. "She" functions here as a demonstrative and its
content/referent in this context is that woman herself
toward whom the arrow is pointing. I might accomplish the
same effect, though, by raising a placard on which has been
inscribed not an arrow, but some token of the English
expression "woman in the corner" (and perhaps by glancing
pointedly at the inscribed phrase as I produce the
sentence ) . Here it seems clear that the inscribed
expression is not part of the sentence, but constitutes the
accompanying demonstration needed to complete a
demonstrative
.
The demonstrative use of
' dthat
' is to be understood as
analogous to the use of 'he' in this second situation. If,
for example, employing the demonstrative use, I verbally
produce an utterance that can be transcribed as
Dthat woman in the corner is a philosopher,
the utterance should be construed as consisting of two
parts: one is a token of the sentence 'dthat is a
philosopher' and the other as a token of "woman in the
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corner" constituting the accompanying demonstration. We may
for convenience sake write this as
Dthat
. .
.
{woman in the corner} is a philosopher
Kaplan regards this use of "dthat" as directly
/
referential, and if he is right about demonstratives in
general, there is no reason to doubt this. On this
treatment, the word 'dthat' itself is a directly referential
singular term. But, Kaplan claims that the operator use of
'dthat' is not directly referential:
"If "dthat" is an operator, and if the
description, which constitutes the operand and
thus syntactically completes the singular term,
induces a complex element into content, then the
correct way to describe "dthat" is as a
rigidifier. Complete dthat-terms would be rigid,
in fact obstinately rigid. In this case, the
proposition would not carry the individual itself
into the possible world but rather would carry
instructions to run back home and get the
individual who there satisfies certain
specifications.
. .
1,28
Now, it is clear that, on the operator use, 'dthat' is
not itself a directly referential singular term, since it is
not itself a singular term. But the question is whether
singular terms of the form 'dthat [a]' are directly
referential, and it is not at all clear to me that they are
not, even if 'dthat' is a rigidifier.. I want to explore
this question further.
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First, how do we make sense formally of
' dthat
• as a
rigidifier? There are a couple of options here. Here is
the most obvious one: First, to the language fragment just
presented m the previous section, we add the word 'dthato'
(for 'dthat '
-operator use). Syntactically,
' dthato
' is an
operator that attaches to singular terms to form a singular
term. For a given context of use u, let C u be the
circumstance determined by, that is embedded in, u. And,
let the content of a singular term a, relative to context u,
be denoted by [a] u . Finally, say that for any circumstance
C
,
if [a] u is an individual, then the value of a (relative
to u) in C is just [a] u , and if [a] u is an individual
concept, the value of a (relative to u)in C is the result of
[c*] u to C. Denote both of these by [o] u /C. The
semantic role of 'dthato' in the singular term 'dthato [a]'
may then be construed as involving a function that takes
[a] u and a context u to the individual concept j such that,
for every circumstance C, j (C) = [a] u /Cu . In other words,
to the constant function that takes every circumstance to
the value of a, relative to u, in Cu .
There is a technical problem with this first option,
though. It conflates character and content, since it is
sensitive both to the context of utterance and the content
of the singular term a. But, we can fit it into Kaplan's
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content/character scheme by prizing apart the context-
sensitivity and content-sensitivity: Let the semantics of
'dthato' be given by the following two rules:
ix) The character of 'dthato' is a function DTO that
takes contexts of use to functions from contents of
singular terms to contents of singular terms.
Which function on contents is it? That is given by the
following rule:
x) The content of dthato
' relative to a context u,
DTOu , is the function that assigns to every
singular term content [a] u the individual concept j
such that, for every circumstance C, j (C) =
[a] u/Cu .
And, then we add the following obvious rule for complete
' dthato 1 -terms
:
xi) The content of [dthato [a]] relative to context u is
DTOu ( [a] u )
Now, here, 'dthato' terms formed from definite descriptions
do turn out to have individual concepts as their contents,
and so are not directly referential, but merely obstinately
rigid . 29
But, there is an alternative, and more straightforward,
operator treatment of 'dthato' terms. We can set up
'dthato' terms so that their content is always the value of
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the bracketed singular term relative to the circumstance
embedded in the context of utterance. Change (x) above to
x') The content of 'dthato' relative to a context u,
DTOu , is the function that assigns, to every
singular term content [a] u , [a] u /C u .
If we adopt this second option, then the content of
’dthato [the x Fx]
'
relative to a context u is its referent
in u, not a sense or function that happens to pick out that
referent at every circumstance. Since the content of a term
is the "propositional component" associated with a term,
then it is the referent of 'dthato [the x Fx]
'
that gets
"loaded into" the proposition at the context of utterance,
as the proposition is "prepared for its round-the worlds
j ourney "
.
But it also turns out on this second option that
'dthato' terms have derived content. Their contents are a
function of the content of 'dthato' and the content of the
embedded singular term (which, if it is a description, also
has derived content)
. So, while they possess one of the two
features we associated with direct reference (content =
referent), when looking only at names and indexicals, they
do not possess the other (underived content) . Call the
operator treatment described by rule (x) the rigidifying
operator treatment, and call the treatment given by rule
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(x') the priorizing operator treatment. Where necessary,
these will be distinguished as 'dthato
r
' and ’dthato
p
'.
I would like to address one possible objection to these
two accounts of the operator use of
' dthat
'
. One might
believe that, for anything to qualify as an operator, it
must have stable character. That is it must be invariably
associated with some one particular content. This conforms
to the notion of operator that we associate with modal
operators, lambda operators etc. Both accounts of
’ dthato 1
,
as either a rigidifying operator or a priorizing operator,
violate this restriction. On these readings,
' dtahto 1 does
not have a stable character: it is itself an indexical
. In
every context of use, its content is some function: a
function that takes the content of a singular term to the
referent of that term in the circumstance determined by that
context. But, which function it has as content varies from
one context to another.
Now, whether or not this is how we understand
'operator', the question here is whether Kaplan restricts
the use of the term in this way. If so, neither the
rigidifying nor the priorizing operator could be what Kaplan
has in mind for the operator interpretation of 'dthat'.
But, is impossible to understand Kaplan's own treatment in
the formal system, the treatment he says is most naturally
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without assuming that
given the operator interpretation
,
30
"dthat " is an indexical.
Kaplan gives the following account of the meaning of
dthat- terms in his system LD:
|dthat[a]| in context c, under assignment f, at time tm world w = |a| in context c, under assignment f, at
the time c(T) of c in the world c (W) of c.
Consider a singular term such as
dthat [the x: x is the number of planets]
Clearly, the whole dthat- term here is an indexical. Where
is the indexicality coming from? Not the embedded singular
term, surely. That term has a stable character. So, it
must be derived from the word "dthat". And, in fact, Kaplan
explicitly rejects the notion that operators must have
stable character. He describes the 'actually' operator as
an indexical, and seems to regard the syncategorimatic
treatment af the latter as an inessential vestige of the
style of the semantics.
If "dthat' were treated as an operator with stable
character, then since definite descriptions also (typically)
have stable character, the content of a dthat- term would not
be sensitive to the context of utterance.
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This brings us to the crux of the issue about direct
reference. Why does Kaplan believe that regarding
' dthat
'
as an operator means regarding
' dthat '
-terms as not directly
referential? in the interpretation of 'dthat' as
rigidifier,
' dthat '
-terms have as their content a constant
function. But, we can't say that that alone is sufficient
reason, for Kaplan, to regard those terms as not directly
referential. In the formalism, Kaplan traets all singular
terms this way, but for some of them, the directly
referential ones, he seems to regard the treatment as an
artifact of the model. The only thing that makes a
difference here is the syntactic complexity. Kaplan seems
to associate this with both having a sense, and having a
complex, rather than an individual, as content. But, not
all terms with derived reference need work this way.
So, what is direct reference? We seem to have two main
options. There is what may be called prior reference
:
a
term has prior reference if and only if its content is its
referent (and so the referent is determined prior to the
evaluation at a circumstance) . And there is underived prior
reference
:
prior reference plus underived content. The
question, then, is this: Is direct reference the same thing
as (a) prior reference, (b) underived prior reference or (c)
something else?
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Whatever Kaplan has in mind, his discussion does not
settle the issue as far as (a) and (b) are concerned,
because he does not carefully distinguish three types of
complexity: sytactic complexity, complexity of content and
complexity of propositional structure.
One might be inclined to argue that Kaplan must have
the notion of underived prior reference in mind, when he
uses the term 'direct reference', since he explicity says
that the demonstrative use of ' dthat
' is directly
referential, but that the operator use is not . 31 But, there
are two good reasons for rejecting this reading: First, as
already noted, Kaplan seems to consider only two alternative
interpretations for 'dthat': the demonstrative use and the
'dthator ' use; and it is true that 'dthator ' is not a
directly referential term. But, Kaplan never seems to
consider the possibility of 'dthatop ' so we don't know
whether he would regard this is directly referential or not.
Second, there are many passages in which the stress is
laid on prior reference. This seems especially to be the
case in the those passages in which he speaks of free
variables as a paradigm of direct reference. The idea is
that in evaluating an open formula at a circumstance,
relative to an assignment to the free variables in the
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formula, it does not matter how the assignment is made, only
What is assigned. 32 But, there are other passages that seem
to stress prior reference:
Thus my vivid talk of loading the referent intothe proposition comes down to this: when using adirectly referential term, the mode of
presentation of the referent (if you will allow alapse into the Fregean idiom) is no part of whatis said. Only the referent itself figures in
content
. Directly referential expressions are
transparent
.
Though there may be a complex
semantical mechanism that mediates the connectionbetween linguistic expression and referent, that
mechanism is unseen in what is said." 33
I think that one possible source of the obscurity here
can be identified: the "1-dimensional" nature of the
structure picture obscures important differences among
propositions. On the one hand, it sometimes fails to
represent all of the propositions 1 s propositional
components, and on the other hand, it may represent too
many. Let me explain.
Kaplan needed to distinguish obstinately rigid
designators from directly referential terms. To do this, he
brought in the idea of a structured proposition. A directly
referential term is thus said to load an individual into
such a proposition. Other singular terms are said to load a
complex structure into the proposition. But, it is not just
the case that complex expressions have parts with seperate
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contents; they also have their own contents. when the
difference between the contents of
' dthat '
-terms and those
of definite descriptions are represented
as the difference between
<DTHAT
, <THE
,
F» and
<THE
,
F>
the nature of the contents of the two terms is not brought
out clearly. We are induced into taking the content of both
of these terms to be some sort of complex entity, and
neglect the fact that the content of the first is an
individual (on the second operator treatment outlined
above), and that of the second is a sense.
There is another, closely related, problem with the
structure picture. According to that picture, any
propositional components loaded into the proposition at the
context of utterance, that is, any contents of component
expressions that go into determining the proposition, show
up along with the proposition at each circumstance of
svsluat ion
. But, if we adopt what I called the denotational
notion of content, we ought to allow that some of these
concepts are "absorbed into the proposition" at the context
of utterance, so that only the proposition, and not (all of)
the contents that determined it, makes an appearance at the
different circumstances of evaluation.
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The kind of use Kaplan makes of possible worlds
semantics tends to reinforce the habits of thought promoted
by the structure picture. In Kaplan's formal system, no use
is made of propositions at all, of any kind, not even as
functions from worlds to truth values. Linguistic
expressions are (apropriately) evaluated at contexts, but
these same linguistic expressions are (misleadingly, I
think) evaluated at circumstances as well. This is no help
in fleshing out the intuitively appealing idea that
sentences determine propositions at contexts, and then these
propositions are evaluated at circumstances. And like the
structure picture, it encourages the view that all of the
contents of the sentence's components are carried around
from world to world. In the formalism, the content of a
complex expression with derived content is, in a sense,
recomputed at every world, generating the misleading
impression that the content has not been determined prior to
evaluation
.
3 . 4 What Are Singular Propositions ?
We are now in a position to say something informative
about singular propositions. I will be guided by the idea
that a singular proposition is typically the content of a
sentence containing a directly referential singular term,
and in saying that a term is directly referential, I will
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mean that it has what I have called prior reference. I
assume that the intuitive notion of a singular proposition
is that of a proposition with an individual as a
constituent, and that the semantic mechanism whereby that
individual gets to be a constituent of the expressed
proposition is irrelevant.
Let us think of propositions or sentential contents as
being determined by an entity that I will call a proposition
determining pair or PDP
. Consider an arbitrary sentence S.
The content of S is some function of the contents of the
smallest contentful components of S. How is this function
determined? A plausible view, and one that is presupposed
by a good deal of semantic theorizing is that, if the
sentence is not syntactically ambiguous, the function is
determined by the semantic categories of the component
expressions together with their order of appearance in the
sentence. No doubt contextual factors also often enter into
the determination of this function. However the function is
determined, let's call it the content function. We can then
correlate with the sentence the ordered pair:
<3 / (cl , c2 , . . . , cn)
>
where 3 is the appropriate content function, and (cl, c2,
...,cn) is the sequence of contents of the sentence's
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component expressions that serve as inputs to 3 . Call this
the input sequence. The proposition determined by the
sentence is not the above ordered pair, but the result of
applying the content function to input sequence, that is
3(cl, c2
, ..., cn)
.
Call the proposition thus determined by
the PDP its product.
Not just whole sentences, but complex component
expressions with content can be represented by a pair of
this sort. In general the pair <3, (cl, c2
, ...,cn)>
consisting of content function 3 and input sequence (c 1( c
* • •
'
c n) will be called simply a content determining pair
CDP
. So, a PDP is just a CDP whose product is a
proposition
.
2 '
or
It will be convenient in what follows to have an
alternative way of representing the PDP <3, (cl, c2
,
cn)>. I will use the notation [[3, (cl, c2, ..., cn)]] for
this purpose. While both of these expressions will be
taken, in isolation, to refer to the same entity, the
square-bracketed version will be used when the product of
the corresponding CDP is to serve as part of the input
sequence of another CDP. In other words, while the
expression [<3, (cl, c2 , ..., cn)>] denotes the same CDP as
the expression [[3, (cl, c2, ..., cn)]], and while both of
the two expressions [<6, (c l7 [3, (cl, c2, ..., cn)]>] and
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[<5 ; (c 1; <3 , (cl, c2
, .. •' cn)»] denote a CDP in which the
second term of the input sequence is the correlated with the
CDP <3, (cl, c2
, ..., cn) > , the second term in the first is
the product of the CDP, and the second term of the second is
< 3 / (cl, c2 , ..., cn) > itself.
Representing the proposition expressed by a sentence by
the associated PDP will allow us to be neutral regarding the
exact nature of propositions
. To use the most simple sort
of example, consider a sentence of the form [a is $"]
Suppose the content of a is a and the content of $> is F.
Then, the proposition that is expressed by a is 0, its
content, can be represented as
(i) <g, (a, F )
>
where g is a content function, and the proposition expressed
is g(a, F)
. Now, which function is g? The answer one gives
this question will depend on which view of properties one
has, and how one thinks they combine with individuals in
order to determine propositions. If properties are
propositional functions, and the proposition expressed is
the result of applying that function to the thing referred
to by the subject term, then the proposition expressed by
the above is just F(a)
. This means that g is the function y
defined by:
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(ii) Y (x, Y) = Y(x)
Suppose on the other hand, you take the proposition
expressed by fa is o] to be a structured entity of the form
<a, F>. Then g is the function 5 defined by:
( iii ) 6(x, Y) = <a, Y>
.
The technique can be extended to represent not just
propositions, the contents of sentences, but the contents of
any complex expression whose content is a function of the
contents of its parts. As an example, consider the sentence
"Some animals are mammals". One way of analyzing this
sentence understands it as having three elementary
contentful grammatical components - 'Some', 'animals' and
'are mammals'
. The content of 'animals' is the property A of
being an animal, the content of 'are mammals' is the
property M of being a mammal, and the content of 'some' is a
function SOME from properties to functions on properties.
That is, the proposition is determined by first applying
SOME to A, and then taking the resulting function and
applying it to M. So, we can represent the content of the
expression 'some animals' by the ordered pair
(iv) <y
'
,
(SOME, A)
>
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where Y ' is the inverse of the function y in (ii) above. We
can then associate with the whole proposition expressed by
our example sentence the PDP:
(v) <Y ' , ( [ Y '
,
(SOME, A)], M)>.
Here is where the notation introduced a few paragraphs
back makes its appearance. We use ' [y ' , (SOME, A)]' rather
than the expression <Y » (SOME, A) >
'
so as to indicate that
it is the product of this latter CDP, and not the CDP itself
which is the appropriate input. But writing it this way,
rather than as the simpler 'y' (SOME, A) ' enables us to
identify that product as the content of some expression.
We can now put forward a characterization of singular
propositions. We define the transitive closure of a CDP Q
as the smallest set C such that (a) every term of the input
sequence in Q is in C, and (b) for any R and y, if R is a
CDP that is in C, and y is a term in the input sequence of
R, then y is in C. We denote this entity by C(Q)
.
A
singular proposition is any proposition that is the product
of some PDP whose transitive closure contains an individual.
I want to avoid several possible sources of
misunderstanding. First, PDP ' s are not propositions, not
even structural propositions, nor are CDP ' s contents (at
least not typically) . The content function in a PDP is
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not itself a "component" of the proposition determined by
that PDP
. The content function is not itself a content.
Second, I am not putting forth some semantic thesis to
the effect that sentences somehow express their contents by
way of PDP
' s . That is, I am not saying that sentences
express propositions by first expessing a PDP which in turn
determines the proposition, but only that a PDP can be
associated with every proposition expressing sentence.
Third, the individuals referred to in the definition
above are to be taken as "ontological" individuals, not
"logical" individuals. What I have in mind is this: there
is no reason why we cannot refer to any kind of entity at
all with a directly referential singular term. The class of
singular terms contains not only descriptions like "the
computer that beat Kasparov" which refers to a genuine
ontological individual - the computer Deep Blue, but also
descriptions such as "the mass of Jupiter" - which
apparently refers to a property - and "the truth about
philosophy professors" - which apparently refers to a
proposition or set of propositions. It also includes
nominalizations such as "pespicacity " and "running in
place". Only the use of expressions like the first one in
this list will be taken as giving rise to singular
propositions
.
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Fourth, there is no implication so far that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between PDP
' s and propositions, or
CDP's and the contents that are their products. in fact, on
most views of the nature of propositions and propositional
components, this is not the case. I intend the notion of a
PDP to be neutral with respect to the actual nature of
propositions
.
Finally
,
note that a content function is always the
first term of a CDP even if, as in example (i) above, one of
the contents is itself a propositional function of some
kind
.
The concept of singular propositions just outlined is a
very broad one. It involves few assumptions about what a
proposition is. A proposition can be a set of worlds, a set
of situations or circumstances, or a some sort of logical
monad. Propositions might even be structural propositions.
I believe that this very broad notion of a singular
proposition is all that is supported by semantic
considerations on direct reference.
At this point, all we have arrived at is an account of
what direct reference is, and a corresponding account of
what singular propositions are, insofar as they are taken to
be the semantic conbtents of sentences containing directly
referential expressions. In the next chapter, I will look
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at arguments that purport to show that there are directly
referential expressions in natural language, and hence that
some natural language sentences express singular
propositions. I will then turn to the more complex issue of
whether or not these propositions are ontologically
/
dependent on their constituents.
Notes
1. See Moore (1966), Prior (1957) and (1967) and Adams
(1981) .
2. Kaplan (1989a), p. 483.
3. The following account of the content/character
distinction, is based entirely on Kaplan's discussion of
these issues in (1989a) and Kaplan (1989b)
.
4. Kaplan (1989a), pp . 500-505, and Kaplan (1989b) p. 578.
5. This claim involves an idealization. Many, perhaps most,
proper names have divided reference
:
they have more than one
bearer. Certainly, contextual factors play a role in
determining the referent of names with divided reference.
Throughout the following discussion, I will adopt the
simplifying pretense that names have a unique bearer.
6. Kaplan (1978b), pp . 67-68.
7. But, see footnote 12 in Kaplan (1989a)
.
8. In Chapter 6, I will argue that Buridanism gives rise to
a modal logic in which there is a failure of the rule of
necessitation
:
i-O - hDo
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The example just discussed illustrates anotherdenying that rule. reason for
9. Kaplan (1989a) pp. 505-507.
10. On this account, then, propositions arefunctions from circumstances to truth values
represented by
1. The use of "after" here is metaphorical. Kaplan oftenemploys temporal metaphors in order to render some of hisideas more vivid. As, for instance, when he speaks of
contents as "first" being loaded into the proposition, andthen" evaluated at a circumstance. Note, though, thatKaplan's system is intended primarily as an account of
semantic meaning, and not an account of some possible
process of interpretation on the part of an ideal
interpreter
.
16.
Kaplan (1986a), p.493, n.17.
17. More specifically, a Carnap/Church account.
18. Kaplan (1986a), p.494.
19.
Making use of this picture, Kaplan often describes the
semantic mechanisms by which the contents of the component
expressions in a sentence determine a proposition, and
ultimately a truth value, metaphorically in terms of a
content being "loaded into the proposition", and the
proposition then being "taken around from circumstance to
circumstance". But, the use of the word "load" invites
different interpretations. Are semantic contents loaded
into a proposition like input is loaded into a computer
program, or like cargo is loaded onto a ship? In the first
case, the entered content (input) data may not be any part
of the proposition (output)
. This might be called content
blending
. If the input content is in some sense a genuine
component of the proposition determined, we may speak of
content packaging
. The distinction between content blending
and content packaging is related to the distinction between
the intensional and denotational accounts of content. The
nature of this relation will be clarified in what is to
below.
20.
We can't take the intuitive idea of the referent of a
singular term to be the same as the idea of the term's
extension (although the referent always turns out to be the
extension)
,
since the extension of any expression is
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determined by the evaluation of the expression's
a circumstance. But, in the case of a directly
term, the referent determines the content.
content at
referential21.
In the formal system, Kaplan treats logical constantsquantifiers, modal and tense operators, the functor
' dthatand the definite description operator 'the' as
sycategorimatic
: rules are given for determining the
contents of complex expressions containing these simple
expressions, based on the contents of the component
espressions, but the sycategorimatical expressions
themselves are not assigned a content. However, Kaplan
mentions the possibility of extending the notion of content
to apply to operators, and says that in that case "we would
see that all indexicals (including N, A, Y and dthat) have aStable Content in every context" (1986a, p. 548)
.
Earlier,
he says: I take content as a notion applying not just to
sentences taken in a context but to any meaningful part of
speech taken in a context" (1986a, p. 501)
.
I conclude that Kaplan regards the syncategorimatical
accounts as inessential artifacts of the particular
technique used in presenting the formal system. If we
extend the notion of content to ' the
'
,
it seems to me that
the account I give here is the only natural one that is
compatible with Kaplan
' s overall treatment of descriptions
.
22.
This definition involves a slight simplification. The
treatment of definite descriptions as functions of this sort
requires, to secure a smoothly running semantics, the use of
a special entity (denoted with
'
t
' by Kaplan) for the value
of the function at circumstances in which nothing satisfies
the property F.
23.
This appears to be Kaplan's own diagnosis of the
problem. He says that "the possible worlds semantics of the
formal system . . . obscures the distinction between direct
reference and rigid designation" (1986b, p. 579), and that
the distinction "is dramatized by the structured
propositions picture. That is part of the reason why I like
it" (1986a, p.497)
.
24. Kaplan (1989a) p. 494.
25. The crucial idea here is that the content is derived
from other contents
,
not just that it is semantically
derived. The contents of all expressions are derived from
their characters.
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26. Kaplan (1989a), pp . 521-522.
27. Kaplan (1989b) p. 579.
28. Kaplan (1989b), p. 580.
29. I am working here with the revised semantic scheme.
30.
Kaplan (1989b), p. 581.
31. Kaplan (1989b), pp . 580-81.
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. citation
33. Kaplan (1989b), pp . 572-73.
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CHAPTER 4
SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS AND ONTOLOGICAL DEPENDENCY
The characteristic results of Buridanism derive from
the intuition that the proposition expressed by a sentence
like "Quine does not exist" depends for its very existence
on the existence of Quine himself. The basis for that
intuition would seem to be a combination of three ideas: (i)
that there are directly referential singular terms, and this
class includes proper names, (ii) that the propositions
expressed by sentences containing such terms are singular
propositions of which the referent of the term is a
constituent, and (iii) that singular propositions depend
ontologically on their constituents.
Together, these three claims generate the thesis that I
have called "N-Dependency" : that the propositions expressed
by sentences containing proper names depend ontologically on
the referents of those names.
In the previous chapter, I formulated an account of the
nature of direct reference, and then used that account as a
basis for an "extrinsic" characterization of singular
propositions. The characterization was such to guarantee
that there are singular propositions, so long as there are
sentences that contain directly referential singular terms.
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In this chapter, I will set out the case for directly
referential singular terms, and argue that the singular
propositions expressed by sentences containing these terms
are ontologically dependent on their constituents. So, this
chapter is devoted to a consideration of the case for N-
Dependency
.
In section 4.1, argue that the most reasonable account
of the semantics of names, demonstrative and indexicals is
that they are directly referential. By "directly
referential", I mean here that they have what I have called
prior reference
:
their contents are identical to their
referents. In the remainder of my discussion, I will
continue to use the expression "direct reference" in this
way. In section 4.2, I describe several strategies of
resistance to direct reference and criticize them. In
section 4.3, I formulate and argue for the Dependency
Thesis
:
the claim that singular propositions are
ontologically dependent on their constituents.
I believe that the case for direct reference is quite
strong. The case for the Dependency Thesis is less
conclusive. But it should be noted that at least some of
the resistance to the idea that the proposition expressed by
"Quine does not exist" depends ontologically on Quine is
based, not on a rejection of the dependency thesis, but on a
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rejection of the claim that "Quine" is directly referential.
So, for readers who are skeptical about the claim that names
are directly referential, but who are not skeptical about
the Dependency Thesis, the argument in sections I and XI may
succeed in convincing them of N-dependency
.
4
. 1 Arguments for Direct Referencp
The main arguments for direct reference were given
their first careful formulation in the context of the
discussions and debates attending the birth of the so-called
New Theory of Reference, in the sixties and early seventies.
Alas, the theory has passed into the ranks of those things,
like the New Criticism, the New Frontier and the New
Testament that are new m name only. And, the New Theory is
not really a theory, but an assortment of theories with
certain common themes. But, I will continue to use the
label "New Theory" when great precision is not required.
Most of the arguments for direct reference are now quite
familiar, and they can therefore be presented rather
briskly, so that more attention can be focussed on the
various attempts to resist them. But there are a few points
to consider before proceeding.
First, it is clear that one thing that was new about
the New Theory was not just its account of what the semantic
contents of certain singular terms are, but also its account
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of how these terms come to have those contents in the first
place. This latter portion of the theory is the "causal" or
"historical chain" account of the reference of proper names.
Part of the appeal of the older view, at least in its
Fregean form, was its explanation of how reference was
determined. Some of the criticisms of the New Theory have
been directed at this aspect of the theory. I will not
address those criticisms here, but will instead restrict my
attention to criticisms having to do with what the content
of a singular term is.
In presenting the arguments for direct reference and
the proposed alternatives to direct reference, I will rely
on the content and character framework developed by Kaplan
and discussed in the previous chapter. This choice is
required by the practical necessity of having an
organizational framework within which to develop the
alternative views. Without relying on such a framework, it
would be impossible to consider these views in the scope of
a single chapter. To some extent, this will require
presenting the views in a somewhat different form than that
given to them by their original authors. Despite this, my
hope is that I have maintained the spirit of these views,
and have not left out any viable candidate theories.
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arguments for direct
Nathan Salmon has classified the
reference as falling into three categories: modal arguments,
epistemic arguments and semantic arguments. This is a
useful classification, and the following presentation is
heavily dependent on Salmon's presentation in Reference and
Essence. But, I will also briefly consider a certain
argument based on propositional attitude ascriptions. And,
I will consider a more direct argument for singular
propositions - Kaplan's "quantifying in" argument.
The first four types of arguments are fundamentally
arguments against something, which is sometimes referred to
as the orthodox theory or the Frege-Russell theory of
singular reference. The theories of Frege and Russell were
of course very different. But there is an area of common
ground. Each, as Kaplan puts it, "held something like a
disguised definite description theory of proper names" 2
.
So, the arguments are directed against descriptional
theories of names. Salmon has proposed the following
account of what it means for a singular term to be
descriptional
:
"an expression a, as used in a particular
context, is descriptional if there is a set of
properties semantically associated with a in such
a way as to generate a semantic relation, which
may be called 'denotation' or 'reference', and
which correlates with a (with respect to such
semantic parameters as a possible world w an a
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tims t) whoever or whatever
at least sufficiently many)
(in w at t)
,
if there is a
and nothing otherwise ." 3
uniquely has all ( or
of these properties
unique such individual
I am not satisfied with this account for a variety of
reasons, but I think that it will suffice for our purposes
here. What I would stress, though, is that on the modified
content/character scheme developed in the last chapter,
there are only two possibilities for the content of a
singular term: either its content is an individual concept
or it is an individual. So, I will assume that to say that
a singular term is descriptional is to say that its content
is (represented by) an individual concept: a function that
takes circumstances of evaluation to an individual.
So, the arguments are directed against
descriptionalism
. What do the arguments argue for? The
semantic and propositional attitudes arguments argue
directly for direct reference. But, the modal and epistemic
arguments are fundamentally arguments for what Kripke has
called "rigid designation". The main idea behind rigid
designation has been presented in the previous chapter.
Here I will just describe the criterion of rigid designation
that I will employ: An singular term a will be taken to be
a rigid designator if and only if the sentence:
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X
(C) ("there exists an x such that necessarily if
exists, then a = x]
is true. 4
Note that it is possible for a singular term to be both
descriptional (its content is an individual concept) and a
rigid designator. And so, a critic of direct reference
might accept the arguments for rigid designation. How,
then, do we get from rigid designation to direct reference?
The move beyond rigid designation to direct reference is
usually motivated by an attempt to explain rigid
designation. Kaplan has written that direct reference was
supposed to "provide the deep structure for rigid
designation, to underlie rigid designation, to explain it". 5
So, one issue we must consider is whether, in the case of
some given rigid singular term, there is any plausible
alternative semantic mechanism that explains why that term
is a rigid designator.
While I believe that the sorts of arguments considered
below are applicable to indexicals and demonstrative, only
the arguments for the direct referentiality of names will be
presented in detail here.
4.1.1 The Modal Arguments
The modal arguments are due to Kripke, and were
presented both in his paper "Identity and Necessity" 6
,
and
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m the extremely influential monograph Naming and
Necessi ty1 .
According to descriptionalism, names are semantically
associated with some property or properties, and the
referent of the term in a context is the individual that has
the property or properties thus associated. The name,
therefore, has the sort of content possessed by a definite
description (whether or not the language actually contains a
definite description with that content)
. Now people
commonly use and understand proper names in natural
languages; so the corresponding description ought to be one
that could be commonly used and understood. For example,
one might think that the name "Kasparov" is associated with
the description "the current world chess champion". But, it
would be implausible to think that the name is alike in
meaning to: "the human being whose genetic sequence is, on
the first chromosome, AAGTCCCTGA.
. .
. ,
and on the second
chromosome...., etc", that is, to a complete genetic
description of Kasparov.
Suppose, then, that the name Kasparov, as used in some
particular context, is identical in content to "the current
world chess champion". If that is the case, then the
proposition expressed by
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1) Kasparov is the current world chess champion
ought to be necessary, or at least the proposition expressed
by the following is necessary:
2) If Kasparov exists, then Kasparov is the current world
chess champion
But then, it is necessary that if Kasparov exists, Kasparov
is the current world chess champion. And, this is certainly
wrong. It is certainly possible for Kasparov to exist,
while someone other than Kasparov is the current world chess
champion
.
8
The argument does not depend upon the particular
description suggested here, but requires only that the
description picks out either (a) a property that Kasparov
has only contingently, or (b) a property that he has
essentially, but one such that it is a contingent matter
that he has it uniquely (perhaps like the description of
Kasparov's complete genetic makeup discussed above).
4.1.2 The Eoistemic Arguments
The epistemic arguments are similar to the modal
arguments. If "Kasparov" means the same thing as "the
current world chess champion", then sentence (2) above is
analytic. It seems then that the proposition it expresses
ought to be knowable a priori, just as it is knowable a
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prion that if the current world chess champion exists, then
the current world chess champion is the current world chess
champion
.
9
But, certainly it is not knowable a priori that if
Kasparov exists, then Kasparov is the current world chess
champion. It is not by the use of my reasoning abilities
alone that I learn this proposition; rather, it is known on
the basis of my a posteriori knowledge of current affairs.
4.1.3 The Semantic Arguments
This argument is due to Donnellan. Thales is alleged
to be the Greek philosopher who held that all is water.
Suppose, then, that the content of "Thales" is given by the
description "the Greek philosopher who held that all is
water". Here is Salmon's formulation of the remainder of
the argument
:
"Suppose now that, owing to some error or fraud,
the man referred to by writers such as Aristotle
and Herodotus, from whom our use of the name
'Thales' derives, never genuinely believed that
all is water. Suppose further that by a very
strange coincidence there was indeed a Greek
hermit-philosopher who did in fact hold this
bizarre view, though he is unknown to us and bears
no historical connection to us. To which of these
two philosophers would our name 'Thales' refer?
This is a clear semantic question with a clear
answer: The name would refer to the first of the
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This argument is of a very different kind than the first
two, and it is essential to understand the difference.
The modal argument asks us to consider the proposition
that is actually expressed by our use of "if Kasparov
exists, then Kasparov is the current world chess champion",
/
and then to evaluate that proposition relative to various
counterfactual circumstances. It is designed to prompt the
intuition that that proposition is false in some of those
circumstances and so is contingent.
In the framework of possible worlds semantics, this is
reflected by the values of the designation function: for all
w, D ( "Kasparov"
,
w) = Kasparov. The name "Kasparov", it is
said, designates Kasparov in every possible world. But,
this locution is a piece of semantic jargon; it does not
mean the same thing that we would mean were we say that it
is necessarily the case that "Kasparov" refers to Kasparov.
Surely, the name might "Kasparov" might have denoted
something else.
The semantic argument asks us to consider not the
proposition that is actually expressed in the present
context, but the proposition that would be expressed in
certain other contexts. The contexts in question are very
similar to ones that actually obtain and have certain
historical facts in common. One of those facts is that the
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man referred to by Aristotle and Herodotus, and from whom
our use of the name Thales derives, never held that all is
water. The claim, then, is that in such contexts, on the
descriptional theory, the occurrence of "Thales" in "Thales
held that all is water", refers to the Greek philosopher who
did hold that view, and the proposition expressed is one
that is true in the circumstance that is embedded within
that context. The theory of direct reference, however,
predicts that in those contexts, the occurrence of the name
"Thales" in the given sentence refers to the person "from
whom the use of the name derives", and that the proposition
expressed by the sentence is then true in the circumstance
of evaluation embedded within the context.
4.1.4 Propositional Attitudes Arguments
Some of the same arguments that use modal contexts to
argue against descriptionalism can be turned into arguments
that employ propositional attitude ascriptions for the same
purpose. So, for example, it might be argued that there are
many people who know that there is a current world chess
champion, but who do not know who the current world chess
champion is. Call one of these people "Lester". Then the
sentence
:
3) Lester does not believe that Kasparov is the current
world chess champion
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is true, but the sentence that results from replacing
“Kasparov" with the description that is supposed to give its
meaning
:
4) Lester does not believe that the current world chess
champion is the current world chess champion
is false.
This argument is related to, but different than, the
epistemic arguments. In those arguments we are asked to
consider the propositions expressed by the embedded
sentences, and to consider whether those propositions are or
are not knowable a priori . Here we look at propositional
attitude ascriptions and are asked to consider whether or
not they are true.
There is a serious problem with propositional attitude
arguments for direct reference. As is shown by Frege's
puzzle about identity, the arguments can be used against
direct reference as well. So, there are people who do not
know that "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are two names for the
same heavenly body, although they know these names and do
believe that each of them is a name of some heavenly body.
Call one of these people "Hester". So we have:
5) Hester does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus
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IS true, but
6 ) Hester does not believe that Hesperus is Hesperus
is false. But, if "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are both
directly referential singular terms, and if their contents
are their referent ^ -.—.j -p ,_-us, and if they both refer to the same
thing, and if the content of a term is the contribution it
makes to determining the proposition expressed by a sentence
that contains it, then
,5) and ( 6 , must say the same thing.
The problem is that propositional attitude verbs seem
be exquisitely sensitive to the smallest differences
between the sentences embedded within their complementary
"that "-clauses, even to those differences that we would
generally think involve no differences in meaning. m fact,
I am inclined to think that for any singular terms a and 3,
even if they are co-referential, and as alike in meaning as
one cares to allow, it is possible to find a context in
which, for some person with name 'S',
S believes a = a
is true, while
S believes a = 3
is false, so long as a and 3 are different terms
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It is possible to sustain the hypothesis that names are
directly referential, even when falling within the scope of
propositional attitudes verbs, in the face of puzzles like
Frege's puzzle 11
. But, because of such puzzles, I think
that propositional attitudes arguments for direct reference,
like the one above, are unconvincing. It seems that,
whatever account the defenders of direct reference give of
the semantics of (5) and (6), in order to defend the claim
that "Hesperus" and " Phospherus " have the same content, the
opponent of direct reference can always use the tools of
that account to forge an account of the semantics of (3) and
(4), in order to defend the claim that "Kasparov" and "the
current world chess champion" have the same content.
4.1.5 Quantifying in
There is one other argument that, while not an argument
for direct reference per se, is an argument for the
possibility of direct reference, and thus for singular
propositions, and so should be mentioned here. 12
Consider locutions that involve quantification into
clauses governed by modal operators, such as 'there is an x
such that it is possible that x is a philosopher'. If we
take these operators as operators on propositions, something
that takes a proposition as a value, then we seem to be
saying this : that there is some thing such that the
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proposition determined by assigning that thing as the
denotation of the variable x in the open formula 'x is a
philosopher' is possible. But, that seems to mean that all
you need to get a proposition from the formula is to supply
the variable 'x' with a referent. This suggests then that,
whether there actually are any directly referential terms in
natural languages or not, we could invent some. And if we
replaced the 'x' in the open formula 'x is a philosopher' by
a directly referential singular term that refers to one of
the things that satisfy the formula 'it is possible that x
is a philosopher', then the proposition determined by the
sentence will be a singular proposition, and will be
possible
.
One can avoid the conclusion of this argument by
insisting on the extensional world theory treatment of modal
discourse. In EWT
,
the apparent propositional operators are
analyzed away. The example in the previous paragraph is
rendered as ' there is an x and there is a world w
(accessible from a) such that x is in w and x is a
philosopher in w" . This sentence may be regarded as not
involving any reference to propositions.
In Chapter Two, I argued that there are problems for
the actualist with the EWT treatment of modal discourse.
Later in this chapter, I will strengthen the argument by
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arguing against approaches to EWT that use individual
essences to avoid these problems.
4 . 2 Resis tance to Direct Reference
Many philosophers, perhaps most philosophers, would
reject N-dependency : the view that the proposition expressed
by a sentence containing a proper name is ontologically
dependent on the referent of the name. But, sometimes it is
difficult to determine the basis for their resistance. Are
they best construed as denying that the referent of the name
is the content of the name (and so denying that the
sentence expresses a singular proposition) ? Or are they
denying that the singular proposition expressed by the
sentence is ontologically dependent on that content? For
example, Plantinga claims that some propositions, including
those containing names and indexicals, are "directly about"
certain individuals, and that those propositions are not
ontologically dependent on those individuals. 13 But, the
most plausible construal of Plantinga' s account is that he
means to deny that names are directly referential, and thus
that propositions directly about an individual are singular
propositions
.
In this section, I want to consider certain views of
singular reference that are in conflict with, or that may
appear to be in conflict with, the theory of direct
150
reference. I will begin with two for which the conflict is
only an apparent one
.
4.2.1 Freqeanism and Modified Fraapanism
Some philosophers have proposed a modification of the
traditional Fregean framework, that would allow that names
and indexicals are rigid designators, while attempting to
preserve the use of senses in propositional attitudes
contexts. Suppose that natural language expressions have,
in addition to their contents, some other semantic value,
which we may call its connotation. Assume that connotations
and contents are semantically independent: neither one plays
any semantic role in determining the other. And, just as
there is a component of the expression's meaning, its
character, that determines a function from contexts to
circumstances, so there is some other component of the
meaning of the expression, corresponding to character, that
determines a function from contexts to connotations.
Since connotations are independent of content, they are
truth conditionally inert: they play no role in determining
the proposition that determines whether the sentence is true
or false. It is still possible that the connotation of a
sentence is a proposition, just not that proposition. But,
connotations do have this role: the content of an expression
falling within the scope of a propositional attitude verb,
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in a given context, is the customary connotation of the
embedded sentence in that context. Suppose, finally, that
the connotation of a singular term is typically not its
referent
.
While proposals of this form14 may be thought of as an
alternative to direct reference, they really require only a
limitation on it. It turns out that certain occurrences of
singular terms, whose contents are usually their referents
are not directly referential. Only those occurrences within
the scope of a propositional attitude verb will fail to be
directly referential. But, most occurrences of the term
will be directly referential.
4.2.2 Modified Descriotionalism
Another technique for interpreting singular terms
construes them as synonymous with certain complex
' dthat '
-
h
terms. So, for instance, while "Kasparov" may not mean the
same thing as "the current world chess champion", perhaps it
means the same thing as "[dthat: the current world chess
champion] " . For this to be a kind of descriptionalism,
'dthat' must be given an operator interpretation and not a
demonstrative interpretation. Otherwise, the embedded
description is not part of the sentence, so there is no
sense in which the singular term is synonymous with some
*
description-like entity.
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Modified Descriptionalism is not refuted by the modal
and epistemic arguments for direct reference. it is in
conflict with the semantic arguments, though. Because,
assuming that "Thales" is synonymous with "[dthat: the
ancient Greek philosopher who held that all is water]
" , it
has the result that our uses of the name "Thales" refer to
whoever in fact did hold that all is water, rather than to
the person from whom our use of the name derives. But,
whatever the merits of Modified Descriptionalism, we have
seen that the operator use of 'dthat' can be interpreted so
as to make ' dthat ' -terms directly referential: they have
prior reference. So Modified Descriptionalism is not in
conflict with the notion that the singular terms to which it
applies are directly referential.
We now turn to a view of singular term reference that
really is in conflict with the theory of direct reference.
4.2.3 Freaeanism with Essences
One line of resistance to direct reference involves the
use of individual essences as the contents of singular
terms. 15 An individual essence of an individual is a
property that is essential to that individual and that is
essentially unique to that individual. More precisely:
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Df: P is an individual essence of x =df necessarily
exists then x has P, and necessarily, for any ynecessarily if y has P, then x = y.
if x
Then we can say that a property P is an individual essence
just in case it is possible that there be something such
that P is an individual essence of that thing.
Part of the appeal of individual essences is that there
might be individual essences that are not individual
essences of any actually existing thing. if there are such
uninstantiated essences, then, they may be able to provide
an actualist substitute for possibilia: rather than say that
there is a possible individual that is F in some world, we
could say that there is an individual essence that is co-
instantiated with F in that world.
What I wish to focus on, however, is the use of
individual essences as the contents of singular terms. If a
singular term 3, that refers in some context u to an
individual i, has an essence of i as its content in u, then
the sentence
C') There is an x such that necessarily, if x exists, then
3 = x
will be true in u. So 3 will satisfy our criterion of rigid
designation. But, since they would function semantically
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like a definite description, terms like 3 would not be
directly referential.
The philosopher most responsible for developing this
treatment of singular terms is Alvin Plantinga 16
. Plantinga
has described four different types of essences: qualitative
essences, cx-relational essences, world-indexed essences, and
thisnesses
. I will consider each of these in turn. in each
case, I will argue, either there are good metaphysical
reasons for thinking that there are no such essences, or
there are good semantical reasons for thinking that they are
not the contents of names, indexicals and demonstratives.
Before proceeding we must explain what is meant by
"thisness", and consider the difference between purely
qualitative properties, called "suchnesses" by Robert Adams,
and quiditative properties. A thisness is the property of
being identical to some particular individual. More
precisely, to say that some property P is the thisness of x
is to say that P is the property of being identical to x.
There is nothing within the Buridanian metaphysics
under consideration in this thesis that rules out thisnesses
of actually existing individuals. But, later I will argue
that those are all of the thisnesses there are: had some of
these individuals failed to exist, so their thisnesses would
have failed to exist; and if had there been individuals
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other than the ones that actually exist, there would have
been thisnesses of those individuals as well, thisnesses
that are not identical to the thisness of any actually
existing individual.
Plantinga is an actualist, but no Buridanian. He
believes not just that there are thisnesses of actually
existing individuals, but that there are thisnesses of all
of the things that there could have been as well. Since
these thisnesses are not actually exemplif ied, we can not
say that, for a given unexemplified thisness P, there is an
x such that P is the property of being identical to x. But,
we can say that there could have been an x that exemplified
P, and that it is necessary that, had P been exemplified by
some thing y, P would have been the property of being
identical to y.
To begin, we need a working account of what it means
for a property to be purely qualitative. Robert Adams
defines purely qualitative properties in terms of a kind of
property he calls a basic suchness . A basic suchness is a
property that (a) is not a thisness, and not equivalent to a
thisness, (b) is not any property P such that there exists a
relation R and individuals x 2 , x2 , ..., xn such that P is the
property of bearing R to x1# x2 , . . ., xn , and (c) is not the
property of "being identical with or related in one way or
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another to an extensionally defined set that has an
individual among its members, or among its members' members,
or among its members' members' members, etc." 17 a purely
qualitative property is one that is a basic suchness or
constructed out of basic suchnesses by certain logical
operations
.
us restrict our attention for the time being to
physical objects. Intuitively, the class of qualitative
properties of physical objects ought to include intrinsic
physical properties such as shape, mass (perhaps), charge
(perhaps) etc. It should also include relational properties
such as being such-and-such distance from a some physical
object x with intrinsic physical properties F, G, H etc.
But, if q is some physical object with those properties F,
G, H, etc., then the property of being such-and-such a
distance from q is not a purely qualitative property.
4. 2. 3.1 Qualitative Essences
A qualitative essence is one constructed out of purely
qualitative properties. Adams argues, convincingly I think,
that it is possible for there to be an individual that has
no qualitative essence. I think that similar considerations
lead to the conclusion that there could be no physical
object that has a qualitative essence.
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Adams argues for the weaker claim from the possibility
of I-pairs: an I pair is simply a pair of objects that share
all of there suchnesses. Adams points out that there seems
to be a variety of different ways in which I-pairs could
exist: there is the famous example due to Max Black
involving
"a universe consisting solely of two large solid
globes of iron. They always have been, are, and
always will be exactly similar in shape (perfectly
spherical), size, chemical composition, color - in
short, in every qualitative respect. They even
share all their relational suchnesses; for
example, each of them has the property of being
two diameters from another iron globe similar to
itself . 1,18
There are also more complicated imaginary universes;
universes that are:
"perfectly symmetrical about a central point,
line, or plane, throughout their history. Or they
may always repeat themselves to infinity in every
direction, like a monstrous three-dimensional
wallpaper pattern." 19
The symmetric universe examples depend on a
controversial issue about the intrinsic properties of
spatial entities. The issue is whether the intrinsic purely
geometrical properties of an object are preserved under
mirror reflection. Consider a solid tetrahedron T with
three edges of lengths 1, 2, and 3, sharing a common vertex
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and mutually orthogonal. Now consider a tetrahedron T' that
is geometrically related to T by reflection through a plane.
Although T and T' are isometric (geometrically isomorphic
with respect to the distance relation)
,
they cannot be made
to coincide by a rigid motion
:
some combination of rotations
about a line and translations (moving it along a straight
line without rotating it)
.
Such objects are sometimes
called incongruent counterparts
.
If some spatial entity
could have an incongruent counterpart, it is an
enantiomorph
.
Since T and T' are isometric, they share all intrinsic
properties that are determined by the distance relations
holding among their parts. But, some have argued that there
are two additional global intrinsic geometrical properties,
each possessed by one and not the other
.
20 If this is the
case then, two objects related by a mirror reflection do not
have all of the same intrinsic properties. And so the
symmetric universes do not necessarily provide examples of
I-pairs
.
Notice that a world consisting only of tetrahedron T
and a congruent counterpart to T, T' 1
,
would not serve here.
Because there would be differences in the spatial relational
properties of the two. For instance, depending on how they
were placed, one of them might have a property like being a
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solid tetrahedron x for which there is another solid
tetrahedron y in the region of space that is (a) bounded by
the plane determined by x's edges of lengths 1 and 2, and
(b) contains x's edge of length 3.
Black's two spheres case depends on the fact that the
spheres are self
-symmetrical
, symmetric about their centers,
so that even if they are related to one another by a mirror
reflection, they will be perfectly congruent. And there
will be no qualitative asymmetries within the spheres that
could serve as a basis for distinguishing properties such as
the one discussed in the previous paragraph. But, there is
a question as to whether anything made of iron could be
self-symmetrical
. It seems that certain physical objects,
like iron atoms, are enantiomorphs
,
and that they appear in
nature in only one particular orientation. 21 If this is
somehow part of the nature of iron, then perhaps there could
not be a self -symmetrical iron sphere.
So, the most compelling examples are those of the
"infinite wallpaper" universes. Any assymetry in the
relationship between two spatial entities x and y in such a
universe will be matched by a corresponding asymmetry
between y and some other entity z. So, for any qualitative
relational property of x, that x has in virtue of its
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relation to y, y will have the same property in virtue of
its relation to z.
Now, if wallpaper worlds are possible, then we can
argue that no spatiotemporal entity could have a purely
qualitative essence. Consider any material thing x at some
time t. It seems possible that x could have existed all by
itself in an infinite otherwise empty space S, in perpetual
possession of the intrinsic properties that it actually has
at t. But, if that is possible, then it seems equally
possible that x could exist in a world consisting of x and
infinitely many copies of x arranged in an infinite
wallpaper pattern. We need only consider some cubical
region of the space S that contains x, and then "brick up"
our new universe with infinitely many replicas of the
region, all oriented in the same way. We can then argue as
follows
:
1. Necessarily, for any x, it is possible that there is y
such that x and y both exist and are I-pairs.
2. Necessarily, for any x and any qualitative property Q,
necessarily, if there exists a y such that x and y both
exist and are I pairs, then x has Q only if y has Q.
3 . Necessarily, for any x, necessarily, if there is a y such
that x and y both exist and are I-pairs, then x * y.
4. Necessarily, for any x and any qualitative property Q, if
Q is an essence of x then necessarily, for any y, if x
and y both exist and x * y, then x has Q and y does not
have Q
.
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But it then follows that
5. Necessarily, for any x and any qualitative property Q, ifQ is an essence of x, then it is possible that there is a
y such that y has Q and y does not have Q.
But, since the consequent is clearly impossible, we have
6. Necessarily, for any x and any qualitative property Q,
Q is not and essence of x.
So, nothing can have a purely qualitative essence.
4 . 2 . 3 .
2
a-Relational Essences
An a-relational essences is a property that consists in
being related in such-and-such a way to such and such actual
individuals. A standard example is the property of being
the organism that resulted from the fusion of gametes A and
B, where 'A' and ' B' are names of the gametes whose fusion
produced some particular human being H. Some essentialists
have argued that a property such as this one is essential to
whatever has it, and is necessarily such that nothing other
than the thing that actually has it could have it. So, it
is an individual essence.
I do not believe that this property is essential to H,
nor do I believe that nothing besides H could have it. But,
we need not consider this issue to make the main point
regarding a-relational essences. Our question here is
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whether we can give a semantic account of names that avoids
direct reference by the use of essences as semantic
contents. And the problem with a-relational essences is
that they cannot do this job alone. Suppose we replace a
name of some entity x by a description of the form "the x
that bears R to a, b, and c" where 'a', 'b' and
'
c' are
of actual individuals. Unless we can replace those
names with descriptions, we have not eliminated direct
reference. So we seem to be involved in an infinite
sequence of essences, or else we terminate the sequence with
a description that contains only terms whose content is some
other kind of essence.
4 . 2 .
3
. 3 World-indexed Essences
For a given property P, let the w- transform of P be the
property of being P in w. Suppose that there is only one
thing that has P in W. Then, the w-transform of P would
seem to be an essence of that thing; for, no matter how that
thing might have been different, so long as it existed it
would have the property of being P in w, and, if anything y
were to have the property of being P in w, that thing y
would have to be x, since only one thing, x, has P in w. A
w-transform that is an essence is a world indexed essence.
I will argue later that, typically, w- transforms are
not essences . I will argue that worlds are almost always
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contingent beings, and that for anything x that exists in a
world w, it is almost always the case that x could exist
without w existing as well, and that if this were actually
the case, x would not possess any w-transforms
. But, this
argument depends on Buridanism, so it would be inappropriate
to bring it up here as a criticism of world-indexed essences
in the course of the argument for Buridanism.
The most plausible candidates among the world-indexed
essences to play the role of contents of names would be a-
indexed essences, where a is the actual world. The idea
here is that the sense of a name would be something very
close to the sort of sense it has according to traditional
Fregeanism - some fairly ordinary property by which speakers
and hearers can identify the referent of the name, the "mode
of presentation" of that referent. The only twist is that
the identifying property gets tied down to a particular
world - the actual one.
Now, one issue here is that cx-indexed essences seem
just to be a special case of a-relational essences. So, we
have the problem that was discussed in the last section. If
we were to fashion a description to do the job explicitly
that the defender of this approach says is done by names
implicitly, we would use a description like "the F in a" or
"the F in (where @ is an indexical that denotes the world
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in which it is used)
. So, in order to get rid of direct
reference entirely, we would need to come up with some other
essence for the actual world.
Perhaps this is not a problem: maybe worlds have
qualitative essences. Also, note if one were to allow this
kind of direct reference only, and attempt to explain all
other singular reference in terms of w-transforms
, and hold
that worlds are necessarily existing entities, then although
there would be singular propositions with worlds as
constituents, those propositions would not be contingent
things - thus avoiding the snares of Buridanism.
The approach here is very similar to what I called
modified descriptionalism above - the use of ' dthat'-
modified descriptions, to secure direct reference. And,
indeed, it suffers from the same problem: It is ruled out by
the semantical argument for direct reference. Whether the
description is rigidified via a world index or not, we get
the result that "Thales" refers to whoever in fact, in our
world, held that all is water. But, that seems wrong.
4. 2. 3.
4
Thisnesses
The thisness of a thing x is the property of being
identical to that thing x, or, better perhaps, the property
of being x. Certainly, if there are thisnesses, then they
are essences. Because, x is surely necessarily such that,
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if it exists, then it is identical to itself, and nothing
other than x could be identical to x. The question,
though, is whether the thisness of x is dependent on x
itself. One who thinks it is not could argue as follows:
the property P of being Plantinga could exist even without
inga existing, and it would still be the property of
being Plantinga. Of course, that does not mean that, were
that situation actual, there would be something, namely
Plantinga, such that P is the property of being that thing.
There seems to me to be only three accounts of what a
thisness might be. On one account, the thisness of x is the
complex property constructed somehow out of x and the
relation of identity. On this account, the thisness depends
on x. Or it is constructed out of some essence of x and
identity. Back to old problems. Or it is a pure haecceity
- something pure and simple and non- individual and non-
qualitative, something we know not what that makes a thing
what it is and not something else. Surely, this view is
just too obscure to be taken seriously.
4 . 3 The Dependency Thesis
I have argued that there are singular propositions
because there are sentences containing directly referential
singular terms. The content of a directly referential
singular term is an individual. Every sentence that
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expresses a proposition can be thought of as determining a
PDF in which the content of each of the sentence's
contentful component expressions is a component. To say
that an entity x is a constituent of a proposition P is to
say that there is a PDP with x as a component whose product
is P. A singular PDP is one that contains an individual as
a component, and a singular proposition is one that is the
product of a singular PDP.
Consider now this formulation of the dependency thesis:
DEP: Necessarily, for any singular proposition P with
constituent c, necessarily, P exists only if c exists.
What reasons are there for thinking that this is true? One
who accepts this is likely to do so for something like the
following reasons:
DEPa: Necessarily, for any singular PDP Q that determines
proposition P, necessarily if P exists, then Q exists
and determines P.
DEPb: Necessarily, for any PDP Q with component c,
necessarily, if Q exists, then c exists and is a
component of Q.
DEPa and DEPb together entail DEP; for, if some singular
proposition P has some constituent i, then there is a PDP Q
with component i that determines P. According to DEPb, Q
cannot exist without i existing as well, and according to
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DEPa, P cannot exist without Q existing as well. So, it is
impossible for P to exist unless i exists.
Notice that there is usually more than one PDP that
determines a given proposition, sometimes more than one is
associated with a single sentence. There is always the PDP
that has as its input sequence the contents of its
elementary contentful components, lined up in the order in
which they appear in the sentence. But, there will also be
PDPs in which the proposition is "partially computed"
.
Up to this point there is nothing to prevent one from
holding the view that, though some entity i may be a
constituent of a proposition P, it is possible for P to be
determined by a PDP without i as a component. Perhaps there
could be, or there may even actually be, a completely
different PDP that determines P but has radically different
components
.
If this is the case, perhaps the proposition P could
exist, not just with additional constituents, but without
constituent i existing at all. However, I want to block an
argument that says this must be the case. Suppose P is a
proposition with i as a constituent. For any individual j,
that does not depend on i, there must be some propositional
function F such that F(j) = P, but which is not defined for
i. Since it is not defined for i, that function does not
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depend on i
. So, it is possible that F and j could exist
without i, and that there is a PDP that determines P via F
and j that does not have i as a component. So, it is
possible that P exist without i.
This argument is question begging. The fact that the
function F is not defined for i does not entail that it
could exist without i. This is especially easy to see in
the case of set- theoretic functions-in-extension
. If a
function is a set of ordered pairs, then consider the
function f consisting of all ordered pairs <x, y> where x is
a natural number greater than 1 and y = x-1. The function f
is not defined for the number 1, but it contains 1 in its
range. So, it seems likely that f depends
on the number 1 for its existence.
Even if functions are construed as functions-in-
intention, the same principle may apply. The defender of
DEP may hold that a propositional function F that has the
proposition [Quine is a philosopher] in its range depends
for its existence on Quine, even if it is not defined for
Quine
.
Of course, the term 'PDP' is my own invention, so
nobody has defended ontological dependency in just these
terms before. But, there is a good reason for framing the
question this way. First, it would be implausible to say
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that the existence of the proposition depends on the
existence of some sentence that expresses it. But, we can't
just assume the existence of structured propositions. PDP's
give us entities that are independent of the sentences that
determine them, but which directly correspond to the way in
which a sentence expresses a proposition, and not to the
expressed proposition itself.
I think that most defenders of DEP would have no
problem with the defense in terms of PDP's. For such a
philosopher, all the talk about PDP's comes down to this:
the reason that a singular proposition depends on its
constituents is that, so long as that proposition exists,
the meanings that determined that proposition would continue
to exist, and the way in which those meanings are combined
to get a proposition would continue to exist. And that is
why the result of combining those meanings in that way would
exist
.
To evaluate DEP it is necessary to consider the
different conceptions of the nature of a proposition, and to
see how plausible DEP comes out according to each of those
conceptions. I do not believe that any of the main
conceptions of the nature of a proposition provides a reason
against DEP, but some seem to give us some reason for it,
while others seem neutral.
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So far as I can see, there are three main Actualist
accounts of propositions to consider: (i) different versions
of the structural view, according to which propositions
literally have their constituents as parts or members; (ii)
accounts of propositions as sets of abstract possible
worlds, circumstances or situations, where these entities
are taken as primitive in some sense, and not defined in
terms of propositions themselves. According to these
accounts, propositions have subsets and so have parts in
some sense, but they do not have their constituents as
parts; and (iii) views that take propositions to be
structureless simples: a sort of logical monad.
Propositions of this sort have no structure whatsoever.
4.3.1 Structural Accounts of Propositions
The structural view of propositions comes in different
versions. While each of them supports something like DEP,
only one supports DEP itself. The others require a
restricted formulation of DEP: a restriction of the class of
propositions to which it applies.
The most straightforward version of the structural view
of propositions takes them to be structured n-tuples in
which the contents of all of the simplest, or elementary,
contentful expressions in the sentence appear as terms, or
terms of terms, or terms of terms of terms etc.
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For example, a sentence such as "The astute philosopher
who wrote Demonstratives teaches at UCLA" expresses a
proposition with something like the following structure:
<<THE
,
<P, <A and <W, d>>>>, T, <a, U>>
9- sentence like "Kaplan is a philosopher" expresses
the proposition <k, P>
. Call these discrete linear
structures
.
Now, I take it as established that sets, and the
sequences constructed from them, depend on their elements,
so it seems plausible to hold that if propositions are
discrete linear structures, then they do depend on those of
their constituents that appear in the structure. But,
there's the rub. On the conception of singular proposition
that I have developed, not all of the contents of singular
terms are elementary contents. So, for example, the
proposition expressed by the sentence "Dthato astute
philosopher who wrote Demonstratives teaches at UCLA" turns
out to be a proposition with a form almost identical the
first one:
<<DTO
,
<P, <A and <W, D>>>>, T, <a, U>>
Kaplan is the content of the ' Dthato ' -clause , so is a
constituent, of the proposition expressed by the sentence.
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But, Kaplan does not appear anywhere in the linear structure
above. So, we have no basis for affirming that DEP holds,
unless we take the reference to constituents in DEP to mean
"elementary constituents".
This view of the nature of propositions leaves no room
for reflecting the fact that the second sentence contains an
expression that has Kaplan as a content - it leaves no room
for derived contents. It seems to leave out an important
fact about the proposition.
An alternative would be to use a two dimensional
representation of propositional structure: so a sentence
like " Dthato woman is the mother of dthato boy" is the
propositional structure:
<<DTO, W>, M, <DTO, B>>
<L, M, I>
In this version, all of the constituents of a proposition
are represented, and we would have a basis for an
unrestricted acceptance of DEP. Call these 2D structures.
The discrete linear structure picture does not allow
for the representation of derived content. At the other
extreme would be the view that, in some sense, only derived
content should be represented. Let's draw a distinction.
Say that the content of an expression is composite just in
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case it has derived content, but that derived content
consists simply in a structure built out of the contents
from which it is derived. For example, one might hold that
the content of a sentence like "Kaplan is a philosopher" is
composite in that it consists of the ordered pair <k, p>
Some expressions, though, like 1 dthato '
-terms
,
have derived
content, but that content is a single individual and is not
made up of the contents of its parts.
The third version of the structural account takes
propositions to contain as parts only those contents of the
sentence that expresses it that are themselves composite
structures or parts of such composite structures. Any
contents that are "absorbed into" some other content will
not be represented. So, the sentence "Kaplan is a
philosopher" and " [Dthato: author who wrote Demonstratives]
is a philosopher" will be taken to express the same
proposition. Both are the structure <k, P>
. Call these
composite structures .
If propositions are composite structures, then DEP
would presumably have to be restricted. For example, the
sentence "[Dthato: son of Dan Kervick] is in 1st grade" and
the sentence "Ian Kervick-Jimenez is in 1st grade" both
express the same proposition, representable by something
like <1, i, f>.
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What is there to be said for the structural views?
Primarily, they offer some account of the way in which
propositions correspond to the world of which they are true
or false. They correspond to certain entities and
properties in virtue of the fact that they have those
entities and properties as parts. This is relevant also to
the issue of the relationship of propositions to the
sentences that express them. In order to explain how it is
that a given proposition P is the content of some sentence
S, we need to explain the relationship between the content
of S and the content of the component expressions of S. The
structural view explains this relation also in terms of
parthood.
Finally, another reason for holding the structural view
is that it holds out some promise of showing why certain
modal properties and relations hold. It may be that in some
cases we can explain, for example, why some particular
proposition P is a necessary consequence of a proposition Q
by appealing to the fact that Q contains P, in a particular
way, as a part.
4.3.2 Propositions as Sets of Worlds
Another group of views of the nature of propositions
takes them to be sets of possible worlds or situations. On
these views, worlds are primitive entities; they are not
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individual concrete universes. The worlds themselves have
no structure, although they do differ in their intrinsic
properties. Propositions do have some structure in the
sense that they have subsets
.
A curious feature of this view is that the more
descriptive a proposition is, the more complex seeming the
situation it describes, the less structure it has. Some
very simple propositions will be true in many worlds, but
the only difference between the proposition that describes a
whole world and the world itself is the difference between
{w} and w.
There are certain notorious problems affecting such
views: one has to do with propositional attitude
ascriptions. On these views, since propositions that are
necessarily equivalent are true in exactly the same worlds,
then if someone believes that the cat is on the mat, then
they also believe that either the cat or the dog next door
is on the mat or the car, but no cat and no canine next door
is on a motor vehicle, and no dogs are on any cars (and by
the way Fermat's Theorem is true).
The view that a proposition is a set of worlds is often
combined with an extensional world theory account of worlds,
and so inherits the problems that those views have been
shown to have. And, views of worlds that are not based on
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EWT are typically modalist views, that build worlds up out
of propositions or states of affairs to begin with. since
these entities are suited by themselves to play the role of
semantic contents for sentences, there seems no reason to
take the constructed worlds and use them in turn to build
propositions
.
Sets of worlds do have some structure, and give us a
set theoretic account of certain logical properties. A
proposition P strictly implies another proposition Q if and
only if P is a subset of Q. The course-grained intensional
entities these views generate can then also be used to build
structured intentions, mitigating somewhat the problems
having to do with the identity of necessarily equivalent
propositions
.
Thinking of propositions as sets of worlds in itself
seems to yield no reason either for or against DEP
.
However, the usual EWT approach quantifies over a "permanent
pool" of worlds, and so seems to require worlds and sets of
worlds to be ontologically independent of the things that
exist in them. Certain possibilist versions of EWT,
however, allow for the formulation of an extensional world
theory in which some worlds are in or exist in other worlds.
This would allow for the possibility that the existence of a
world may depend on the existence of the things that exist
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in that world, and so might allow for a defense of DEP
Without Actualism, though, DEP lacks bite. And, if it
should turn out that there is a way for a proposition to be,
without existing, then the case for Buridan's Thesis looks
tenuous
.
4.3.3 Logical Monads
A third view of the nature of propositions takes all
propositions to be like the worlds of the second view. They
have no internal structure at all. They do differ in their
intrinsic properties, but those properties have no basis in
the properties and internal organization of their parts.
Logical Monads are mysterious. They must differ in
their intrinsic properties, or else they would have no
differences in their truth conditions. And, there is an
unfathomably large collection of these properties. The view
offers no non-trivial account of how it is propositions have
the truth conditions they do. And, unlike the view that
propositions are sets of worlds, they offer no account of
how it is that propositions have the logical properties that
they have. Everything is primitive.
I believe that only structured propositions hold out
any promise of being able to explain the connection of
propositions to the things they represent, and that this is
a strong reason for favoring the structural account over the
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other accounts, and for believing the Dependency Thesis.
But, a full defense of this claim would require more space
than I can devote to it.
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CHAPTER 5
BURIDAN
' S THESIS AND BUR IDANISM
Buridan 1 s Thesis is the view that no proposition is
true or necessary or possible unless it exists. in this
chapter, I will consider the argument for Buridan' s thesis
and explore the consequences of the thesis. But, I will
take up these topics in inverse order. In my judgment, it
is easier to understand the issues involved in the defense
of Buridan s Thesis by first developing a proper conception
of where it leads.
In section 5.1, after first formulating the thesis, I
will show what metaphysical consequences can be drawn from
it. In section 5.2, I address the issue of the connection
between the immediate metaphysical consequences of Buridan 1 s
Thesis and more remote consequences having to do with
various conceptions of possible worlds. In section 5.3, I
consider the main arguments for the three components of
Buridan' s Thesis, and evaluate their effectiveness. In the
next chapter, I will take a more detailed look at the impact
of Buridanism on modal logic.
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5 . 1 Consequences of Buridan ' s Thesis
5.1.1 Formulation of Burl dan's Thesis
The three components of Buridan' s thesis can be
formulated as follows:
BTl : Necessarily, for any proposition P, necessarily, if pis necessary then P exists.
BT2
. Necessarily, for any proposition P, necessarily, if p
is possible then P exists.
BT3
. Necessarily, for any proposition P, necessarily, if p
is true then P exists.
The use of the iterated modality in the formulation of BTl,
BT2 and BT3 is essential. The first occurrence of
'necessarily' in each of the three indicates that each
holds, not just of actually existing propositions, but of
any propositions that would have existed had things been
different. The second occurrence of 'necessarily' gives the
thesis its bite. Consider, for example, BT2
. Since every
proposition that is possible satisfies the antecedent of the
conditional following the second occurrence of
'necessarily', then without this second occurrence, BT2
would just reduce to the more or less trivial actualistic
thesis that it is necessary that every proposition that is
possible exists. 1 And this follows directly from Actualism:
the claim that it is necessary that everything (propositions
that are possible included) exist. But, according to BT2
,
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it is not just the case that the proposition that Quine is a
philosopher is both possible and existent, but that no
matter how things were different, if the proposition were
still possible, then it would still exist, and if it did not
exist, it would not be possible.
^•1*2 Some Elementary Con sequences of Buridan 1 s The.q-i.c;
I mentioned some of the consequences of Buridan'
s
thesis in the Introduction. In this section I want to
further develop these consequeneces
.
I will use two devices to refer to propositions:
italicized
' that ' -clauses and square brackets. So, the
proposition that Quine does not exist will also be denoted
by ' [Quine does not exist]
'
.
I will make a few initial
assumptions about the semantics of modal attributions.
First, I will assume that all of the following
5.1) It is necessary that $
5.2) That 3> is necessary
5.3) Necessarily $
are equivalent. This ought not to be a very controversial
assumption. The claim that the first two are equivalent
reflects the judgment that 'that' clauses are a kind of
singular term, and that the singular term can be moved to
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subject place" without affecting meaning. This is a
parallel to the idea that ascriptions of belief, like:
5.4) Sam believes that $
can be rephrased both as
:
5.5) It is believed by Sam that $
and
:
5.6) That $ is believed by Sam.
The claim that the first two are equivalent to the
third is somewhat different. One might think that claims of
the third form such as "necessarily, Quine is a human being"
are alternate formulations of de re modal claims such as
'Quine is necessarily a human being' and that this latter is
only equivalent to the de dicto claim "it is necessary that,
if Quine exists, then Quine is a human being". Perhaps
then, it is best to regard the inclusion of the third item
on the list as a stipulation. I will avoid de re uses of
'necessarily', and will express the just-mentioned de dicto
claim as "Quine is essentially a human being", and I will
take the third form to be equivalent to the other two.
I will also assume that the proposition [Quine does not
exist] is simply the negation of [Quine exists] . It is not
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the same proposition as [Quine has non-existence]
.
According to Serious Actualism, discussed below, [Quine does
not exist] is possible, while [Quine has non-existence] is
not. Similarly, for any x, the proposition [x is not F]
will be taken to be the negation the proposition [x is F]
,
and I will assume that the former is not equivalent to the
proposition [x is non-F]
.
Now, the proposition [Quine does not exist], certainly
seems to be a proposition that is possible. Quine's
existence is a contingent matter. If [Quine does not exist]
is not possible, then its negation is necessary. So [It is
not the case that Quine does not exist] is necessary, or it
is necessary that Quine exists. This seems false.
But, the proposition [Quine does not exist] is
expressed by the sentence "Quine does not exist", which
contains the directly referential name 'Quine'. So, [Quine
does not exist] is a singular proposition with Quine as a
constituent. According to the Dependency Thesis, then, it
is impossible that that proposition exist unless Quine
exists as well. Now, suppose that it is possible that
[Quine does not exist] is true. If BT3 is true, then it is
necessary that, if [Quine does not exist] is true, then
[Quine does not exist] exists. But, by DEP, it is necessary
that if [Quine does not exist] exists, then Quine exists.
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not
It follows that it is necessary that if [Quine does
exist] is true, then Quine exists. But this is obviously
false, because it is obvious that if Quine does not exist,
then [Quine does not exit] is not true. So, our
supposition, that it is possible for [Quine does not exist]
/
to be true, is false. We conclude that:
A) It is possible that Quine does not exist, but it is notpossible that [Quine does not exist] is true.
So, [Quine does not exist] is possible, but not possibly
such that it is true. Now A is the negation of
^ it possible that Quine does not exist, then it is
possible that [Quine does not exist] is true.
and (A 1 ) is an substitution instance of the schema
SA' : If it is possible that 0, then it is possible that [0]
is true,
so, we seem to have a counterexample that shows the schema
SA' is invalid. 2
Similar arguments can be made affecting the schematic
form of the characteristic axioms of B, S4 and S5 To
simplify the presentation, let us refer to the proposition
[Quine does not exist] as ' ->Q ' and [Quine exist] as 1 Q
' :
While Q is possible, it is also possible that ->q not exist,
and if -<Q were to fail to exist, then, by BT2
,
it would not
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be possible; so it is not necessary that
have a violation of the schema
“'Q is possible. We
S5 : If it is possible that
is possible that ®.
then it is necessary that it
Now, consider a necessary proposition such as [Quine
exists or Quine does not exist]
. While it is necessary, it
is also possible that it fail to exist. And it is necessary
that, if it did not exist, then, by BT1
,
it would not be
necessary. So, it not necessary that it be necessary.
Thus, we have a violation of
• If it is necessary that <t>, then it is necessary that it
is necessary that 0.
Finally, Q is true; that is Quine exists. But it is
possible that Quine fail to exist, and in that circumstance
Q would not exist as well. And, by BT2
,
if Q did not exist,
then Q would not be possible. So, it is not necessary that
Q is possible. So, we have a violation of Brouwer's axiom.
B: If 0, then it is necessary that it is possible that <t,
and the similar axiom
TB: If it is true that $ then it is necessary that it is
possible that $.
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Buridan Thesis also has some interesting consequences
related to the supposed duality of the modal operators
'possibly and necessarily. m standard systems of modal
logic, we have the following theorems:
D1: “ it: is not Possible that <t», then it is necessary that
D2: ifc iS n0t necessary tha t ® then it is possible that
Insofar as I can determine, Buridan' s Thesis gives us
no reason to doubt these rules. There is no proposition-
expressing sentence that, when substituted for 0, makes
either of them come out false. 3 But, in standard systems of
modal logic, we also have as theorems the necessitations of
the above
:
D1 : Necessarily, if it is not possible that $, then it is
necessary that ->$,
D2 : Necessarily, if it is not necessary that 0 then it is
possible that -><£.
And, if Buridan' s Thesis is true, there do seem to be
counterexamples to these claims. Consider that it is
possible that Quine not exist; and if Quine were to fail to
exist, neither Q nor ^Q would exist. So, by BT1
, Q would
not be necessary, and, by BT2
,
-iQ would not be possible.
So, it is possible that: Q is not necessary and ->Q is not
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possible. But, this is equivalent to the denial of D2
. a
parallel argument can be given against D1
.
In standard systems of modal logic, we also have as an
inference rule the rule of necessitation
:
NEC: if 0 is a theorem, then $ is a theorem.
If it is true, though, that D1 and D2 are valid
schemas, so that all of their instances are true, and that
the necessitations of those schemas are not valid, then this
rule must fail as well.
5 . 2 Buridan's Thesis and Possible Worlds
5.2.1 Generic Modal i sm
Much of the difficulty surrounding Buridanian
metaphysics and logic pertains to the interaction between
Buridanism and various accounts of possible worlds. In this
section, I want to explore those connections. Some
actualist philosophers, including some who are receptive to
the basic Buridanian outlook, have thought that Buridanism
requires either some modification of the doctrine that a
proposition is possible if and only if it is true relative
to a world, or a modification of our understanding of the
very notion of a possible world.
In this section I will develop an account of possible
worlds, and of the nature of the relationships holding among
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possible worlds and broadly logical modality. The account
IS compatible with Buridanism, and yet allows us to keep the
traditional conception of possibility as truth relative to a
world. I believe that one positive aspect of the account is
that it preserves a popular "modalist" treatment of possible
worlds as maximal possible something-or-others
, but is
simpler, and more simply stated, than some alternative
modalist accounts that attempt to accommodate Buridanism.
In the Introduction, I set out a theory that I called
minimal world theory, and briefly discussed its modalist
interpretation. According to minimal world theory, the
following are true
MWT1) Necessarily, for all P, necessarily P is necessary if
and only if p is true relative to every world.
MWT2 ) Necessarily, for all P, necessarily P is possible if
and only if p is true relative to some world.
MWT3 ) Necessarily, for all P, necessarily P is true if and
only if P is true relative to the actual world.
Many philosophers believe these three things, although they
may differ about the meanings of "world" and "true relative
to" . I have used the term "relative to a world" in order to
express the three claims in as neutral a manner as possible.
More commonly, one encounters expressions such as "truth at
a world" or "truth in a world" or "truth according to a
world". But, as we shall see, these terms have now become
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somewhat theory laden lat-or -in f-v, -uy i a . L te m the chapter, i will assign
a more specific non-neutral meaning to the locution "true
(or false) relative to W" ; but, for the present, the precise
interpretation of the expression should be left open.
There is a family of accounts of possible worlds that
are often called "modalist" accounts. Modalists do not use
possible worlds to explain the modal notions of broadly
logical possibility and necessity, rather they typically use
modal notions in giving their account of what a possible
world is. I will begin by presenting a generic version of
modalism: it is generic in that it makes no claim about what
worlds are, but only about the relations of truth and
falsity relative to a world. Generic Modalism, then,
results from adding to the above three claims certain
additional hypotheses
:
First
,
in some sense worlds are supposed to determine
the truth or falsity of every proposition. They are thus
said to be maximal. We may define maximality like this:
Dfl: X is maximal =df for every proposition Q, Q is true
relative to X, or -*Q is true relative to X.
Then we have
:
The Maximality Hypothesis
MAX: Necessarily, for every world W, W is maximal.
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Second, worlds are possible worlds. The situation they
represent is supposed to be one that could obtain, so they
do not determine the truth of two inconsistent propositions.
Thus
,
we have
:
The Consistency Hypothesis
CON: Necessarily, for all W, and for all propositions P and
0, it P and Q are inconsistent, then they are not bothtrue relative to W.
These two claims generate certain further consequences.
Suppose we accept the following standard definitions of
propositional entailment and inconsistency.
Df 2
:
Necessarily, for all P and for all Q, P entails Q if
and only if necessarily, if p is true, then Q is true.
Df 3 Necessarily, for all P and for all Q, p and Q areinconsistent if and only if it is not is not possible
that both P is true and Q is true.
It is an uncontroversial claim that, for any proposition P,
it is necessary that if iQ is true, then Q is not true.
(Even Buridanians have no trouble with this one, it is the
converse that they doubt)
. So, it is a consequence of Dfl
and Df2 that if P entails Q, then P and ~iQ are inconsistent.
We can then conclude from MAX and CON the
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Closure Hypothesis
CLO: Necessarily, for any world W,
and Q, if p entails Q, then if
then Q is true relative to W.
and any propositions P
P is true relative to W,
Suppose otherwise: suppose there is a world W relative to
which some proposition P is true, but relative to which some
proposition Q entailed by P is not true. By MAX, since Q is
not true relative to W, ->Q is true relative to w
. But, if p
entails Q, then P and iQ are inconsistent, so by CON, they
are not both true relative to W.
The consistency of a world is not supposed to be just a
pairwise consistency of propositions, but is a global
affair
,
so it would seem that Generic Modalism involves the
Joint Possibility Hypothesis
JP: Necessarily, for any world W, the propositions that are
true relative to W are such that they could all be true
together
.
This hypothesis seems to be merely a logical
consequence of CON. The intuitive idea is this: suppose
that for some world W, the propositions that are true
relative to W are such that they could not all be true
together. Take any one P and let Q be the conjunction of
all the rest. Since each of the conjuncts of Q is true
relative to W, then Q is true relative to W. But, it would
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seem that it is not possible p and Q are both true
Q are inconsistent, which violates CON.
so P and
The reasoning here is not airtight. It involves a
controversial appeal to infinite conjunctions. And, the
formulation of the hypothesis makes use of plural
quantification. This is done so as to avoid commitment to
the claim that, for any world, there is a set consisting of
all of the propositions that are true relative to that
world. But, the hypothesis certainly seems to be in the
spirit of the rest.
One other assumption about the truth-relative- to-a-
world relation is often made. Whatever that relation
consists in, and whatever worlds are, it holds necessarily
between a world and a proposition, if it holds at all. So,
we include in Generic Modalism the
Necessity of World Relativity Hypothesis
NWR: For every world W and proposition P, P is true relative
to W if and only if necessarily, P is true relative
to W.
From NWR and JP we can conclude not only that the
propositions that are true relative to a world W are such
that they could all be true, but a stronger result:
JP+: Necessarily, for any world W, it is possible that:
every proposition that is true relative to W is true.
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Now, I have argued that a consequence of Buridanism is
that there are propositions that are possible but not
possibly true. Specifically I argued that while [Quine does
not exist] is possible, that proposition is not possibly
true. But, armed with the above hypotheses, the Generic
Modalist may argue against this claim as follows:
1'
-*- s Possible that Quine does not exist, (ass.)
2. [Quine does not exist] is possible, (from 1)
3. There is a world W such that [Quine does not exist] istrue relative to W. (from 2 and MWT2
)
4. There is a world W such that necessarily, if every
proposition that is true relative to W is true, then[Quine does not exist] is true, (from 3 and NWR)
5. For every world W, it is possible that: every proposition
true relative to W is true. (JP+)
6. It is possible that [Quine does not exist] is true.
(from 5and 6)
7.
If it is possible that Quine does not exist, then it is
possible that [Quine does not exist] is true, (from 1-6,
by conditional proof)
So, Generic Modalism seems incompatible with Buridanism.
The Buridanian has two options here: to drop the possible
worlds talk altogether, or to come up with a modification of
Generic Modalism.
There is some appeal to the first option. We have
already seen, in Chapter Two, that there is a problem
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concerning the compatibility of Actualism and extensional
world theories. Some have held that, without the benefits
of the first-order, extensional, analysis of modality in
terms of EWT, one might as well ignore the talk of possible
worlds. I don’t believe this is true. While I won’t
attempt to argue for it here, I believe that there are other
uses for the notion of a possible world even when it is
limited to the MWT conception.
5.2.2 Adams's World-stories
One philosopher who has taken the second option of
preserving the connection between modality and possible
worlds, but rethinking the nature of that connection, is
Robert M. Adams. 4 While I am sympathetic both to Adams's
goal and to the spirit of his overall approach, I believe
that Adams
' account involves an extreme and unnecessary
complication of the modalist account of possible worlds.
But, a consideration of Adams's account will help to prepare
the way for the introduction of my own account, because in
many other respects, Adams's views are very similar to mine.
Indeed, my own views were developed largely in response to a
reading of Adams' "Actualism and Thisness", but with an eye
toward avoiding the complex possible worlds machinery that
Adams seems to believe is required by the Buridanian
principles discussed so far.
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Adams introduces the notion of a world-story as his
version of a possible world. World-stories are maximal
consistent sets of actually existing propositions. They are
consistent in that they could all be true together. Adams
says that while "the intuitive idea behind calling the
world-stones maximal is that for every proposition p, each
world-story contains either p or the negation of p" 5
, this
intuitive idea of maximality, he says, requires two
modifications. Before considering these modifications, we
may ask: why is it that they are needed? Because, if we
take worlds to be unrestrictedly maximal, then, for every
world-story W, either [Quine exists] or [Quine does not
exist] is true in W. But, as we have seen, the latter can't
be true at all, so if it is a member of a set of
propositions, those propositions can't be true together.
So, it can not be part of any world-story, given the notion
of consistency of a world-story put forward by Adams. So,
it would follow that the former proposition is a member of
every world-story. If we assume that a proposition is
necessary if it is included in every world-story, then
[Quine exists] is necessary. But, this is false.
I believe that there is a flaw in Adams argument for
restricted maximality here, but the discussion of that can
wait. We may first consider Adams's two restrictions.
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First, a world-story should not include singular
propositions about those individuals that would exist if the
world were actual, but which do not actually exist
.
6 There
are world-stones that include the proposition that there is
a talking dinosaur (I assume). if that world were actual,
/
that is if all of its members were true, then there would be
a true singular proposition of the form [ . .
.
is a talking
dinosaur] and there would be a false singular proposition of
the form [ . .
.
is not a talking dinosaur] both about the same
individual. There would also exist many other propositions
with this same individual as a constituent. But, it seems
plausible to assume that there does not actually exist
anything that could be a talking dinosaur, so the singular
proposition with the talking dinosaur as constituent that
would exist if there were such a beast is not any singular
proposition that actually exists. It is a proposition that
comes into existence along with the talking dinosaur. And
the same goes for all those other singular propositions that
would have the same entity as a constituent
.
7
This first modification is a natural consequence of
Actualism and the Dependency Thesis: if there are no
possibilia, then there are no singular propositions about
them. And if there are no singular propositions about
possibilia, there are no sets containing such propositions.
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I will let Adams describe the second modification:
Intuitively, a world-story should be completeth respect to singular propositions about thoseactual individuals that would still be actual if
l
1 proP°sltlons in the story were true, andshould contain no singular propositions at allabout those actual individuals that would not
exist m that case. For the propositions would
not exist and therefore could not be true, if theindividual did not exist. Let us say, thereforethat if w is a set of propositions, and s is the
set of all the actual individuals that s contains
any proposition about, and p is a singular
proposition that is exclusively about one or more
members of s, then w is not a world-story unless wincludes either p or its negation. Furthermore,
if a world-story contains any singular proposition
at all about an individual i, it must contain theproposition that i exists ." 8
Now, according to the first modification, a world-story
need not contain singular propositions about individuals
that could exist, but do not actually exist. And according
to the second modification, it also need not contain
singular propositions about actual individuals that would
not exist if all of the members of the world-story were true
together. But, in presenting the second modification, Adams
introduces two further requirements: if W is a world-story,
and W contains any singular proposition about some actual
individual i, then for every actually existing singular
proposition P about i, S must contain P or its negation.
And, if a world-story includes any singular proposition
about an individual i, then it is not enough that it include
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either the proposition [i exists] or its negation [i does
not exist]; it must include the former proposition.
Adams says a proposition is true in a world-story if
and only if it is a member of that story. But, he does not
accept MWT1, MWT2 and MWT3
, if "true relative to W" is
interpreted as meaning the same as "true in W"
. what Adams
does believe is that if a proposition could be true, then
there is a world-story in which it is included. (The
members of a world-story could all be true together, so it
follows that, for each proposition that is a member of the
story, that proposition could be true)
. But, since Adams
agrees that there are propositions that are possible but not
possibly true, he holds that there are propositions that are
possible but not true in any world-story. So, Adams
introduces another relation: the relation of being true at a
world-story. Intuitively, a proposition is true at a world
if it is truth about that world from our perspective. The
relation is defined recursively through a series of clauses.
Let w be a world-story and a an actual individual that would
not exist in w:
(Cl) All propositions that are included in the world-story
of w are true at w as well as in w.
(C2) If p is an atomic singular proposition about a, then ->p
is true at w.
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( C3 ) A11 Propositions that follow truth-functionallvpropositions true at w are true at w.
(C4) X
V Xn) is an atomic propositionalction from x1; . xn to singular propositionsabout a, then
-«(3x1 ) / (3xn )0(a,
. x) itrue at w. s
( C5 ) All propositions that follow by a "free" quantificationlogic from propositions true at w are true at w.
(C6) If Op and Dp are singular propositions about a, then
-,0p and -i|I]p are true at w.
(C7) « (3xn )0o(a, xl7 xn ) and -» (3Xl )(dx:)<£(&, x
x , xn ) are singular propositions about
a, then they are true at w. 9
There are perhaps some problems with this as a complete
account of truth at a world, but the gist of the account is
clear enough, and that is what I want to focus on. It is
supposed to be a consequence of the definition that world-
stories are maximal with respect to the true at relation.
How could one use Adams
’ s account of worlds to block
the argument against Buridanism that I presented above?
Well, one could say that the notion of truth relative to a
world is ambiguous between truth at a world and truth in a
world. If we read "true relative to a world" as "true in a
world-story", then Adams would take premise (3) to be false.
If we take it to mean "true at a world-story", then premise
(5) fails, since in many cases not all of the propositions
that are true at a world could be true.
201
Adams treatment of worlds as world-stories has some
interesting consequences. Not, only are world-stories not,
in general, maximal, but they typically are not even
possibly maximal
. If the members of a world-story w that
includes [there is a talking dinosaur] were all true, then
there would be additional singular propositions that do not
actually exist. since these are not members of w, w would
not be maximal in that circumstance. And it follows that w
would no longer be a world-story.
In general, what world-stories there are depends on
what else is the case. First, as just described, if all of
the members of W were true, then although W would still
exist, it would not be a world-story. However, there would
be some additional world-stories that do not actually exist:
ones made up of newborn singular propositions. Among the
new world stories, there would be at least one maximal one:
the one that contains all of the propositions that would be
true in that situation. But, this world-story does not
actually exist.
Notice, though, that for any world-story W, the
elements of W could all be true together, and Adams believes
like me that if a proposition is true, then it exists. So,
if the members of W were all true together, then, although
some of the world-stories that actually exist would no
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longer exist, W would not be one of them, w would still
exist, though it would no longer, perhaps, be a world-story.
There are a number of problems that one might have with
Adams's world-stories. Some of these have to do with the
assumption of such large sets of propositions. For example,
for every subset S of propositions in a world-story w, there
would be at least one true proposition: the proposition that
S is a set of propositions, for instance. But, the set R of
all such propositions is a subset of W and so has
cardinality less than or egual to that of W. But, by
Cantor's theorem, the cardinality of P(W), the set of all
subsets of W has cardinality greater than that of W, and we
have assumed that there is an injection from P(W) into R.
So the cardinality of R is both greater than and less than
or equal to the cardinality of W. A problem.
But, even if there is some way around this problem
about cardinality, I think that Adams's account is just more
complicated than it needs to be.
5.2.3 A Different Account of Worlds
I believe that the complications of Adams's account can
be avoided if we switch from sets of propositions to world-
propositions: propositions that describe a whole world, and
use in this account the appropriate notion of entailment. I
am not saying that we avoid the appearing and disappearing
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worlds, and recover EWT Tn thst-l nat aspect, my views are like
Adams's. But, we can accomodate Buridanism in a much
simpler way (which is important when it comes to using
worlds in the analyses of other concepts)
In moving gradually toward the new account, we can stay
/
with sets of propositions for the time being. First, on
Adams account, world-stories are maximal with respect to the
true at relation, so why not consider a new kind of set, a
secondary world-story, which is any set W* consisting of all
propositions that are true at some given world-story W. Then
secondary world-stories will be maximal: for each
proposition P they include either P or -ip.
For Adams, a proposition P is true in a world-story W
just in case [P is true] is true at W, then, if p is true in
W, the proposition [P is true] is a member of the secondary
world-story W* .
Notice that secondary world stories will contain
propositions such as [Quine does not exist]
,
and, since this
proposition could not be true, we cannot say that all of the
members of a secondary world-story could be true together.
Still, there is some sense in which the secondary world-
story is possible. What is it? Well, consider a secondary
world-story W* that includes the proposition [Quine does not
exist] (refer to it as -iQ)
,
and suppose there exists such a
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thing as the proposition that is the conjunction of all of
the propositions that are members of W*
. Then, although we
cannot say that this proposition is possibly true (if it
were true, each of its conjuncts would be true; but -,q could
not be true), we can say that it is possible. This only
seems to commit us to the possibility of ->Q, not its
possible truth. Call a proposition such as this a world-
proposition
.
So far, there has been no gain in simplicity, since
everything depends at bottom on the notion of a world-story.
But, noting that secondary world stories are unrestrictedly
maximal, we can drop the original world-stories from the
picture and say that a set of propositions is a secondary
world-story if and only if it is maximal (for all P, it
contains either P or
->P)
,
and the conjunction of all its
members is possible.
Finally, we need one last nudge to move us all the way
over to the use of world-propositions, rather than sets of
propositions, and to avoid the commitment to conjunctions of
all true propositions. To what notion of entailment does
the inclusion of a proposition in a secondary world-story
most naturally correspond? It ought to be the relation that
holds between a conjunction and its conjuncts.
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5 . 2 . 3 . 1 A Necessary Digression
We don t want to use the notion presented as Df 2
,
despite the fact that it is commonly accepted. Consider the
proposition [Quine is not a talking dinosaur]
. This is a
singular proposition containing Quine as a constituent, so,
by DEP and BT3
,
we have
(8) it is necessary that if [Quine is not a talking
dinosaur] is true, then Quine exists.
Now, Buridanism rejects the validity of the schema:
(9) necessarily, if $>, then [®] is true,
but it accepts the validity of:
(10) necessarily, if <D and [$] exists, then [<D] is true.
As a consequence we get:
(11) Necessarily, if [Quine is not a talking dinosaur] is
true, then [Quine exists] is true.
So, according to Df 2
:
(12) [Quine is not a talking dinosaur] entails [Quine
exists]
.
And, since a conjunction entails its conjuncts, an
entailment is transitive, (12) leads to the conclusion:
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( 13 ) [Quine is not a talking dinosaur and Quine
exist] entails [Quine exists]
.
does not
But the proposition [Quine does not exist and Quine is not a
talking dinosaur] is one that is possible. Indeed, it seems
necessary that if Quine does not exist, then he is not a
talking dinosaur. But, again appealing to the principle
that a conjunction entails its conjuncts, we have
(14) [Quine is not a talking dinosaur and Quine does not
exist] entails [Quine does not exist]
Only impossible propositions entail two contradictory
propositions. So, conclusions (13) and (14), together with
the claim that the proposition [Quine is not a talking
dinosaur and Quine does not exist] is possible, are
contradictory
.
I believe that (14) is true and (13) is false, and that
the source of the problem is with the definition of
entailment given in DF2
. I do not believe that this is the
correct analysis of the ordinary notion - the one involved
in the claim that a conjunction entails its conjuncts. To
get a fix on the correct notion, consider the following
propositions
:
A: Kasparov is a world chess champion
B: Kasparov is a world champion
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In some sense A obviously entails, implies B. One account
of this relation was given above in Df 2
:
to say that A
implies B is to say that it is necessary that if a is true,
then B is true.
But, there seems to be another, more direct account.
Let us introduce the notion of narrow entailment:
Df4: P narrowly entails Q =df necessarily, if p then Q.
This definition requires a higher order formulation. The
variables P
’ and ' Q
' serve both as terms, and as sentential
variables. I think this accounts for the difficulty in
distinguishing it from the other first-order account of
entailment given by Df2
.
Ordinary English just doesn't use
higher order grammar much, if at all. Now, in the example
here, A seems both to entail and narrowly entail B, because
both of the following seem true:
(15) Necessarily, if it is true that Kasparov is a world
chess champion, then it is true that Kasparov is a
world champion.
(16) Necessarily, if Kasparov is a world chess champion,
then Kasparov is a world champion.
But, as I will argue, Buridanism has the result that there
are cases of two propositions where one entails the other,
in the first sense of "entails", but does not narrowly
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entail it; and cases where one narrowly entails the other,
but does not entail it. To get a feel for this, consider
the following family of propositions:
A: [Quine is not a human being]
B: [Quine does not exist]
C: [Nothing is a human being]
Let's use the letters 'A',
'
B
•
and 'C' as constants standing
for their corresponding propositions. And allow them to
function both as terms and sentential constants. I want to
compare these three relationships: X narrowly entails Y, X
entails Y, and X narrowly entails that Y is true. I claim
that, given the Buridanian principles already outlined, and
assuming that being a human being is an essential property
of Quine, each of the following claims is true:
I. a) Necessarily, if A, then B,
I.b) Necessarily, if A is true, then B is true (the
antecedent is always vacuously satisfied)
,
I. c) It not necessary that, if A, then B is true,
II. a) Necessarily, if C, then A
II. b) It is not necessary that, if C is true, then A is
true
,
II. c) It is not necessary that, if C, then A is true,
III. a) It is not necessary that, if B, then C
Ill.b) Necessarily, if B is true, then C is true.
Ill .c) It is not necessary that, if B, then C is true.
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So, we can say the following: A narrowly entails B and A
entails B, but A does not narrowly entail that B is true. C
narrowly entails A but does not entail A and it does not
narrowly entail that A is true. And, B entails C but does
not narrowly entail C and does not narrowly entail that C is
true. This ends the digression.
5. 2. 3.
2
World- Propositions
We can now formulate a notion of world-proposition that
corresponds to the conjunction of the members of a secondary
world-story. Let P and Q
' range over propositions. We
define
:
Df 5
:
P is true relative to Q =df Q narrowly entails P
Df 6 P is maximal =df for every Q, either Q is true
relative to P or -iQ is true relative to P.
Df 7 P is a world-proposition =df P is possible and
maximal
.
From this point on the phrase "truth relative to W"
will be used exclusively in the sense of Df 5
.
And, I will
use the term "world" as synonymous with "world-proposition"
If a proposition is true relative to a world, then it
is possible, but it need not be possibly true. If it is
possible that a proposition P is true, that is if [P is
true] is possible, then [P is true]
,
and not just P, is true
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relative to some world W. In this situation, we will say
that P is true inside W:
Df
8
: ? is true inside Q =df [P is true] is true relative
to Q
.
The expression is somewhat awkward, but I want to use one
that is different from Adams's "true in a world" to avoid
confusion. However, I do think that the notions are
extentionally equivalent in the sense that P is true inside
a world-proposition W if and only if P is true in a world-
story .
One should not think that the notion of truth inside W
corresponds to the result of replacing "narrowly entails" in
Df5 with "entails". We saw in the previous section that
there is a difference between saying that P narrowly entails
[Q is true] and saying that P entails Q. Note also that if
a world W narrowly entails not just P, but [P exists] as
well, then W will narrowly entail [P is true]
.
There are a number of interesting consequences that
follow from Buridanism together with the account just given
of worlds as maximal possible propositions. Recall that
there are worlds that narrowly entail [Quine does not
exist]
,
that is there are worlds relative to which [Quine
does not exist] is true. Now, it is not in general true
that whenever a proposition P narrowly entails another
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proposition Q, then it also entails Q. But this further
result will often hold in the case when P is a world: To
see this, consider a world W that narrowly entails the
proposition [Quine is a philosopher]
. The proposition W’ =
[W & Quine is a philosopher] will then be equivalent to W,
and will thus be a world as well. But, if W' were true,
then, since [Quine is a philosopher] is a conjunct of W'
,
[Quine is a philosopher] would be true
.
10
The same result will hold for a world V that narrowly
entails [Quine does not exist]
. The corresponding
proposition V' will have the property of being necessarily
such that if it is true, then [Quine does not exist] is
true. But, since the latter could not be true, it follows
that V' could not be true as well. So, there are some
entire worlds which, like the proposition [Quine does not
exist], are possible but not possibly true. I will accept
as a hypothesis the claim that worlds depend ontologically
on all of the propositions that are true relative to it.
Cosequently, some worlds narrowly entail their own non-
existence: there are worlds W such that necessarily, if W,
then W does not exist. If things were as the world
describes them, the world itself would not exist.
Just as with Adams's world-stories, which worlds there
are depends on what else is the case. If things were
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are would no longer
different, many of the worlds there
exist, and there would be new worlds that don't actually
exist
.
Before concluding this section, I want to say something
about how one should diagnose the argument against
Buridanism, if we take worlds to be world-propositions, and
analyze truth relative to a world in the way I have
suggested. First, while I do not accept the hypothesis I
called the "Necessity of World Relativity Hypothesis", I
would accept the weaker:
NWR ' : for any world W and proposition P, if p is true
relative to W, then necessarily, if w exists then P is
true relative to W.
So, I would accept the argument up to premise four, since
NWR' is sufficient by itself to derive premise four from
premise three. But, I would reject premise five for the
reasons already discussed: some world-propositions narrowly
entail propositions that, while possible, are not possibly
true
.
5 . 3 The Defense of Buridan's Thesis
The argument for Buridan's Thesis is, I believe, the
weakest link in the argument for Buridanism. It's not that
I don't think the thesis is true - I'm inclined to think it
is - it's just that I don't think I can give a non question-
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begging argument for it. Ultimately, it seems to come down
to a certain set of intuitions about what we mean when we
say a proposition is necessary, or true, or possible.
So my goal here is more modest: to try to give a more
precise account of the issues that are involved in Buridan's
Thesis and to try to present the intuitive basis for the
thesis in the best possible light. Perhaps I can get the
reader to share my intuition. My faith in Buridanism is
sustained by the feeling that the overall picture of the
modal universe it provides has a sort of harmonious and
lively inner beauty, beside which the more conventional S5-
ish picture seems dull and flat. But, then again, sometimes
the truth is dull, and parents always find their children
beautiful
.
5.3.1 Serious Actualism
A standard approach to the defense of Buridan's thesis
is through some version of one of a family of doctrines
variously called Serious Actualism, Property Actualism or
Predicate Actualism. Serious Actualism has been defended by
Alvin Plantinga 11 :
SA: Necessarily, for any x and for any property P,
necessarily, if x has P then x exists.
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SA can be used to defend Buridan 1 s Thesis, if necessity,
possibility and truth are taken to be properties of the
propositions to which they are attributed. So, we have two
main issues: first, whether Serious Actualism true and,
second, whether it entails Buridan 's Thesis (or any
component of it)
.
Critics of Serious Actualism appeal to certain alleged
counterexamples. One such, due to John Pollock 12
,
is
supposed to involve the property of nonexistence
.
It is
possible that Quine not exist; but, were Quine not to exist,
then he would have the property of nonexistence. So, there
is an x and a property P such that, it is possible that x
have P and yet not exist. Contra SA. In addition, there is
the property of not being a philosopher. Although this
property may be exemplified by something that also exists,
it is also necessary that, for any x, necessarily, if x does
not exist then x is not a philosopher. And so, the argument
runs, it is possible that something have the property of not
being a philosopher, and yet not exist.
Plantinga at one time claimed that Serious Actualism
follows from Actualism13
. He later retracted that claim14
(though not Serious Actualism) ; but, later yet, he
reaffirmed it . 15 The reaffirmation, though, involved a new
argument from Actualism to Serious Actualism.
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I want to examine Plantinga 's arguments. Ultimately, I
don't think that either argument is completely convincing.
But the examination will help in clarifying the issues
related to the defense of Buridan’s Thesis.
Plantinga has given another formulation of SA in terms
of worlds 16 :
SAW: Necessarily, for any x and any property P and any world
W, x has P in W if and only if x exists in W.
Plantinga holds that x has P in W if and only if it is
necessary that if W is actual, x has P; and he holds that x
exists in W if and only if it is necessary that, if w is
actual, then x exists. So SAW turns out to be a consequence
of :
SAW'
:
Necessarily, for any x and any property P and world W,
necessarily, if W is actual then, if x has P, x
exists
.
Which is (more-or-less ) equivalent to SA since, for
Plantinga, to say that a proposition Q is necessary is to
say that for any world W, necessarily, if W is actual, then
P is true. He argues, in "De Essentia", for the weaker
SAW17 :
Assume, contrary to SAW, that there is some object, say
Socrates, that has some property P in some world W and that
Socrates does not exist there. Well, by Actualism we have:
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1. It is true in every world that there are no nonexistent
objects
,
from which it follows that:
2. It is true in every world that there are no nonexistent
objects that have P,
which is equivalent to:
3. It is true in every world that whatever has P exists.
By hypothesis:
4. It is true in w that Socrates has P,
from which Plantinga says it follows, given premise 3, that:
5. It is true in W that Socrates exists,
which contradicts the original assumption that Socrates does
not exist in W.
This argument contains a fallacy, which Plantinga
recognizes in "On Existentialism" 18 . Premise 3 says this:
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It is true in every world W that: for all x
,
if x has P,
then x exists. But, in order to derive premise 5 from
premise 4, we would require the claim: for all x and for
every world W, it is true in W that: if x has P then x
exists
.
Serious Actualism seems then to be a separate thesis
from Actualism. But, in his "Reply to Pollock" in Profiles
Plaritinga offers a new argument for Serious Actualism19
.
The revised argument is presented in two stages. In the
first stage, Plantinga argues that the property of
nonexistence is necessarily unexemplified. Plantinga takes
the property of nonexistence to be the complement of the
property of existence
.
For Plantinga P* is the complement
of P if and only if, necessarily, for any x, x has P or x
has P*, but not both. But, given Actualism, this does not
entail that for any x, necessarily x has P or x has P*
,
but
not both. Rather it entails only that for any x,
necessarily, if x exists, then x has P or x has P*, but not
both
.
Stage One goes as follows:
1. For any property P, if P is exemplified, then there is
something that exemplifies P
2. For every property P, whatever exemplifies P exists,
(from 1, by Actualism)
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3. If nonexistence is exemplified, then nonexistence is
exemplified by something that exists, (from 2 by UI)
4. nonexistence is not exemplified, (from 3)
Plantinga claims that the conclusion follows from premise 3
since it is impossible that something both exemplify
/
nonexistence and also exist, and this claim seems
unobjectionable. He then says that since each of the
premises is necessarily true, it follows that nonexistence
is necessarily unexemplified.
Now, technically, we don't get the necessitation of 3
from the necessitation 2 unless we add: necessarily, there
is a property P, such that P is the property of
nonexistence. But, this does not seem to be much of a
problem
.
If one were an Actualist, but wanted to deny Serious
Actualism, how might one respond? One might hold that it is
possible that: Quine does not exist and Quine exemplifies
nonexistence. By existential generalization, it follows
from this assertion that
5. There is an x such that it is possible that: x
exemplifies nonexistence and x does not exist.
And from 5, and the claim that necessarily there is such a
thing as the property of nonexistence, we get:
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6
. There is an x such that it is possible thatproperty P such that x exemplifies P and x
exist
.
there is
does not
a
from which, by Actualism, it follows that:
7
.
There is an x such that it is possible that there is aproperty P such that x exemplifies P and there is nothingthat exemplifies P.
which contradicts premise 1. So, it seems that the critic
of Serious Actualism can maintain Actualism, but deny
premise 1
.
However, since Plant inga takes E*, the property of
nonexistence, to be the complement of E, the property of
existence, then, by the definition of a complement of a
property we get:
8.
necessarily, for any x, x has E* if and only if x exists
and does not have E.
But that x both exist and have nonexistence is impossible,
so the conclusion of the Stage One argument follows more
directly
.
Stage Two of the argument for Serious Actualism then
proceeds as follows:
9. Necessarily, had Socrates exemplified P, then either
Socrates would have exemplified (P & E)
,
or (P & E*),
10. Necessarily, if Socrates exemplifies (P & E*), then
Socrates exemplifies E*,
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11
.
12 .
13 .
14 .
Necessarily, nothing exemplifies E*,
Necessarily, if Socrates exemplifies P
exemplifies (P & E)
,
then Socrates
Necessarily, if Socrates exemplifies (P & E)
, thenSocrates exemplifies existence,
Necessarily, if Socrates exemplifies E, then Socrates
exists
.
I think this argument is question-begging. Plantinga
defines the complement of a property P to be one that a
thing x has if and only if x exists and does not have P.
But, since the actualistic critic of Serious Actualism
believes that there are properties such that it is possible
that Socrates exemplify p and yet fail to exist, then it
follows that there are properties P such that it is possible
that Socrates exemplify p and exemplify neither E nor its
complement E*
. So, premise 9 appears unwarranted.
What might such a property P be? What about the
property of not existing, i.e. being such that it does not
exist. This property, one might argue, is not the
complement of existence. Since it is necessary that, for
every x, it is necessary that x exists or does not exist,
then, unlike E*, not-existing seems to satisfy a stronger
claim
:
15. Necessarily, for any x, necessarily, x has existence or
x has non-existence.
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And, 15 contradicts Serious Actualism, on the assumption
that there is some x that is possibly such that it does not
exist (and so does not have the property of existence)
. if
we run Stage Two of the argument with the property E** of
not-existing in place of E*, then the revised premise 9
seems warranted, but now there is a problem with the revised
premise 11. That premise is no longer the conclusion of the
Stage One argument. And, a corresponding revision of that
argument will be ineffective, because now the original
criticism of that argument will stick.
Plantinga's immediate response to this is to claim that
not-existing is not a property, but a condition. Conditions
are just propositional functions. Something may satisfy a
condition but not a property. For example, Quine satisfies
the condition of not being an ostrich, or being such that he
is not an ostrich, but there is no property of not being an
ostrich. There is a property of being a non-ostrich, and
Quine exemplifies that property.
The distinction between properties and conditions, and
having or exemplifying properties and satisfying conditions
results in a lot of inconclusive skirmishing between
Plantinga on the one side, and Pollock and Fine on the
other. Plantinga holds that, while there is a distinction
between properties and conditions, an object can neither
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satisfy a condition, nor exemplify a property without
existing. Pollock suggests that Plantinga is merely
defining "property", "condition" etc. in such a way as to
make these claims true . 20
I doubt that the terminology is sufficiently precise to
enable us to say that the question of the truth or falsity
of SA has a determinate answer. In any case, even if we
accept SA, in order to evaluate Buridan's Thesis, we will
still be left with the question of whether truth, necessity
and possibility are properties or not.
At this point, then, it may be best to stipulate
certain interpretations for these imprecise terms. Take a
condition to be a propositional function, and use the
expression 'C\x\' to denote the proposition that results
from applying condition C to the argument x. Grammatically,
' C\x\
'
may occupy a "propositional place" in a sentence; it
is a kind of propositional variable. We can then define an
existence-entailing condition:
EE: C is existence-entailing =df necessarily, for any x,
necessarily, if C\x\, then x exists.
And, from this point forward, let's just stipulate that a
property is an existence-entailing condition. Let's say
that
:
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Sdef: x satisfies C =df C\x\
.
And, say that x has or exemplified a condition C if and only
if it satisfies C and C is a property. The question we now
face is. are the conditions of being necessary, being
possible and being true existence-entailing or not? Are
they properties in our defined sense?
Despite the inconclusiveness of the argument for
Serious Actualism, I believe that there is an intuitively
plausible distinction here, between existence-entailing
conditions and those that are not existence-entailing. What
follows is an attempt to give an impressionistic sketch that
brings out the appropriate intuition.
When we describe a universe, our own, or one that doesn't
exist but could, we take certain ingredients and put them
together into propositions. Now, some of the propositions
seem to have this property: if the universe we are
attempting to describe really existed, then someone who
existed in that universe could take the same ingredients and
put them together in the same way, and come up with a
proposition that would be true of the universe: the person
could say: "yes, this proposition is true".
Other propositions seem different. While we can
recognize that the proposition somehow accurately describes
the fictive universe from our point of view, we can see that
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if that universe were real, none of the people there would
be able to put that proposition together, not just because
they would have no handle on the ingredients, but because
the ingredients wouldn't be there to be put together.
Often, these propositions seem to involve negation, and they
represent the fictive universe by contrast with our own. We
can say things like: "that universe is not like ours: for
instance Quine is not there". But, from the standpoint of
the people who would exist if the universe were actual,
there is no Quine to "not be" there. From their point of
view nobody is left out, everything that there is, is there.
In the Buridanian scheme, this corresponds to the
difference between propositions that are true inside of a
world, and those that are merely true relative to a world
but not true inside them.
Of the propositions that we can form, some seem to be
clear cases of one or the other. The clear cases of the
internal characterizations are propositions that attribute
certain "positive atomic" properties to some individual or
individuals. If we can say of the fictive universe that
Mars has mass m there, then the denizens of that universe
would be able to truly characterize it in the same way.
The clearest cases of purely external characterizations
are like my favorite and off-used example: the proposition
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that Quine does not exist. In this case the proposition,
when used to characterize the other universe, does not seem
to be an attribution of some feature to Quine in that
universe, so much as a kind of contrastive characterization.
It is a way in which that whole universe differs from ours:
it lacks Quine.
Other propositions straddle a middle ground: we can say
of certain universes that Quine is not a philosopher there.
Sometimes that is because, though Quine would exist if that
u^*-iv€;^£>e were real
,
he would have chosen another career
path. For some, though, it is true because Quine would not
exist there, and so could not be a philosopher or a
photographer or a cabbage or king. In the first case, our
imagined inhabitants would be able to truly characterize
their universe as one in which Quine is not a philosopher.
In the other case, they could not.
In understanding the straddlers, we might make use of
the other two cases as models. Consider the proposition
that Quine is not a philosopher. We seem to be able to
interpret this proposition in two ways: first, as a purely
contrastive negation, in which we describe something that
the whole universe lacks: Quine's being a philosopher; but
also as an attribution of a certain feature to Quine in that
universe, his not being a philosopher.
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It'S as though, to obtain the condition of not being a
philosopher, you first take a proposition of the form x is a
philosopher, then form its negation, and then abstract an
individual from it. In using that condition to form a
proposition, you may mean two different things. You may
mean: plug an individual back in to the place from which one
was abstracted, re-forming a proposition like the original;
or you may mean: to describe the individual as being
characterized by the condition, in which case you don't plug
an individual back in, but instead attribute the abstracted
condition to the individual.
The possibility of an attribution treatment seems to go
along with the possibility of the proposition serving as an
internal characterization, since it is modeled on the clear
cases of internal characterization. The possibility of
treating the proposition as a contrastive description goes
along with the clear cases of external characterization,
which seems somehow to essentially involve propositional
negation
.
So, there seems to be some intuitive basis for the
notion that there is a difference between the proposition
that it is not the case that Quine is a philosopher, and the
proposition that being such that he is not a philosopher is
truly attributable to Quine. The latter entails Quine's
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existence, while the former does not. And, since the truth
of the former is all that is required in order for it to be
the case that Quine satisfies the condition of being such
that he is not a philosopher, then this condition is not
existence entailing.
Let us formulate a hypothesis about conditions and
positive properties. Suppose we take it that we have some
conception of what a "positive atomic" property or relation
is. Then we can say that such a property, or the
conjunction of such properties, is a basic condition. Basic
conditions would seem to be existence-entailing. But, the
condition of not having a basic condition, or of not having
an existence-entailing condition generally, would seem not
to be existence-entailing. Call these latter conditions
absences
.
5 ' 3 * 2 BT1 and BT2 - Possi bility and Necessii-y
Can we take either possibility or necessity as
absences, rather than existence-entailing conditions? If
so, the BT1 and BT3 would fail. it seems reasonable,
though, to require the defender of the view that possibility
and necessity are absences to come up with some proposal as
to what they are absences of.
There seem to be two prominent proposals: first, one
might hold that to say that a proposition is possible is
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just to say that its negation is not necessary; second; one
might hold that to say a proposition is necessary is just to
say that its negation is not possible.
These two proposals cannot be taken jointly as
definitions; not without circularity. But, perhaps one can
defend the notion that they are both true, when interpreted
merely as necessary equivalences.
Now, the first proposal only gives us a basis for
saying that possibility is an absence if we have some reason
for saying that necessity is a positive property; and,
similarly, the second proposal only gives us a basis for
saying that necessity is an absence if we have some basis
for saying that possibility is a positive property.
Taken together, the two proposals merely entail that to
say something is possible is to say it is possible, and to
say something is necessary is to say that it is necessary.
And, obviously, both the view that these two conditions are
absences, and the view that they are properties are
consistent with these claims. It seems we must make a
choice. In order to defend the idea that one of the
conditions is merely an absence, we need to assume that the
other is existence entailing.
There are other plausible hypotheses about which modal
conditions are primitive. For example, we could start with
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impossibility
; then, we could define a necessary proposition
as one whose negation is impossible, a possible proposition
as one that is not impossible, and a contingent proposition
as one that is neither impossible or necessary. Or we could
start with contingency; then, we could define a necessary
proposition as one that is true but not contingent, an
impossible proposition as one that is false but not
contingent, and a possible proposition as one that is not
impossible
.
Whichever of these hypotheses is true, if any, in each
case we begin with one condition that is not defined in
terms of the others, and for which we therefore are given no
justification for viewing it as an absence.
This raises a further question. If we adopt any one of
these hypotheses, does BML collapse into S5? I believe that
in each case the answer is no. Since, at this point, I have
not discussed the logical system in detail, I will not
attempt to demonstrate this claim. But, I will give one
example
:
Consider, for example, the hypothesis that possibility
is the primitive property, and that a proposition is
necessary just in case its negation is not possible. If we
add this definition to the axioms of BML, we do get some
changes. Both ' iOP o ~'P' and '(-'OP o D-iP) will be
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theorems of the modified system, whereas only the first is a
theorem of BML
. But, there are still some S5 theorems that
don't hold. For instance, D(P => OP) will still fail. To
derive this in S5, we need the full rule of necessitation
.
Adding the suggested definition to the axioms will not allow
us derive this rule.
5.3.3 BT3 - Truth
I believe that a more difficult problem for Buridanism
is the defense of BT3 . There is a very plausible account of
truth that seems to justify the idea that truth is not
existence entailing. This is the deflationary or reductive
account
:
DTR : T ( P
)
=df P.
Deflationary accounts are sometimes given metalinguistic
formulations such as
DTR'
:
TO =df O.
A metalinguistic account states, in effect, that expressions
of the form 1 . .
.
is true' are replaceable by, or synonymous
with, the corresponding expression Such account run
into trouble with claims such as: 'the thing you said last
night is true'. DTR' gives the incorrect result that this
means the same thing as 'The thing you said last night'.
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This is not the intent of DTR; it is not a verbal
definition. Instead it corresponds to the higher order
equivalence
:
DTR ' ' : ( T ( P ) = P).
The deflationary account seems to conflict with BT3
It entails that, since it is possible that Quine does not
exist, then it is possible that it is true that Quine does
not exist. That is, it is possible that [Quine does not
exist] is true. But, by the dependency thesis, it is
necessary that if Quine does not exist, then [Quine does not
exist] does not exist. So, DTR has the result that it is
possible that a proposition be true, yet not exist.
How might Buridanians respond? First, they might claim
that the account is inadequate somehow. Though there don't
seem to be any obvious counterexamples to it - I take it
that Buridan's Thesis is not obvious - the Buridanian may
claim it is somehow evident that truth involves more than
what is stated in DTR, but in addition involves some
positive relation of 'correspondence'. Whether or not this
is true, it is hard to see how it could be defended without
question begging.
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Another approach would be to follow Kit Fine in
claiming that there are two senses of 'true'
.
21 One is the
sense given by DTR; the other is:
DTR+: T ( P ) =df P and
,
where is an operator indicating propositional
existence. On the first reading, BT3 is false. On the
second, it is analytically true.
This seems very much like an ad hoc manoeuvre. Is
there any independent basis for the claim of ambiguity,
other than the desire to defend Buridan's Thesis in the face
of the plausibility of DTR? Fine does not provide any.
And, it is hard to believe that the sense given by DTR+ is
what anyone means by 'true'
.
It would be somewhat more
plausible, perhaps, to combine these two responses, and to
claim that the second sense of 'true' is the one associated
with some intuitive notion of correspondence. Then, one
could try to spell out this notion, with the hope of having
BT3 fall out of the correct analysis as a logical
consequence
.
In any case, I believe that it is more reasonable for
the Buridanian is to hold, not that there are two different
senses of 'true', but rather one indeterminate sense, which
is some sort of an amalgam of deflation and correspondence.
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Given that philosophers have been of two minds about whether
or not BT3 is true, perhaps this is evidence that the
ordinary notion of truth, the notion associated with our
prior ordinary uses of 'true', is built up of these two
aspects. And, that it is only in the face of abstruse
Buridanian considerations that these two aspects are shown
to diverge
.
Notes
1. I will often use the somewhat awkward expression
"proposition that is possible" rather than "possible
proposition" since the latter may be taken to mean
"proposition that possibly exists".
2. For the purposes of this chapter, it will not matter
whether we think of the validities of modal logic as
schemas, containing substitutional variables, or as
formulas, containing either proposition constants or
objectual variables which take propositions as values.
3. Prior believed that there were counterinstances to D1 and
D2 . That is because he took "possible" and "necessary" to
be equivalent to "possibly true" and "necessarily true",
respectively. See Prior (1957), pp. 41-54.
4. The following account of Adams views is based on Adams
(1981) .
5. Adams (1981), p. 21.
6 . Adams (1981), p. 21.
7. It is not clear to me that this first "modification" is
really a modification of the intuitive idea of a world-
story; rather, it seems to be a clarification of what is
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involved in that intuitive notion, given the truth ofActualism.
8. Adams (1981), p. 22.
9. Adams (1981), pp . 23-29.
10. I have assumed here the following principle: for anyproposition P, necessarily, P is true if and only if p and P
exists
.
11. Plantinga defends Serious Actualism in Plantinga (1979)
and (1985b). '
12. Pollock (1985), pp. 126-29.
13. Plantinga (1979).
14. Plantinga (1983).
15. Plantinga (1985b).
16. Plantinga (1979), p. 108.
17. Plantinga (1979), pp . 108-109.
18. Plantinga (1983), p. 12.
19. Plantinga (1985b), pp. 318-19.
20 . Pollock (1985)
.
21 . Fine (1985)
.
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CHAPTER 6
THE LOGIC OF CONTINGENT EXISTENCE
Once Buridanism is accepted, there remains the problem
of determining what effect it ought to have on modal logic.
In this chapter, I outline of the system I propose, which I
call Buridanian Modal Logic' or ' BML ' . There are a number
of questions here about the connections between metaphysics
and logic, and about the correct analysis of the notions of
logical truth and logical consequence. Without exploring
these in depth, I will try to explain my conception of the
connection between modal logic and modal metaphysics
. Some
of these questions may have no right answer.
In the first section I will present a sketch of BML,
explain its motivation, and point out its most interesting
features. I pay special attention to those places in which
it differs from more standard systems of modal logic. I
will also say something about the intended semantical basis
for the logic, and how it may be provided with something
close to a standard possible worlds semantics. Although
this latter semantic framework really misrepresents the
intuitive basis for the system, it does have instrumental
value, and may help to facilitate comparisons between BML
and other systems.
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One benefit of BML, not directly related to the issues
having to do with Buridanism, is that it provides a unified
solution to a cluster of problems in modal logic that I will
refer to as the problems of contingency. in the remainder
of the chapter, I compare my approach to these problems with
those of other philosophers who have attempted to treat some
of the same issues. I will begin in section 6.2 with a
discussion of the free logical approach to the problems of
contingency. In sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, I will examine
Arthur Prior's system Q, Harry Deutsch's Logic of
Contingency and Christopher Menzel
' s True Modal Logic.
6 . 1 Buridanian Modal Logic
6.1.1 The Formal System Described
The language of Propositional Buridanian Modal Logic,
Lbml(p) / is the same as that of standard systems of
propositional modal logic, but with one addition: we add the
sentential operator indicating propositional existence.
The axioms of BML(P) are as follows:
K: D(PoQ) o (DP o DQ)
T: DP o P
D: OP = -.ChP
S5 ' : OP => B(&p 3 OP)
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T: H(DP 3 g)P)
or : (Op 3 rp)
Schema St): If A and B are any sentences containing the same
proposition letters, then
(Sa = SB)
is an axiom.
Schema [UPC: For every valid PC wff A,
A
is an axiom.
and the system contains the following rules of inference:
RSN : bA - bD (SA 3 A)
US: If bA, and B is the result of replacing the proposition
letters p x , . . . , pn wherever they occur in A by the
sentences S x , ..., S n , then bB.
MP : If bA and bA3B, then bB
.
Perhaps the first thing that deserves notice is that
the characteristic axiom of S5, 'OP 3 OP', has been
replaced by the restricted version S 5 1 : ' OP 3 H{SP 3 OP) ' .
I have argued, in Chapter Five, that there are instances of
the S5 axiom that are false, for example "if it is possible
that Quine does not exist, then it is necessary that it is
possible that Quine does not exist". But, I believe that S5
embodies an important insight: that propositions possess
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their modality essentially. An object x possesses a
property P essentially if and only if it is necessary that,
if x exists, then it has P. if one thinks that propositions
exist necessarily, then there is no reason to attend to the
difference between the claim that a proposition possesses
its modality necessarily, and the claim that it possesses
its modality essentially. But, in a Buridanian setting,
these two claims must be distinguished. Thus, S5 is
replaced by S5 . In BML, we can deduce restricted versions
of the characteristic axioms of S4 and Brouwer's system B as
well
:
S4 ' : DP 3 (gp 3 DP)
B' : P 3 \3(&p 3 OP)
Another key feature of BML(P) is its restriction on the rule
of necessitation
:
N: i-A - hQA.
That rule has been replaced by:
RSN: hA - hD(^A => A)
As an example of the effect of this restriction, I note that
while the sentence ' P => OP' is a theorem of BML, its
necessitation ' D(P =3 OP) 1 is not. We can derive only:
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CT’ : ( (P & ^P) 3 OP)
.
Here is an example illustrating the motivation for this
restriction: While it is true that "if Quine is not an
ostrich, then it is possible that Quine is not an ostrich"
is true, the sentence "necessarily, if Quine is not an
ostrich, then it is possible that Quine is not an ostrich"
is not. According to Buridanism, if Quine did not exist, he
would be neither an ostrich nor possibly such that he is not
an ostrich. What is true is the sentence "necessarily, if
Quine exists and Quine is not an ostrich, then it is
possible that Quine is not an ostrich"
.
This example is as good as any for illustrating a
general feature of BML that distinguishes it from systems
such as Prior's system Q. Let me begin by making some
points about the notion of logical validity. We might say
that there is a weak and a strong sense of that notion.
In the weaker sense, to say that a sentence is valid is
just to say that there is no interpretation of its non-
logical expressions that makes it false. In the case of
propositional logic and a sentence like ' P => OP', this
means that there is no proposition such that, when that
proposition is assigned as the meaning of ' P', the sentence
comes out false.
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In a stronger sense, we would say that it is not just
that there happens not to be a proposition that makes p o
OP' come out false, but that there could not be a
proposition that makes it come out false. We have to be
careful here. The sentence could of course have meant
something different than it does, but the idea is that
necessarily, no matter how things might have been different,
the sentence 'P => OP', given the meaning it actually has,
could not have turned out false on any reinterpretation of
its non-logical constants.
Both the weak and the strong sense must be
distinguished from another claim that might be made on
behalf of a sentence: the claim that every allowable
interpretation of the non-logical constants of the sentence
makes it necessarily true. Call this '-validity'.
BML is consonant with both the weak and strong sense of
validity, but not with D-validity. With regard to the
sentence 'P o OP', this sentence is both weakly and
strongly valid, intuitively, because both of the following
claims are true:
1. For every proposition P, if P, then it is possible
that P,
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2. Necessarily, for every proposition P, if p then it ispossible that P.
But, given Buridanism, the following is not true:
3. For every proposition P, necessarily, if p, then it is
possible that P.
/
So, the sentence is not D-valid.
Notice that in BML(P), every instance of the schema
' ^
A
' is a theorem, but not every instance of ' d^A' is a
theorem. This is because every instance of the former is
true, and no matter how things were different, every
instance of it would be true. Given the truth of Actualism,
necessarily, everything exists. So, necessarily, every
proposition exists. So necessarily, every interpretation of
the propositional constant
'
P
' in ' ^P’ is true. But, there
are many propositions that do not actually exist, so there
are instances of 1 D&P
'
that are not true.
The two axioms
:
r : mnp => rp)
or : (Op =) rp)
and the axiom schema
:
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^D: If
.
A
.
and B are anY sentences containing theproposition letters, then
same
(«?A = g’B)
is an axiom,
play a crucial role in BML
. They allow deductions of
restricted versions of standard theorems that would
otherwise not be deducible in any form. An illustration of
this point can be made with respect to axiom D, the duality
axiom. In BML(P), each of the following is a theorem:
Tl. 0-^P 3
-.OP
T2 . ->DP 3 0-^P
T3 . Chp 3
--0P
T4 . --Op 3 Chp
But, their necessitations are not all theorems, only the
necessitations of Tl and T3
:
T5 . (O-'P 3 -iQP)
T8. (nP 3
-,0P)
are theorems. The other two, T2 and T4 yield, in
conjunction with RSN and axioms HZ’ and 0%
,
the theorems:
T7 . ( (iDP & gp) o OiP)
T10 . ((-nOP & <fP) o D-iP) .
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Similarly, even though we cannot deduce S5, S4 and B in
BML / we can deduce sentences that are usually taken to be
equivalent to them:
CS5 : ODP o Dp
CS4 : OOP 3 OP
CB: ODP o p
So, in BML, these are not equivalent to S5, S4 and B. The
failure of the necessitations of the duality rules T2 and T4
P-^ys ^ole here, since, in standard modal logic, one must
make use of these necessitations in deriving S5, S4 and B
from CS5
,
CS4 and CB
.
One last point about BML has to do with the schema:
PC: For every valid PC sentence A,
A
is an axiom.
We could not accomplish the same result by having as axioms
only PC-valid sentences because, using the rule RSN, we get
for each such sentence A only:
(«?A 3 A) .
Still, it seems to me that every sentence that is PC-valid
is necessary, although not necessarily true. It is
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necessary that Quine exists or Quine does not exist, but it
is not necessarily true that: Quine exists or Quine does not
exist
BML(P) can be extended by adding operators 1 T' and 'F'
for truth and falsity of propositions. The addition of 'T'
requires only the addition of the axioms
:
T&
:
D(TP 3 gp)
T= : P = TP
As consequences, we will be able to deduce:
TP/P: ( TP o P) and
P/TP: ( (P & gp) 3 TP)
.
We can then introduce the definition for F:
FDef: FP = T->P
allowing us to derive all of the following:
“'FP = TP,
F~iP h TP,
iTP s FP,
TiP = FP,
( (--FP & gp) = TP) ,
(F^P = TP)
,
( ( iTP Sc &P) = FP) ,
(T-iP = FP) .
I have not presented an "official" quantified version
of BML in the Appendix. But, I would like to describe in
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outline the form that I believe such a system should take.
The quantification theory for BML, BML(Q), requires nothing
new in itself different from ordinary QT. It is a classical
and not a free quantification theory. We may introduce a
predicate 'E!x'\ though, indicating individual existence,
and then we will need axiom schemae like the following
linking the two concepts of individual and propositional
existence
:
t n ) = (E!t x & ... &E ! tn ) ] ,
where t
x , . . . , tn , are all of the terms in 0 ( t lr . . . , tn )
(^Vv$ = |f0)
(«^3v0 = £T$)
The individual constants in BML(Q) all denote things
existing in the actual world, just as the propositional
constants of BML(P) denote propositions the exist in the
actual world. So the formulas:
4 . VxFx => Fa
5 . Fa 3 3xFx
are valid, but not
6 . D(VxFx o Fa)
7 . (Fa 3 3xFx) .
Instead we have restricted versions:
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( VxFx => (E ! a 3 Fa) )
( (Fa & E!a) o 3xFx)
(VxFx =3 ( J^Fa 3 Fa))
CH( (Fa & <#Fa) ^ 3xFx)
.
6.1.2 The Semantics for BMT,
In the Appendix, I lay out a semantic system for BML(P)
and prove completeness with respect to the semantics. I
would like to point out that I take the semantics to be of
instrumental value only. It is somewhat complicated variant
of standard possible worlds semantics for modal logic. I
believe that taken literally2
,
it misrepresents the modal
facts. But, if BML(P) is to be given a possible-worlds type
semantics, it would have to be something like the one here.
And, I think that it does help in both illustrating the
intuitions behind BML, and facilitating comparison with
other systems. The key ideas behind the semantics are
these
:
1. Each model contains a distinguished world,
representing the actual world. Truth in a model is defined
as truth in the actual world of the model.
2 . Every world in the model is assigned two classes of
propositions: the existents at that world, and the
projections at that world. The existents are those
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propositions that exist relative to that world, so those
that are true are true inside of that world, and those that
are false are false inside that world. The projections of a
world are those propositions that are either true or false
relative to the world. If a proposition is true relative to
a world, and is one of the existents, then it is also true
the world. A proposition that is in neither the
class of projections of a world nor the class of existents
of that world receives no valuation at that world.
3 . All of the propositional constants for BML are
interpreted as standing for propositions that are in the
class of existents for the actual world. And, the class of
projections for the actual world is identical to the class
of existents for the actual world. This has the result
that, while there are gaps in the valuation of propositions
at worlds, those gaps never affect the evaluation of a
sentence at the actual world, since the propositional
constants all refer to propositions that exist there. (In
the quantified version of BML, all constants are taken to
refer to individuals in the domain of the actual world.)
4. There is an accessibility relation between worlds
defined in terms of the projections and existents of worlds.
A world w' is accessible from a world w if and only if the
projections of w' are identical to the existents of w.
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Intuitively, this means that a world w’ is accessible from w
if w' can be described from the standpoint of w, in terms of
the existents at w. Defining accessibility in this way also
has the effect that, if w‘ is accessible from w, then w' is
maximal with respect to the propositions that exist in w.
6-1.3 The Problems of Contingency 3
Modal logic ought to make room for the fact that there
are contingent beings. But, in some standard versions of
quantified modal logic, formulas like 6 and 7 above turn out
Vcili-Ch In addition, we sometimes get as valid the formulas:
PCI: D3x(x = a)
PC2 : DVxDSyix = y)
PC3 : OE!a
PC4: (a = a)
I think the problem with the first three, and with 6
and 7, is obvious. Many would see no problem with the last.
But, I take it that if Quine did not exist, then Quine would
not be identical to anything. So, I don't believe that PC4
ought to be regarded as valid. Standard systems also
sometimes declare valid the Barcan Formula and Converse
Barcan Formula, each of which seems subject to
counterexample
.
249
All of these problems are related. They all seem to
result from a failure to model the fact that different
things exist in different worlds.
The problem, then, is to avoid commitment to the
validity of these problematic formulas, while retaining
commitment to the validity of these:
PC5 : VxFx o Fa
PC 6 : Fa o 3xFx
PC7 : Vx (x = x)
and to allow for the consistency of:
PC 8 : 0->3x (x = a) .
If a = Quine then PC8 is true, so PC8 ought to turn out true
on some models. Call the problems related to meeting these
desiderata the problems of contingency
.
In the logic of BML
,
the problems of contingency are
handled by the restriction on the necessitation rule. This
restriction corresponds in the semantics to the fact that
validity is evaluated as truth in the actual world of every
model, and by the requirement that all constants denote
things in the actual world. Another key is that quantifiers
range, at each world, over only things that exist in that
world
.
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This technique for handling the problems of contingency
is, in itself, independent of Buridanism. Call it the root
world technique
.
I now turn to some other approaches toward
the problems of contingency.
6 • 2 Free Logic and Contingency
The problems of contingency have often been dealt with
by replacing classical quantification theory with some
version of free logic. Basically, a free logic is one in
which the formulas
VxOx => $(a/x)
$(a/x) 3 3x0x
are invalid. They may be replaced by:
VxOx => (E!a o $(a/x))
($(a/x) & E ! x) o 3x$x
I eschew the free logical approach in BML. The
quantification theory is classical. The restriction on
necessitation has the result that while
VxOx 3 ®(a/x)
0 (a/x) 3 3x$x
are valid, their necessitations are not. Instead we have:
251
[(Vx<J>x & gfc(a/x)) ^ o (a/x) ]
[($(a/x) & <f<5>(a/x)) d 3xOx]
Now it seems to me that there are two basic philosophical
motives that might push one into free logic.
One might seek an interpretation of constants that more
closely reflects the use of names in natural languages like
English. That class of English names might be thought to
include "Pegasus" "Sherlock Holmes", "Shangri-la" etc.
There seems little doubt that, on a natural reading, the
sentence "Pegasus does not exist" is true. So, it seems
that whatever the correct treatment of names like "Pegasus"
is, if we use the constants in the formal language to take
their place, then we are going to want a free logic.
There is nothing wrong with using "constants" in such a
way. However, the logical constants in BML are to be
regarded as genuine designators. In regimenting natural
language sentences with names in them, they should only be
used for those that actually stand for something. And,
given Actualism, if it stands for something, then it stands
for something that exists, and there is thus no need for
free logical restrictions on EG and UI
.
Another motivation for free logic involves possibilist
quantification. One may regard quantifiers as quantifying
over a domain that includes more than just the things to
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which the predicate
' E !
'
applies. Alternatively one might
have an inner and outer domain for two different sorts of
quantifiers, with the ordinary existential quantifier
ranging over the inner domain. There seems to be little
formal reason for possibilist quantification if Possibilism
is not true. In quantified BML there is only one sort of
quantifier, and the quantifiers range over the same entities
that satisfy 'E!x'.
6 . 3 Prior's System 0
Much of the discussion of the issues involved in
Buridanism has its historical point of origin in the works
of Arthur Prior
. A good way to see how the logical system
BML is related to the metaphysics of Buridanism is to
compare BML to an alternative system, Prior's system Q,
which is based on very similar metaphysical intuitions. 4
Prior's system differs from BML in two ways: first, it's
semantics are very different, being based on the method of
matrices. And, its theorems appear quite different. I
would like to be able to give a simple account of the basis
for the differences between them. But, despite the fact
that the systems are based on very similar intuitions, it is
very difficult to directly compare them, as I will explain
below
.
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Prior's views are similar to mine in that he accepts
the three components of Buridan 1 s thesis. But, in
formulating the system Q, Prior equates a proposition's
being possible with its being possibly true. On his
account, then, a proposition like [Quine does not exist] is
/
not even possible. 5 One immediate consequence is that,
while Buridanism finds counterexamples to the schema
'(A o OA)
'
,
Prior does not. For him, the antecedent of
the embedded conditional is only possible if it is possibly
since, as both Buridanians and Prior agree,
’(TA o OA) 1 is valid 6
,
Prior is able to derive the former
formula
.
The matrix method for Q associates each sentence with
an infinite sequence of 0’s, l’s and '2’s. The ordering of
the values plays the role of correlating the values of
different sentences. The places in the sequence can be
thought of as playing the role of possible worlds in a
possible worlds scheme: so if x is the value that is the
n ' th term in the sequence of some sentence A, and y is the
value of the n ' th term in the sequence for a sentence B,
then x and y should be thought of as corresponding to the
value of those sentences at some one particular possible
world. Otherwise, the ordering of the terms in the sequence
is irrelevant - the order of terms for a given sentence
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were
could be permuted, without any real change in its
interpretation, so long as an identical permutation
performed on the sequences of all other sentences.
The assignments can then be pictured as an infinitary
matrix as follows:
Al
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
W1 W2 W3
10 0
2 2 1111111
0 0 0
0 2 0
2 11
W4 W5 W6 W7 W8
2 2 10 2
10 12 1
0 0 11011111
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 01112 1
etc .
etc
.
This is how Prior interprets this scheme: a value of 2
corresponds to the proposition's not existing at the given
world, a value of 1 corresponds to the proposition's being
true and existent at that world, and a value of 0
corresponds to the proposition's being false and existent at
that world. Prior then gives rules for the interpretation
of his modal operators, L and M. Since I am using standard
notation, rather than Polish notation, I will use the
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symbols and for Priorian necessity and possibility.
But, it should be noted that Prior discusses both a strong
and a weak sense of necessity and possibility. The
operators will be used for the strong sense
, to be explained
below
.
The interpretation rules for and in the
strong sense, are as follows 7 : the value of #A is 1 at a
world W if and only if the value of A is 1 at some world,
and the value A at W is not 2. It's value is 2 at W if and
only if the value of A at W is 2, and its value at W is 0
otherwise. The value of BA is 1 at a world W if and only
if the value of A is 1 at every world (that's every world,
not just the ones in which the value of A is not 2) . It's
value is 2 at W if and only if the value of A at W is 2, and
its value at W is 0 otherwise.
Notice that a sentence is true or false at a world if
and only if it is stateable there. This corresponds roughly
then to my notion of truth and falsity inside of a world,
not to truth and falsity relative to a world.
Let's use ' \B\ ' and ' \ \ ' for Prior's weak sense of
necessity and possibility. ' \ \ P
'
is true at a world W
just in case there is some world at which it is not false.
Since P is always stateable at least one world, weak
possibility corresponds to being stateable somewhere and not
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false somewhere. This condition could be satisfied by a
proposition if it is either false or unstateable everywhere,
and true nowhere. This is not much of a sense of
possibility and Prior does not employ it much or stress it.
But, it turns out that ' \4P\ ' is equivalent to '-.B-.A'. The
weak necessitation of P, \B\P, is defined as true at a
world W if and only if p is either true or unstateable at
every world. This makes '\B\P' equivalent to • -«-.?
As we can see above, there are six types of sentence
sequences to consider: (I) those with a mixture of 0's, l's
and 2's, (ii) those with a mixture of l's and 2's, (iii)
those with a mixture of 0 1 s and 2's, (iv) those with a
mixture of 0's and l's, (v) those with all l's and (vi)
those with all 0's. Prior requires that the first term of a
sequence is not 2 . This means that there is at least one
world at which all propositions exist. This is similar to
the actual world in my scheme, although for Prior this is
just a way of making sure there is at least one world of
this type. The logical laws for Prior are those that are
not false at any world, that is they are true at every world
in which they are stateable (and they are always stateable
somewhere)
.
Prior also introduces the operator 'S', and interprets it
so that 'SA' is true at a world W if and only if the value
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of A is either 0 or 1 at every world. in effect, this means
that 'SA' says that A is necessarily stateable. Note that
'SA' is not automatically true at a world just because A is
stateable there. So, 'SA' should not be interpreted as
equivalent to BML 1 s ' %A' .
How does the logic of Q compare to that of BML? There
are different ways in which they may be compared. First, we
could attempt a direct syntactic comparison, using Prior's
strong possibility and strong necessity, which are the
notions he uses in the formulation of the system.
In this case, we get many superficial similarities and
dissimilarities: for example one similarity is that Prior
does not have as valid the sentence:
(-p = B->P)
but, unlike BML, Q also declares invalid the simpler
sentence
:
^P = B-iP
But, this sort of direct syntactical comparison is
misleading for two main reasons. First, Prior's semantic
framework does not allow for the expression of something
corresponding to truth at or relative to a world, rather
than truth in or inside the world. While truth inside a
world can be defined in terms of existence and truth
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cannot be
relative to a world, truth relative to a world
defined in terms of the others. Consequently, in some
sense, no Q sentence expresses what BML expresses by simple
sentences such as ' DP
' or 'OP'. Prior's sentences '?' and
'P' are closer in meaning to BML's 'DTP' and 'OTP'.
In addition, there is no simple way to capture within Q
the BML notion of validity, since there is no distinguished
actual world in a Q matrix. The function of the actual
world m BML is that, in it, every proposition exists. And
a sentence is valid just in case it is true at the actual
world of every model. Intuitively, there is no distinction
in BML between truth relative to the actual world and truth
inside the actual world. However, this second feature could
be accommodated within the Q framework by regarding the
first term of the corresponding sequence for a sentence as
representing the actual world. (Prior also requires that
there be a certain world such that every sentence is
stateable at that world, but does not require that validity
be determined relative to that world)
.
There are two noteworthy results of these features.
First, while Prior is able to solve some of the problems of
contingency (taking the box in the strong sense)
:
PCI: D3x(x = a)
PC2 : nVxn3y(x = y)
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PC3 : De ! a
PC4 : (a = a)
He is able to do this only at the cost of losing these
formulas
:
PC5 : VxFx 3 Fa
PC 6 : Fa r) 3xFx
PC7 : Vx (x = x)
and the following turns out to be inconsistent:
PC 8 : 0-3x(x = a)
.
However, one might make the following suggestion.
First, BML contains certain sentences that are valid because
they are true at the actual world of every model, but not at
every world of every model. Q sentences are valid only if
true at every world of every model (matrix)
. So, any
sentence in Q that is expressible in BML and is valid ought
to be valid in BML as well. Second, although not every
sentence expressible in BML is expressible in Q, it does
seem that every sentence expressible in Q is expressible in
BML. So, there seems some reason to think that, given the
appropriate translation of Q sentences into BML sentences,
the Q validities ought to be a subset of the BML validities.
260
Such a scheme might go as follows:
A - tA
t ( ~>A ) - -it
A
t (A & B) - tA & tB
tSA - T(tA)
tBA - DT(tA)
t4A - OT(tA)
tA - TA, for A atomic.
Note, that even the sentence
'
P
' of BML is not
expressible in Q. For Prior,
'
P' is equivalent to 'TP' in
BML, hence the first and last rule above.
For the most part, the translation scheme above does
take valid Q sentences into valid BML sentences, although,
as we have seen, there are a number of BML sentences that
are not the translation of any Q sentence. There are a few
exceptions to the parallel, though. The translation of the
Q sentence 'P o iP', for example, turns out to be, in BML,
'TP o OTP '
.
The Q sentence is valid in Q, but the
corresponding BML sentence is not valid in BML.
6 . 4 Deutsch's Logic of Contingency
Harry Deutsch has developed a system of modal logic,
LCB
,
designed to solve the problems of contingency, among
other things. 8 Since BML accomplishes the same task, I
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would like to consider in this section the way in which my
approach differs from that of Deutsch.
In order to prepare the way for a presentation of
Deutsch’ s views, let me review some facts about Kaplan's
treatment of indexicality in his logic of demonstratives
.
Recall, Kaplan's framework depends on having two levels
of evaluation, the evaluation of character at a context of
use, and the evaluation of content at a circumstance of
evaluation. For directly referential singular terms, the
referent is determined in the context of use. That referent
is the singular term's input toward the determination of a
proposition, and that proposition is then evaluated at
different circumstances. A sentence is true in a context
just in case the proposition it determines in that context
is true at the circumstance of evaluation that is embedded
in that context.
While the framework allows a unified treatment of direct
reference and indexicality, there is no essential
theoretical connection between these two concepts. We can
have indexical terms that are not directly referential, and
directly referential terms that are not indexical. In fact,
Kaplan's scheme allows for pure constants that may be
treated as non-indexical directly referential terms.
Regarding these constants, Kaplan thinks of them not just as
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having stable character, but as being in some sense
"characterless". in some sense, the context doesn't fix the
referent of a constant, the interpretation of the language
does that. 9
Deutsch's system, LCB, exploits two levels of
evaluation to solve the problems of contingency. I will
begin by describing a simplified version of the system. 10
An LCB-model is a quadruple <K, w*
,
D, g>, where K is a
set of worlds, w* is an element of K (the actual world), D
is a function that assigns a domain to each world, and g is
a valuation function that assigns extensions to predicate-
world pairs, truth values to sentential constants (0-place
predicates), and to each ordered pair (t, w)
,
where t is an
individual constant and w a world, a member of D(w)
Take a context of origin c to be some world in K. An
assignment is a function from variables into the domain, and
a w* -assignment is an assignment f such that f (v) is an
element of D(w*) for each variable v. Then we define the
denotation in w relative to c and f as follows
den ( t) fcw = f(t), if t is a variable;
den ( t) fcw = g(t,c), if t is a constant.
Think of the function g as a sort of "reference-fixing’
function, analogous to the character of an indexical term
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(although Deutsch makes it clear that context of origin is
not the same thing as context of use)
. The function den is
what is often called a "designation function". So, the
function den assigns to a constant t the same entity in
every possible world, relative to a given context of origin
The context of origin fixes the referent, and then the term
is evaluated at each world (circumstance of evaluation) as
having that rigidly fixed referent.
We then define the notion of truth at a world in a
model, relative to a context of origin (and assignment f)
we define the notion 0 is true at w in M w.r.t. c and f
(M*=0 fcw ) as follows:
(i) if 1 < n, t 1# .., tn are terms, and 0 has the form
F n t lr . . . ,t n , then M*=<J> fcw if and only if
<den(t 1 ) fcw den (
t
n )
f
cw 6 g(Fn , w) . If n = 0, IM f c w if
and only if g(Fn
,
w) =1.
(ii) If f is a truth-functional compound, then M*=$ f c w is
defined as usual.
(iii) If $ has the form Vv?, then M*=O f c w if and only if for
each object a e D(w), M>= f (a/v) c<wW where f(a/v) = a, and
if u * v, then f(a/v)(u) = f(u).
(iv) If $ has the form t 1 = t 2 , then M>= fCiW 0 if and only if
den (
t
x )
f
c w = den (
t
2 )
f
c w .
(v) If <D has the form Dp, then Mi= fc>w $ if and only if for
each world w ' E K, M>= fcw . W.
(vi) If 0 has the form AW, then M>= f c w O if and only if
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Then we say that a formula O is true in a model just in case
it is for each w*
-assignment f, <D is true at w* in M w.r.t.
c* and f, where c* is the context of origin such that c*=
w*
. So, a closed formula 0 will be true in M if and only
if, on every assignment of actual individuals, O is true in
M at the actual world of M (taken as circumstance of
t ion ) , relative to the actual world of M (taken as
context of origin)
. Then we say that 0 is valid if and only
if for each model M, 0 is true in M.
The intuitive idea here is just as in LD, Kaplan's
logic of demonstratives. In LD, a sentence is true at a
context if and only if the proposition it expresses in that
context is true at the circumstance (world-time) that is
part of that same context. Deutsch's scheme requires the
evaluation of constants at a context of origin, and the
addition of a distinguished world - the actual world. This
allows for a definition of truth in a model. So, being true
in a model turns out to mean the same thing as being true at
the actual world of that model.
There are some significant differences between LCB and
BML . In LCB, the modal logic is a version of quantified S5,
because possibility and necessity are evaluated without the
use of an accessibility relation. Also, in LCB the sentence
"Necessarily Quine = Quine" comes out valid, because every
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name is assigned a denotation in each circumstance of
evaluation with respect to each context of origin. So,
since truth in a model is equivalent to truth at w* (taken
as the actual world), with respect to w* (taken as context
of origin)
,
then the sentence "Necessarily, Quine = Quine"
is true in every model.
LCB is able to solve the other problems of contingency,
though, because it uses a variant of the root world
technique. There is thus a significant parallel between LCB
and BML
. In both, truth in a model is determined by a
sentence's being true in the actual world of that model. In
BML, all constants are assigned to entities in the domain of
the actual world. In LCB constants have different referents
in different worlds (taken as contexts of origin), but the
referent at a world must be in the domain of that world.
And in BML, as in LCB, the quantifiers are taken as ranging,
at a given world, over only things in the domain of that
world. So, it seems that the two logics use a very similar
technique to solve the problems of contingency.
However, in LCB, the contexts of origin include more
than the actual world. The context of origin functions in a
parallel fashion to the context of use for indexicals. We
are to think of individual constants as having variable
reference. The function g in effect is the reference-fixing
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function. With respect to a particular context of origin, g
determines a denotation, which is defined so as to be
rigidly fixed to be the same thing in each world.
Consider three sentences like:
Gl: Gorbachev does not exist.
G2 : Possibly, Gorbachev does not exist.
G3 : Gorbachev is a world leader.
The sentence Gl is actually false, because the thing
"Gorbachev" refers to, from the standpoint of the actual
world taken as context of origin, that is Gorbachev, does
exist at the actual world. So, what the sentence means in
the actual context of origin (the actual world) is a
proposition that is true in the actual circumstance of
evaluation (also the actual world)
. In LCB
,
Gl will be
false with respect to any context of origin, because
constants always have some referent fixed by that context,
and whatever "Gorbachev" refers to there is something that
exists there. However, generally, G2 will be true with
respect to a context, because the thing "Gorbachev" refers
to in that context does not exist in some worlds other than
thp one that is the context of origin.
G3 is true in some contexts, including the actual
context, and false in other contexts. But, when we say that
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G3 is false ir^ other contexts, that is not necessarily
because our Gorbachev is not a world leader there (although
that may be the reason, if the referent of "Gorbachev" in
that context is our Gorbachev)
, but it may be false because
the thing that "Gorbachev" refers to there is not a world
leader there.
In effect, it might seem, Deutsch is giving something
like an indexical theory of names, but in fact that is not
the case. Contexts of origin are not contexts of use, they
are a third parameter. While the scheme here presented does
not involve indexicals, Deutsch 's comments suggest that they
would be incorporated into the system in such a way that
evaluation of the individual constants at a context of
origin happens in between the evaluation of indexicals at a
context of use and the evaluation of content at a
circumstance of evaluation. Deutsch comments on the
sentence
:
(9) Bucephalus does not (now) exist.
He says
:
"Thinking now of the elements of a model as
moments or intervals of time, and taking the bound
variable tacit in (9) to range over things that
presently exist, (9) will be true if we take the
context of origin for the denotation of
"Bucephalus" to be the ancient time in which
Bucepahlus existed. Thus, context of origin
should not be confused with context of use." 11
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Deutsch is clearly thinking of a reading of the sentence (9)
as
:
( 9 ' ) It: n
°^ !r
he Case that there is (now) an x such that xis Bucephalus
.
It seems that, on Deutsch' s reading, the referent of the
indexical 'now' is determined first by the context of use.
Then, with that time fixed, the sentence is evaluated at
different contexts of origin, at which there are different
referents for the name "Bucephalus".
What is it though that determines whether a particular
utterance of (9) in a context of use is true or false? I
believe that Deutsch 's intent is that the context of use
assigns to a constant a particular context of origin. It's
ss though the character of a name is a rule or instruction
like: go to such-and-such context of origin to pick up a
referent for this name. And then at the context of origin,
there is an instruction of the form: here is a referent for
the name, now evaluate the sentence at such-and-such
circumstances
.
Deutsch 's system offers an interesting account of the
semantics of reference for names. However, I think that the
issues surrounding the use of names for past existents or
non-existents like "Bucephalus" are irrelevant to the
problems of contingency: those problems are entirely solved
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by the root world technique. Deutsch's theory seems
designed to handle puzzles having to do with the variability
of reference of names. By discussing the problems of
contingency m this context, he creates the impression that
these problems and the aforementioned puzzles are connected.
But, it seems to me that those puzzles are entirely
independent of the problems of contingency.
I think this can be seen if we consider the case of
pure constants: a constant whose referent is determined by
the interpretation of the language, and not by any
contextual factors. In Demonstratives
,
Kaplan discusses
these as one possible account of the semantics of names.
Names, on this view, are in a sense "characterless". Their
meaning is on a par with the meanings of predicates and
logical connectives. They are fundamental, and the factors
that determine whether the names have this meaning belong to
metasemantics, and not semantics.
The question is not whether this is the right account
of natural language names. The point is that, if a language
contains pure constants, we still have the problems of
contingency with regard to them. We could design a language
otherwise like English, but containing the pure constant
"Squine". And we could stipulate that the meaning of
"Squine" is just Quine, and is absolutely independent of
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contextual factors of any kind. it seem to me that the
sentence "Possibly, Squine does not exist" is true in this
language, and that "Necessarily, there is an x such that x =
Squine" is false. But, the context of origin machinery
would be inapplicable to pure constants. 12
6 • 5 Menzel's True Modal T.oair
Chris Menzel has produced a system of modal logic that
he calls "The True Modal Logic" ( TML
)
13
. Menzel begins with
basically Priorian intuitions, but seeks to preserve a more
standard modal logic. According to Menzel, the difficulties
that force Prior into system Q reside in Prior's notion of
what it is for a proposition to be possible; and he says
that there is an alternative to that notion that leads to "a
much happier and more standard modal logic that Q" 14
.
Menzel's proposal is very similar in spirit to my own, but
our logics come out different. In this section I will
examine the reasoning that leads Menzel to TML, compare BML
and TML, and try to account for the differences between
them
.
I think that one way of viewing the difference between
BML and TML is that, in TML, Menzel applies certain
"Buridanian" intuitions only to quantified modal logic, and
leaves propositional modal logic untouched.
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There are two main components of Menzel 1 s account: the
metaphysical component with its alternative to Prior's
notion of possibility, and the logic Menzel thinks that
alternative supports. I want to first make some remarks
about the metaphysical component
.
In effect, Menzel offers a variation on the theme of a
distinction between a proposition's being true at, or
relative to, a world, and it's being true in, or inside of,
a world. Where I would say that a proposition P is true
relative to a world W, Menzel would say that P characterizes
W. He then says that a proposition is true in a world if
and only if it characterizes that world and exists in that
world
.
There are important metaphysical differences between us
with regard to the notion of a world. Menzel develops his
account as part of an overall effort to defend possible
worlds semantics. But, I don't believe these differences
play an important role in the divergence of BML and TML
.
Menzel uses this distinction to rebut Prior's argument
that a proposition like [Quine does not exist] is not
possible. He says that, while it is true that the
proposition is not true in any worlds, it does characterize
some worlds, and so is possible. So far we are in
agreement
.
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The main difference is this. I take it that P is
possibly true if and only if it is possible that P is true.
That means that [P is true] is true relative to some world.
And, to say that [P is true] is true relative to a world is
equivalent to saying that [P] is true inside the world.
Menzel understands possibility in more or less the same way,
but takes possibility to be equivalent to possible truth.
And since, like me, he does not believe that for any
proposition P, it is necessary that: if P, then P exists, he
would then deny BT3
. He likewise seems to reject the other
components of Buridan's Thesis.
This rejection shows up in his discussion of the
duality rule:
D ' : <& = iOi®
Prior's argument against the validity of this rule depends
on the claim that a proposition like [It is possible that
Quine does not exist] is true if and only if it could be the
case that [Quine does not exist] is true. Since Prior
believes that it could not be the case that [Quine does not
exist] is true, he also holds that [Quine does not exist] is
thus not possible. Menzel denies both of these Priorian
claims. So, he thinks that the argument against the
validity of the above fails.
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Since Prior believed that D' was invalid, he certainly
thought it could not serve as a definition do
. But, after
rebutting Prior's argument for the invalidity D', Menzel
then goes on to argue that, since the argument fails, "there
is no apparent reason to abandon the standard definition"
.
So, he incorporates into his system:
Def : do =df
Just as in BML, there is a certain restriction on the rule
of necessitation. But, by treating D' as a definition, and
not just a theorem, Menzel
• s TML yields the necessitation of
D'
,
and the necessitation of the necessitation etc.
TML also includes the full S5 axiom ' 0<D 3 DO
<
5 ' and not
the restricted version S5 ' = 1 04> 3 3 0<D) ' in BML.
Given Defd S5 is once again equivalent to the converse CS5:
' 0d4> 3 d3>
'
In very many other respects, especially in its
treatment of quantification theory, TML is like BML. While
TML contains no ' -like operator for propositional
existence, it does contain a predicate ' E!
'
for existence of
individuals
.
Menzel deals with the problems of contingency by
applying the root world technique, but Menzel ' s account of
the failure of necessitation has only to do with the
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contingent existence of individuals, not propositions. m
effect, the restriction does not allow the application of
necessitation to theorems that are derivable only with the
aid of the theorem 't = f . This has the result that Menzel
is able to give a complete solution to the problems of
contingency. He includes as an axiom a " free-logic "
-like
version of UI
:
VxO 3 ( E ! t 3 $( x t ))
but, since he includes the axiom:
t = t, he gets the theorem:
VxO 3 ® ( x t ) ,
but not:
VxO 3 (E ! t o $ ( x t ) ,
due the restriction on necessitation.
This is very similar in strategy to the one BML applies
to individuals and propositions. However, since the
theorems in the propositional portion of TML can be deduced
without use of 't = t', propositional TML remains unaffected
by the restriction on necessitation, and is in fact just
propositional S 5 .
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This suggests that the main differences between TML and
BML should show up in the interaction between propositional
modal logic and quantified modal logic. And, here there are
some significant differences.
One example that is representative of the others is
that in TML it is a theorem that:
3x0 ( ~>E ! x & 0E!x)
This says that there is an x such that it is possible that
(x does not exist and it possibly exists)
. In other words
it is possible that there be a de re possibility about a
non-existent object. This sort of claim is not a theorem of
BML, and it seems not to be in the spirit of the Priorian
intuitions with which Menzel began.
Notes
1. This is the notation used by Menzel in Menzel (1991)
.
2. By "taking the semantics literally", I mean taking it to
have an intended model, in which the worlds of the model are
genuine possible worlds, and in which belonging to the
domain of a world is the same as existing in that world.
3 . Many of the problems discussed in this section have been
described by Harry Deutsch, in Deutsch (1990).
4. Prior's system Q is presented and discussed by Prior in a
number of places. See Prior (1957), pp. 41-54; Prior
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(1967), p.154 60; Prior (1968), pp . 148-9 and 155-60 Thesystem is also presented in Hughes and Cresswell (1968}
pp. 303-5. ''
5. In a late paper, "The Possibly-True and the Possible"
reprinted in Prior (1976), pp . 202-14, Prior developed a'framework closer to my own approach, although, so far as I
am aware, he did not apply the results to a system of modallogic
.
Prior does not have a 'T 1 operator, but it seems certain
he would interpret it so as to make this valid.
7. I will be somewhat loose in the next few paragraphs about
quotes, corner quotes etc.
8. In Deutsch (1990).
9. Kaplan (1989a), pp . 558-63.
10. Deutsch’ s system involves a complication of the notion
of context of origin, explained below. In the official
version, a context of origin is a sequence of worlds rather
than a single world. However, this feature of the system is
designed to handle cases of sentences containing more than
one name. So, for sentences containing only one proper name,
it does no harm to regard the context of origin as a single
world
11. Deutsch (1990), p. 99.
12. the machinery would play a residual technical role, just
as in LD, for the sake of uniformity, names are assigned
constant functions as their content. In LD, that feature
plays no real theoretical role, and Kaplan takes it to
misrepresent what is actually going on. Likewise, a pure
constant may be assigned a constant function from contexts
of origin as its middle-level meaning for the sake of
technical uniformity.
13 . Menzel ( 1991 ) .
14 . Menzel (1991)
,
p. 331.
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APPENDIX
FORMAL DEVELOPEMENT OF BURIDANIAN MODAL LOGIC
A. 1 The System BMUP)
A -l-l Language and Axiomatic Basis
The language of propositional BML
, S£BML , is the same as
that of ordinary propositional modal logic, with one
addition. We add the sentential operator to indicate
propositional existence. Read 'gV' as : "the proposition
that P exists", or just, "P exists". Syntactically, 'g'
functions just like the modal operators and ' 0
' The
system BML(P) is the intersection of all sets of sentences
^bml that contain each of the following axioms and that
are closed under the indicated rules of inference.
Axioms
K: (PcQ) o (DP o DQ)
T: DP 3 p
D: OP = -illhP
S5 ' : OP 3 [J(gP 3 OP)
r : chop 3 gp )
0^: (OP 3 rP)
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Schema ^D: If a and B are any sentences containing the sameproposition letters, then
(«fA = gB)
is an axiom.
Schema DPC : For every valid PC wff A,
A
is an axiom.
Rules of Inference
RSN : bA - vU{g& 3 A)
US: If bA, and B is the result of replacing the proposit
letters p lr . . . , pn wherever they occur in A by the
sentences S 1# ..., Sn , then bB.
MP: If bA and bA^B, then bB
.
A. 1.2 Some Theorems and Non-Theorems of BML(P)
The following list of sentences of BML(P) contains both
theorems and non-theorems
. They have been interspersed
that the BML(P) theorems may be contrasted with similar
theorems. Theorems are indicated by ' T' prefix.
Tl. 0~>P 3 -iQp
T2 . ->DP 3 0->P
T3 . ChP 3 -.OP
T4. nOP 3 D-.P
T5 . (O-iP 3 iDp)
6 . ( -.Qp 3 0“>P
)
T7 . ( (-.DP & &P) 3 0“>P)
T 8 . (-'P 3 iOP)
9 . (iOP 3 D-.P)
T10 . ((-OP & ^P) 3 D-.p)
11. ( 0-i P 3 -OP)
T12. (£*> 3 ( 0-i P 3 -.DP))
13 . (D-iP 3 ^0P)
T14. D(^P 3 (-.? 3 -.OP))
ion
so
non-
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15. (
-dP 3 0 -> P
)
16. \D(gp 3 (-.? d O-iP) )
T17
. B(gp 3 D((-dp & gp) r> 0->P) )
18. (-.OP ^ Dip)
19 . B(gp 3 (-OP 3 D-iP) )
T20 . (gp 3 n((-.op & gp) 3 n-,p)
)
T21. DP 3 p
T22
. (DP 3 p)
23 . (Dp 3 p)
T24 . B(gp 3 BiB? 3 P) )
T25. P 3 OP
26
. (P 3 OP)
T27
. ( (P & gp) 3 OP)
28 . ( (P & gP) 3 OP)
T29. B(gP 3 ( ( p & gp) 3 OP))
T30. OOP 3 OP
T31. ( OOP 3 OP)
32. Dn(OOP =3 OP)
T33 . D(^P 3 (OOP 3 OP) )
34. np 3 DDp
t35. Dp 3 n(^p 3 op)
T36. DP 3 ( OP 3 DP)
T37 . DP 3 D-.0-.P
T38. B(BP => —> 0
~
1 P
)
T39. -.OP ^ D-iOP
40. (-.OP ^ D-tOP)
T41. (-.OP ^ (gp 3 ^OP) )
T42 . OOP =3 Dp
T43 . ( ODP ^ DP)
44. (OOP =3 Dp)
T45. [gp 3 (OOP ^ BP))
46 . OP 3 OOP
T47 . OP => (gp 3 OP)
T48 . D(OP d (gp 3 OP) )
49. CD(OP i3 (gp 3 OP))
T50. D(&P ^ (OP ^ (gp 3 OP)))
T51. -dP ^ Q-dP
52 . (->? ^ D-dP)
T53. ( ( -dP & gP) o Q-dP)
54. QH((-dP & gP) ^ D-dP)
T55. (&p 3 ( (-dP Sc gP) ^ D-dP) )
T56. ((? 3 Q) 3 (Dp 3 DQ) )
T57. (? ^ P)
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T58 .
T59
.
T60 .
T61
.
T62 .
A. 1
DRl :
DR2 :
DR3 :
DR4 :
DR5 :
DR 6 :
DR7 :
(OP =3 (^p id OP) )
(A =3 -i-iA)
(^(P V Q) 3 ^P)
\3(&P 3 (g’Q 3 p V Q) ) )
(^P 3 ( -i[HP 3 0 “> P ) )
3 Some Derived Rules of BMT,(P^
For every sentence A, v-%K.
For every sentence A, if hQA, then hA.
For any sentences A and B, if hDa and hCJ(A => B)
,
then
hDB.
For any sentences A and B, if hD(A => B) and v-D(B 3 C)
,
then !- (A 3 C) .
\-{&A 3 gfe)
,
for any sentences A and B such that every
proposition letter in B is also in A.
If i-A, and B results from A by substituting some
sentence D for some or all occurrences of a sentence C,
and C and D are PC-equivalent, and C and D exactly
the same sentence letters, then hB.
If hA, and B is a PC-consequence of A, then
hB.
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A. 2 Semantics for BML (P)
A BML (P) -frame is an ordered set <W, a, X, P, A> suchthat W is any set, a is a member of W, A is a two-place
relation on W, and X and P are functions from W into (?($£)In addition X, P and A are required to meet the followinq
conditions:
1. X (a) = P (a) = S£,
2. For any sentences A and B of ££
:
a . 1 : A E X(w) iff -iA E X(w)
a.
2
: A E P (w) iff -iA E P(w)
b. 1 : AVB 6 X ( w) iff A e X (w) and B E X (w)
b . 2 : AVB 6 P ( w
)
iff A 6 P(w) and B E P(W)
c . 1 : A&B 6 X (w) iff A 6 X (w) and B E X (w)
c . 2 : A&B
€ P(w) iff A e P(w) and B E P (w)
d. 1 : A=>B 6 X (w) iff A E X (w) and B E X (w)
d . 2 : A^B e P(w) iff A 6 P (w) and B E P (w)
e . 1 : A=B 6 X (w) iff A e X (w) and B E X (w)
e . 2 : A=B 6 P (w) iff A 6 P (w) and B E P (w)
f .1 : DA 6 X (w) iff A 6 X (w)
f .2 : DA E P (w ) iff A 6 P (w)
g.i : OA E X (w ) iff A E X (w)
g. 2 : OA 6 P(w) iff A 6 P (w)
h. 1 : %A E X (w) iff A 6 X (w)
h . 2 : %A E P(w) iff A 6 P (w)
A c W X W such that <w, w’> 6 A only if X = P(w'
)
A BML (P) -model is an ordered pair <&
,
V> such that ^ is a
BML (P) -frame and V is a function V: $£ X W - {0, 1, -} such
that
:
4. For any sentences A and B:
a. V (A , w) = - iff A £ P (w)
b. V ( ~iA, w) = 1 iff V (A , w) = 0
c. V(AVB, w ) = 1 iff V(A, w) * - and V(B, w) * - and
either V(A, w) = 1 or V(B, w) = 1
d. V(A&B, w) = 1 iff V (A , w) = 1 and V(B, w) = 1
e. V(AbB, w) = 1 iff V(-iAVB, w) = 1
f. V (A=B
,
w) = 1 iff V ( Ac>B
,
w) = 1 and V(B=>A, w) = 1
g . V
(
%A
,
w) = 1 iff A E X(w)
h. VIDA, w) = 1 iff, for every world w' such that Aww'
,
V (A, w' ) = 1
i. V(0A, w) = 1 iff, for some world w' such that Aww',
V ( A, w' ) = 1
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5. For every world w, there is a world w' such that for
every sentence A, if V(A, w) = 1 and A e X(w) thenV (A, w' ) = 1
.
6. For all worlds w and w' and each sentence A, if
V(OA, w) = 1, Aww ' and A e X(w'), the V(Oa/w') = 1.
Some Definitions
Df : A is true in a BML(P)
-model M =df V(A, aM ) = 1.
Df: A is valid =df for every BML(P)
-model M, A is true
in M.
Notes on the Semantics
Condition 5 plays two roles here. First, it guarantees
that, for each world in the model, there is some world
accessible to that world. Otherwise, all sentences would
turn out to be trivially necessary in certain models and no
diamond-governed sentences would be true in those models. A
sentence such as dp => OP would then turn out to be invalid.
Second, and related to the first role, Condition 5 is
responsible for the soundness of Axiom T.
Note also that, as a result of conditions 1 and 4a,
there are never any truth-value gaps at the actual world of
a model. So, every sentence is either true or false in
every model
.
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A. 3 Completeness and Canonical Mo^pIp:
In this section, I will prove the completeness of
BML(P) relative to the semantic framework presented in the
previous section. To say that BML(P) is complete is to say
that every valid sentence of S£ BML is a theorem of BML(P).
The method of the proof will appeal to a certain class
of BML models called BML(P) canonical models, or BML(P) C-
models . The basic outline of this completeness proof is
adapted from Hughes and Cresswell’s Companion to Modal Logic
(herafter H&C) . But, BML(P) C-models differ significantly
in structure from the canonical models for the systems of
modal logic treated in H&C. BML(P) is a peculiar modal
logic, and most importantly, it is a non-normal modal logic.
So, the canonical model techniques of H&C cannot be applied
straightforwardly to BML(P). There are two important
differences between BML(P) C-models and the canonical models
for normal modal logics:
First, BML(P) models differ generally from the Scott-
style models that Hughes and Cresswell are concerned with by
having a distinguished actual world. For Hughes and
Cresswell, a normal modal logic such as S5 is related to a
particular Scott-style model - the canonical model for a S5
.
In this model, for every consistent set of sentences, there
is a world in the model at which the members of that set are
jointly true. For BML(P), on the other hand, there is a
whole family of BML(P) C-models. And, the most that can be
said is that, for each BML ( P) -consistent set of sentences,
there is a BML(P) C-model such that the members of that set
are jointly true at the actual world of that model.
Second, due to the failure of the rule of necessitation
in BML(P), there are special conditions on the kinds of
structures that can serve as BML(P) models generally, and
BML(P) C-models specifically. In a normal propositional
modal logic, every theorem is true at every possible world,
and no inconsistent sentence is true at any world. Things
stand differently with BML models. We can say that every
theorem is true at the actual world of every BML(P) model,
and no inconsistent sentence is true at the actual world of
a BML(P) model. But, these claims do not hold for every
world of a BML(P) model. Consider sentences such as:
(S) -.DP o 0-iP, and
(S') -OP & 1 O-1 P.
(S) is a theorem of BML(P), and (S') is BML ( P) -inconsistent
since its negation is equivalent to (S)
.
For every BML(P)
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model, (S) is true at the actual world of that model, and(S ) is false at the actual world of that model. But, there
are BML(P) models such that, at some world w in that model,
(S') is true and (S) is false. These are worlds at which
is true, and thus 'DP', 'ChP\ 'OP' and '0-.P' are allfalse
.
Here, then, is an overview of how the canonical model
technique for proving the completeness of BML(P) works: To
say BML ( P ) is complete with respect to the class of BML(P)
models is to say that, if a sentence is BML ( P) -valid, then
it is a theorem of BML(P)
. This is equivalent to
1) For every sentence A, if A is true in every BML ( P) -model
,
then A is a theorem of BML(P)
.
(1), in turn, is equivalent to:
2) For every sentence A, if for every BML (P) -model M f A is
true at aM , the actual world of M, then A is a theorem of
BML(P)
.
Recall that, for any BML ( P) -model
,
and any sentence A
°f SPbml/ A is either true at aM or false at aM , and that A is
true at aM if and only if iA is false at aM . Also, say that
a sentence A of Sf BML is BML ( P) -consistent just in case -'A is
not a theorem of BML(P) . Then (2) is equivalent to:
3) For every sentence A, if A is BML ( P) -consistent
,
then
there is some BML(P) -model M such that A is true at aM ,
the actual world of M.
And, (3) just says that every BML ( P) -consistent sentence is
true in some BML ( P) -model
.
In the remainder, I will first define a class of
structures that are BML(P) canonical models, or C-models. I
will then show that each BML C-model is indeed a BML-mode 1
.
It will then be an easy matter to show that each BML-
consistent sentence of S£BML is true in some BML(P) C-model,
and thus that it is true in some BML(P) model. This will
complete the proof of completeness.
Some Initial Definitions
In what follows, I will use the terms 'theorem',
'valid', 'model' etc. in place of ' BML- theorem
' ,
'BML-
valid'
,
'BML-model' etc. The turnstile, ' h ' will be used
exclusively to indicate BML theoremhood.
285
Dfl: A is a O-theorem (b 0 ) =df i-A
A is a 1-theorem (bj =df hQA
A is a 2-theorem (b 2 ) =df bD(^A 3 Qa)
A is a 3-theorem (b 3 ) =df 3 \3(&h 3 Qa) )
A is an i-theorem (bj =df hD(^A 3 .. U{%A 3 Da)..)
Call sentences of the type following the turnstile on
the right sides of the definitions canonical sentences
.
More specifically, for a given sentence A, the 0 th canonical
sentence for A is A itself, the 1 st canonical sentence for A
is DA, the 2 nd canonical sentence for A is (IfA 3 Qa) etc.
In general, the i th canonical sentence for A is (§?& 3 B)
,
where B is the (i-l) th canonical sentence for A. Note that
the i canonical sentence for A contains i occurrences of
the box, O
,
and i -1 occurrences of the existence operator
(i-n addition to any occurrences of these symbols
contained within A itself)
.
Df 2 : A is an N- theorem (bNA) =df for every i > 0, h^A.
Some Initial Theorems
THEOREM 1 : For any sentence
PROOF : By the definition of
By axiom T, b(QA 3 A)
. So,
THEOREM 2 : For any sentence
h i+1A
.
A, if b
xA, then bA
a 1 - theorem, if b
xA then
by MP
,
bA
.
A and any i > 0, if bjA,
bOA.
then
PROOF: Suppose Then bB where B is the i th canonical
sentence for A, with i occurrences of and i-1
occurrences of
,
extraneous to A. By RSN, then, bD(^B 3
B)
,
and by DR5
,
bD(^A 3 ^B)
,
since B and A contain the same
proposition letters. So, by DR4 we have bD(^A 3 B) . This
is the (i+l) st canonical sentence for A, so, A is a i+1
theorem
.
COROLLARY 1 : For any sentence A, b
x
A if and only if bNA.
PROOF: It clearly follows from from Theorems 1 and 2 that,
if b-jA, then b AA for every i > 0, so bNA. And by the
definition of an N-theorem, if bNA, then b xA.
COROLLARY 2: bQA, if and only if bNA.
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PROOF: This follows easily from Corollary 1 and thedefinition of a 1 -theorem.
The following theorem presents some results that willbe useful for the upcoming completeness proof:
THEOREM 3a: The following sentences are N-theorems:
1. D(P => Q) (DP => DQ)
2 . Dp 3 p
3 . OP 3 (g’p 3 Op)
4 . P 3 -1 -1 p
5. r(P V Q) 3 ^p
6 . rp 3 (g’Q 3 r(P v Q) )
7 . ^P 3 (-iDp 3 0-iP)
PROOF. For each sentence A in the above list, I IA appears in
the list of theorems already generated in Section I. So, by
Corollary 2
,
each such sentence is an N-theorem.
THEOREM 3b: The following derived rules hold:
1. If hN A and bN (A 3 B) , then if bN B
.
2. If i-n (A 3 B) and bN (B 3 C) , then bN (A 3 C) .
3. i-n (^A 3 ^B) , where all the proposition letters in B are
also in A.
4. If A is a valid PC-wff, then bN A.
PROOF: Each of these can easily be obtained from the derived
rules and theorems of section I, and from Corollary 2.
THEOREM 3c: If kA, and B and C are N-equivalent (i.e. bN (A =
B) ) , and D is a sentence that results by substituting C for
some or all occurrences of B in A, then kD.
PROOF: (proof omitted)
THEOREM 4: For each sentence A and all i > 0, if i- i+ 1A,
then b-jA
.
PROOF: By cases:
Case (a) : Suppose i > 2. Then if A is an ( i+1 ) -theorem we
have bB where B is the (i+l) th canonical sentence for A:
(*Ta 3 ... D(gx 3 Da) ...)
with i + 1 occurrences of and i occurrences of '<£' ,
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xtraneous to A. Let C be the sentence that results from Bby deletion of
_ the expression '(«& 3 - from the left side
o B and deletion of the final right parenthesis ' (
’ fromthe right side of B . m1 ~
for A:
Then C is the i th canonical sentence
(^A 3
. . .Da)
. .
. )
with i occurrences of and i -1 occurrences of
,
extraneous to A. In other words, B = [D(^a => C)~|. Let D bethe sentence that follows the initial box in C So C = IHUdI
and B
- \p{gk o Dd)]. And, D contains i-1 occurrences of
each of ' and
. Finally, note that D = [ (&A 3 E)l. As
an instance of T22, we have
(- (Do 3 D)
.
And, since B is a theorem, we have
i-D (&A => DD)
,
so by DR4 , we get
hD(^A 3 D)
,
and by substitution for D:
i-D (&A o {&A o E) ) .
This yields, by DR 6 :
(-(«Ta 3 E)
and thus
,
hOD.
Since CUD = C, the i th canonical formula for A, then A is an
i- theorem
.
Case (b) : Suppose i = 1. Then, A is an ( i-t-1) -theorem only
if it is a 2 -theorem, so we have:
i-D (&A 3 DA) .
By DR2 and DRl, respectively, we get:
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i- (<?A Qa.)
,
and
h^A,
so, by MP, we have:
hOA.
Thus, A is a 1-theorem, and thus an i-theorem for i = 1.
Case J_c_L: Suppose i = 0. Then if A is an ( i + 1 ) -theorem we
have :
hOA
and by DR2 we have bA,
so A is a 0-theorem, and thus an i-theorem for i = 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Some More Definitions
Df 3 : A is 0-consistent (hA) ==df i/q-^A
A is 1-consistent ( idA) =df i/yA
A is i-consistent (iHA) =df ^i-A
Df 4 : A is N-consistent ( nhA) =df for some i > 0, iHA
A is N-inconsistent =df A is not N-consistent.
Df 5 : A finite set of sentences r = {yl7 y2 , ..., yn } is
N-consistent if and only if yx& y2& ...8c yn is N-
consistent. Otherwise, it is N-inconsistent
.
Df6: A set T of sentences is N-consistent if and only if
every finite subset of F is N-consistent.
Note that, if a set of sentences is 0-consistent
,
then
it is N-consistent. But, the converse of this result does
not hold.
Df 7
:
For any sets of sentences A and r, A is maximal with
respect to r if and only if, for every sentence A in r,
A is in A or ->A is in A. A is maximal if and only if
it is maximal with respect to SPBML .
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Df 8 : For any set of sentences r, r* is the set of sentences
A such that 2?A e r ; [r] is the largest set A such that
r is maximal with respect to A; _ (r) is the set of
sentences A such that Qa e F
.
Df 9 : r is MP-closed =df for all sentences A and B, if A
and A^b are in r, then B is in r.
Df 1
0
: A is a branch of r =df (i) r is MP-closed and
N-consistent, (ii) [A] = t*
,
and (iii) ‘(r) c a.
Df 11 : Say that r is a stem of A just in case A is a branch
of r. Say that n spawns A just in case either (i) n
bears the ancestral of the stem relation to A, or
(ii) n = A.
Note that condition (ii) must be added to Dfll because not
every set of sentences is a branch of itself.
Df 12 : For any set r
,
let S(D be the set of sets of
sentences spawned by F, i.e. S(T) contains r, all
branches of r, branches of branches of r etc.
Definition of Canonical Models
Let a be any maximal O-consistent set of sentences.
Consider the structure
«S (a)
,
a, Xs(a)
,
Ps(a)
,
AS(a) >
,
V>
in which S(a) is once again thee set of sets of sentences
spawned by a, Xs(a) is a function from S(a) into such that,
for all s in S(a), XS(a) (s) = sg
,
PS(a) is the function from
S (a) into SP such that, for all s in S(a), Ps(a> (s) = [s]
,
and
As(a) is the subset of ordered pairs <s, s ' > in S(a) X S(a)
such that s' is a branch of s. Finally, V is a function
V: SP X S(a) - {1, 0, -} defined by:
V (A, s) = 1 iff Acs
V ( A, s) = 0 iff -iA 6 s
V ( A, s) = - iff A ^ s and iA £ s
Such a structure will be called a canonical model or C-
model. In a C-model, the term a will be called the actual
worldset of the model, and the members of S(a) will be
called the worldsets of the model.
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Note that every maximal O-consistent set of sentences adetermines a unique C-model
. The following important result
wiH ^e crucial for the proof of completeness.
THEOREM 5 (The Transmission Theorem): For any C-model M
with actual worldset ex, if knA and r is a worldset of M and
A 6 Ps(a) (D , then ACT.
PROOF: By Theorem 3a. 4, we have kn (A => -nA) , so by Theorem
3b. 1, if knA then bN^A. So, since by hypothesis bNA, then
hN -i->A and -iA is therefore N-inconsistent
. And, since r is
N-consistent
,
then
->A £ r. But, by hypothesis A e ps(a) (p)
so either A or ->A is in r. So, A e r.
COROLLARY 3: For any C-model M with actual worldset a, if
i-n (A => B) and T is a worldset of M, and A e r and (A => B) e
Ps(a) (D , then B e r.
PROOF: An application of Theorem 5 yields that (A o B) is in
T, if i-n (A => B) and r is a worldset of M, (A o B) e Ps(a) (r) .
And, if A e r, then MP-closure gives the result that B e r.
We are now ready to prove the central result of this
section
:
* *
The Completeness Lemma: Every C-model is a BML-model.
PROOF: Clearly S(a) is a set containing a, by the definition
of S(a), and xS(a) and PS(a) are functions from S(a) into
P(S£), and As(a) c S(a) X S(a). Also, by the definition of
V, V is a function from $£ X S(a) into the set {1, 0, -}.
It needs to be shown that conditions 1 - 6 of the semantics
hold also.
Condition 1:
1(a): Ps(a) (a) = [a], but since a is maximal, [a] = Sl? BML .
So, Ps(a) = S£bml .
1(b): Xs<a) (a) = a*. But, by DR1 , for every A in SP BML , \-%K.
From 1(a) above, we know ^A is in Ps(a) (a) no matter
what A is. So, by the Transmission Theorem, ^A is
in a, for every A in if BML • Thus, ar = ^BML -
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Before proceding to the proof of condition 2, we needfirst to prove condition 3.
Condition 3: If <s, s’> 6 As(a)
,
then s’ is a branch of s.
So, [s'] = sy . By definition of XS(a)
,
Xsla) (s) = s^ By thedefinition of PS(a)
,
Ps(a) (s’ ) = [s']. Then Xs(a) (s) = PS(a) (s').
Condition 2: The proof goes by induction on the depth of a
world-set: For a given C-model M, define the depth-0 set to
be {a}, the depth-1 set to be the set of all branches of a,
other than q if ex is a branch of itself, the depth— 2 set to
be the set of all branches of elements of the depth-1 set
that are not themselves in either the depth-1 set or the
depth- 0 set. In general, the depth- (i+1) set is the set of
all branches of elements of the depth-i set such that those
branches are not themselves in any depth- j set for j < i.
Finally, we say the depth of a world-set s, D(s), is the
natural number i such that s is in the depth-i set.
Base case, D(s) = 0: D(s) = 0 iff s = a. Since, from the
proof regarding condition 1, we know that PS(a) = XS(a) = &[BML ,
then it is trivial that each component of the 'iff'
statements in 2a.
1
- 2h.2 holds.
Inductive case : Assume, as the inductive hypothesis, that
each of the statements 2a.
1
through 2h.2 holds for any
worldset s such that D(s) < n. It must be shown that they
also hold for any worldset s such that D(s) = n+1.
2a. 1 (left to right): Suppose A 6 Xsla) (s) and D(s) = n+1,
Then %A 6 s, by definition of Xsla) . So, obviously <%A £
Xs <a) ( s ) or -i|TA £ Xs(a) (s) . Thus, %A £ P S(0l> (s) by definition
of Ps(a) . Each worldset of depth n+1 for n > 0 has a stem of
depth n, so there is a worldset s' such that D(s') = n and,
by proof of condition 3, Xs(a) (s') = PS(a) (s) . So, <?A £
XS(a) (s') . By the inductive hypothesis, we now get:
~
|A £ Xs(a) ( s ' ) , and
{%K => &-*A) e xs(a) (s')
and so, {&A o If-iA) £ Ps<a) (s) . We know, from DR5 and
Corollary 2 that t-N (^A => &->A) , and so by application of the
transmission theorem (IfA o ^A) 6 s. By MP-closure, then,
r-^A 6 s, so ~iA £ XS(a) (s) .
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2a. 1 (right to left): Suppose
-A e Xsla) (s) and D(s) = n+l
6 S
'
by definition of XS(Q >
. So, obviously gbA e'X
f Js%] °V 7 6 f a) (s). Thus, SnA e Ps(a>( S ) by definitiono P
. Each worldset of depth n+1 has a stem of depth n
so there is a worldset s' such that D(s') = n and, by proof
is'). Byof condition 3, X
s(a) (s') = PS(a) (s). So, IBa e Xs(a)
the inductive hypothesis, we now get:
Ik 6 XS(a) (s' ) , and
(I^A o %K) e Xs(a) (s')
and so, (IT-iA => &A) E PS(a) (s)
. We know, from DR 5 and
Corollary 2 that bN (^f-iA ^ ITA) , and so by application of the
transmission theorem (IT-iA o ITA) 6 s. By MP-closure, then%A e s, so A e xs(a) (s) .
2a. 2 (left to right): If A 6 PS(a) (s) and D(s) = n+1, then
there is a worldset s' such that s' is a stem of s and D(s')
= n, and
A E XS(U) (s')
. By the inductive hypothesis then,
->A E
XS(a) (s') and so ->A E PS(a) (s).
2a.
2
(right to left): If -«A 6 Ps(a) (s) and D(s) = n+1, then
there is a worldset s' such that s' is a stem of s and D(s')
= n, and
->A E XS(a) ( s ' ) . By the inductive hypothesis then, A E
Xs(a) (s' ) and so A 6 Ps<0() (s).
2b. 1 (left to right): Suppose AVB 6 Xs(a) (s) and D(s) = n+1,
Then
^(AVB) e s, by definition of Xs(a) . So, obviously I’(AVB) 6
Xs(a) (s)
or iIT (AVB ) e XS(a) ( s ) . Thus, ^(AVB) e Ps(a) (s) by definition
of Ps(a) . Each worldset of depth n+1 has a stem of depth n,
so there is a worldset s' such that D(s') = n and, by proof
of condition 3, XS(a) (s') = PS(a) (s). So, IT (AVB) e XS(a) (s').
By the inductive hypothesis, we now get:
ITA E Xs(a) (s')
IB 6 Xs(a) (s')
(IT ( AVB) =3 lA) E Xs(a) (s' )
(^(AVB) o IB) E Xs(a> (s' )
and so, (IT (AVB) o lA) E Ps<a> (s) and (I(AVB) o IB) 6 Ps<a) (s).
We know, from theorem 3a. 5 that hN (IT(AVB) o lA) and
i-N ( IT (AVB) => IB), and so by application of the transmission
theorem (IT (AVB) => lA)
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6 s and (g’(AVB) z» gB) e s. By MP-closure,
e s, so A e XS(a) ( s ) and B 6 XS(a) (s).
then, gA e s and
2b. 1 (right to left): Suppose A e XS(a) (s), B e XS(a) (s) and
D(s) - n+1
,
Then gA 6 s and gB 6 s, by definition of xS(ot)
So, obviously gA e PS(“>(s) and gB e P s '«> (s)
. Each worldset
of depth n+1 has a stem of depth n, so there is a worldset
s such that D(s'
)
= n and, by proof of condition 3,
Xs(a) (s') = PS(a) (s)
. So, gA e Xs(a) (s' ) and ^B e Xs(a) (s')
the inductive hypothesis, we now get:
By
^(AVB) 6 Xs(a) (s' )
{gA ^(AVB) ) e xs(a) (s' )
(gB o (gA 3 g ( aVb) ) ) e xS(a) (s' )
and so (gB => (gA o ^(AVB) ) ) e PS(a) (s). We know, from
theorem 3a. 6, that hN (gB => {gA => ^(AVB) ) ) and so by an
application of the transmission theorem {gB o {g’A =>
g (AVB ) ) )
)
6 s. By two applications of MP-closure, then,
^(AVB) e s, so (AVB) 6 Xs<0° ( s ) .
2b. 2 (left to right): If (AVB) e Ps(a) (s) and D(s) = n+1,
then there is a worldset s ' such that s' is a stem of s and
D(s') = n, and (AVB) e Xs<a) (s'). By the inductive
hypothesis then, A 6 XS(a) (s') and B e XS(a) (s') and so A e
PS(a) (s) and B E Ps<a) (s).
2b. 2 (right to left): If A 6 PslQ) (s) and B E Ps(a) (s) and D(s)
= n+1, then there is a worldset s' such that s' is a stem of
s and D (s
' ) = n, and A € XS(a) (s') and B e Xs(a) (s'). By the
inductive hypothesis then, AVB e XS(a) (s') and so AVB e
Ps(a) (s) .
The proofs for the remaining clausesin condition 2, 2c
through 2h, are omitted. They continue in a similar
fashion
.
Condition 4:
The proof of Condition 4 requires the use of some important
lemmas
:
LEMMA 1: For any world-set s, Xs(a) (s) c PS(al (s).
PROOF: For any sentence A, if A 6 Xs(a) (s), then g’A E s.
Then, gA E Ps(a) (s). But then, by the proof of condition
2h . 2 , A 6 Ps(a) (s) .
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LEMMA 2: For any N-consistent set r, "(r) is N-consistent
.
PROOF
: .
Suppose r is N-consistent, but "(r) is not. Thenthere is a sentence A such that CUA E F and hN ->A. We havefrom Theorem 3a . 2, that hNDA => A, and so, by Theorem 3c,
hN (^A o -iQa) , since the sentences Qa d A and -iA =>
-.Qa are
PC-equivalent. By Theorem 3b. 1, then, we have hN^DA, so Dais N-inconsistent
. But, since Dh E r, then r is N-
inconsistent
, contradicting our initial assumption.
LEMMA 3:. For any set of sentences r and sentence A, if OA e
r and F is N-consistent, then "(r) u {A} is also N-
consistent
.
PROOF: By reductio. Suppose OA e r
,
r is N-consistent and
"(F) u {A} is not N-consistent. Then, some finite subset
A of '(T) u {A} is not N-consistent. By the previous
theorem, '(D is N-consistent, so A must contain A. So, A
= { Yi / •••/ Ya* A}, where each Yi C F. So,
1* ^ (Yl & ••• & Yn Sc A) .
By the definition of an N-theorem,
2. I“2 ~1 ( Y 1 k ••• & Yn & A)
and by the definition of a 2-theorem:
3 . h (
y
! & ... Sc Yn 8c A) =3 Ch (yi & ... Sc yn Sc A) ) .
First, we show that:
(*) t-HU-i (\Hy 1 Sc ... Sc DYn Sc OA) .
From 3, we get:
4. hD(^--(Yi & ••• & Yn & A) 3 D((Yi & ••• & Yn) 3 "'A) )
by the rule of PC substitution. We also get:
5. !-(( (y1 Sc ... & Yn) 3 -1A) 3 ( ( Yi Sc ... & Yn) 3 "'A))
as an instance of T57, and thus, from 4, 5 and DR4 we get
6 . i- (irb ( yi Sc ... Sc Yn Sc A) o ( CD ( Yi & ... Sc Yn ) -) n -1A ) )
which is equivalent to:
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7. hD( (r-i( Yl & ... & Yn & A) & ((y1 & ... & Yn) ) 3 ChA) .
We have the following:
8. hD ((-.r-i( Yl & ... & Yn & A) & (( Yl & ... & Yn) ) 3 i^A) ,
9 . i-O ( -i^A ^ -iOA)
,
10. !-(-.A ^ -i<>A)
,
/
(each of these is easily derivable in BML)
From 7 and 10 we get
11. (- ( (^-i ( Yi & ... & Yn & A) & (D(Yi & ... & Yn) ) 3 -’OA)
and from 8 and 9 we get:
12. )- ( ( i^T-> ( Yi & ... & Yn & A) & (IU(Yi & ... & Yn) ) 3 ->0A) .
11 and 12 together give us:
13. (-((Yl Sc ... Sc Yn) 3 -,0A).
We have as a theorem of BML:
14. Sc ... Sc IHYn ) 3 D(Yi & ... & yJ),
and 13 and 14 together give us:
15. i-O ( (0/1 Sc ... Sc 0/n ) 3 -'OA) , which is equivalent to:
16. h[Zb(0/i Sc ... Sc DYn Sc OA)
which is the sentence (*) above. 16 may be read as saying:
17. H 1-i(DYi Sc ... Sc 0/n Sc OA
)
which gives, by Corollary 1:
18. t-N -> (OYi Sc ... Sc OYn Sc 0A ) .
But, each of the Oyi is in r and so is OA, so 18 says that
F is not N-consistent , contrary to the hypothesis.
LEMMA 4: For any sets of sentences r and A, if F is N-
consistent, and [F] is a subset of A, then there is an N-
consistent extention of r, T’, such that [ F ' ] = A.
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The sentences of 9? can be effectively enumerated, sothere is an effective enumeration of A, since A is a subset
of . Let Ai = <X1 , \2 , . ..> be such an enumeration. Define
Ai = <5i> to be <Xlt ->Xx< X2 , ->X2 , ...>. That is 5i = X2i _ 1 ifi is odd, and 5i = “'Si, if i is even.
Define the following sequence of sets r t by
r 0 = r
r i = r o u (5i)/ if r 0 u (Si) is N-consistent
,
r
x = r 0
otherwise
.
r i = r i-i u (Si), if r i_i u (Si) is N-consistent, ft =
otherwise
Let T + = u{Ti|i > 0}
It can be shown that r + is N-consistent. If r + were N-
inconsistent
,
then there would be a sentence A such that
t-N ->A . But, then A E one of the 1^. Each is obviously N-
consistent, though. So, none may contain A. It is also
easy to see that [T + ] = A. Clearly, for any set S of N-
consistent sentences, and any sentence A, either S u {A} or
S u {-A} is N-consistent. So, for any element of A, either
A or -iA is in F + .
LEMMA 5: For any worlset s, there is no sentence A such that
A and ->A are in s
.
PROOF: Worldsets are, by definition, N-consistent, and so
contain no N-inconsistent sentences. Suppose, for the
purpose of reductio
,
that for some worldset s and sentence
A, both A and ->A are in s. Then, by a few applications of
the proof of condition 2, A => (iA (A & iA) ) E P S(0,) (s) . By
the Transmission Theorem then, (->A => (A & -»A ) ) E s. By two
applications of MP-closure (A & ->A) E s. But, (A & ->A) is
N-inconsistent. Contradiction.
With these lemmas in hand, we now return to the proof of
condition 4:
4a
:
Vs(a> (A, s) = - iff A £ s and ->A £ s iff A £ P !
4b: VS(a) (nA, s) = 1 iff -iA E s iff Vs(a) (A, s) =0.
4c ( left to right): If Vs(a) (AVB, s) = 1, then AVB e s and AVB
e Ps(a) (s) . Suppose neither A nor B is in s. We know from
the proof of condition 2b. 2 that A E Ps(a) (s) and B E PMa) (s).
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So, if neither A nor B is in s, then
->A and
->B are in S Wehave
:
hN ->A o ( ~'B 3 ( (AVB) 3 (A & -.A) ) )
6^ 3 ( A Sc 3A )
by Theorem 3b. 4. And, both are in PS(a) (s) since A and B are
in PS(u) (s) . So, by the Transmission Theorem we have:
“'A 3 ( -«B 3 ((AVB) 3 (A Sc ->A) ) ) 6 s
Then, by three applications of MP we have:
(A Sc ->A) 6S.
But, s is N-consistent
,
so we have a contradiction.
4c (right to left): If neither Vs(a) (A, s) nor V(B, s) = -,
and if Vs(a) (A, s) = 1 or VS(Q) (B, s) = 1, then both A and B
are in Ps(a) (s) and either A 6 s or B 6 s
. So, by the proof
of condition 2, AVB 6 Ps(a) (s) and both A 3 (AVB) and B 3
(AVB) are in PS(a) (s). We have by 3b. 4:
6N A 3 (AVB)
hN B 3 (AVB)
so, by the transmission theorem,
A 3 (AVB) 6 s
B 3 (AVB) 6 s.
Then, since either A or B is in s, then by MP closure (AVB)
is in s. So, Vs(a> (AVB, s) =1.
The proofs of conditions 4d through 4f are omitted. They
continue in a similar fashion. We turn next to 4g.
4g : VS(a) (^A, s) = 1 iff &A 6 s iff A 6 s* iff A 6 XS(a) (s) .
4h (left to right): If Vs(a) (QA, s) = 1 then DA 6 s. So, A 6
~(s), and thus A 6 s', for each branch s ' of s . So, A 6 s'
for each s' such that <s, s'> 6 As(a) . So, Vsla) (A, s') =1 for
each s' such that <s, s’> 6 As(a) .
4h (right to left): If Vs<0,) (A, s') =1 for each s' such that
<s, s ' > 6 As(a)
,
then A 6 s' for each s' such that <s, s’> 6
AS(a) . Then A 6 Ps(a) (s') for each such s', so A 6 Xs(a) (s)
since <s, s’> 6 As(a)
,
and therefore %A 6 s. By Lemma 1,
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since A e XS'«(S) then A 6 Ps -'(s), and so, by the proof ofcondition 2, ->A t 0~>A, OA, %A, ->dA and %A 2 (-iQA 3 0->A) are
Suppose, for purposes of reductio, that Da is
We have
,
by 3 a . 7
:
S(a)in P
not in s
.
i~n 2 ( IDa 2 o^a
so by the transmission theorem <oA 2 (iQa 2 OvA) e s . By
two applications of MP-closure, then, O-iA e s. And by the
proof of the left to right version of 4i, ~iA is in some s'
such that <s, s'> E AS(j> . But, by Lemma 5, no sentence and
its negation are both in some worldset. Contradiction. So,A e s and Vs(0‘ > (QA, s) =1.
4i (left to right): Vs(a) (OA, s) = 1, then OA E s
.
Each
worldset is N-consistent
,
so, by Lemma 3, '(s) u A is N-
consistent, and[ (s) u A] c sy . Let s' be an N-consistent extention of "
(s) u A such that [s' ] = s^. Such a set is guaranteed by
Lemma 4. In order to prove that <s, s'> E As{a)
,
we only
need to show that “(s) c s'
.
This is obvious since s' 2 '
(s) u A. And, equally obvious is that A 6 s'. So, there is
a worldset s' such that <s, s’> E AS(a) and V(A, s') = 1.
4i (right to left): If V(A, s') =1 and <s, s'> e AS(a)
,
then
Acs' and s' is a branch of s. Since A e s' then A e
P s<0,) (s'), so A e XS(a) ( s ) and %A E s . By Lemma 1, A 6 PS(a) (s)
and OA, ->A
,
-<0A, %A, and <%A 3 (-1OA o ->A) are in Ps(a) (s) .
Suppose OA is not in s, then, since OA 6 Ps(a) (s), ^OA is in
s
.
We have
:
t-N %A o (->0A 3 ChA)
by Theorem 3a. 7, and since %A 2 ( 1OA 2 CbA) is in Psla) (s),
then, by the transmission theorem, <%A 2 (-1OA 2 D-iA) e s.
By two applications of MP-closure, we get that ChA E s.
Then, by the left to right version of 4h, we get ->A E s' .
But, no sentence and its negation are in the same N-
consistent worldset. Contradiction. So, OA E s and V(OA,
s) = 1.
Condition 5.:
For any s E S(a)
,
define s' to be s? n s . Clearly, if A E s
and A 6 Xs<a) (s)
,
then Acs'. We just need to show that s'
is a worldset:
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(i) N consistency: s' is a subset of s. Since, by
hypothesis, s e S(a), then s is a worldset and is N-
consistent. But, s is N-consistent only if every finite
subset of s is N-consistent. And, every finite subset of
s is a finite subset of s, since s' c s. So, every finite
subset of s is N-consistent. Thus, s' is N-consistent.
(ii) MP-closure: Suppose A e s' and A=>B e s'. Since s' c
s, then A and A=>B are in s. But, by hypothesis, s is a
worlset and so is MP-closed. So, B e s. Since A=>B e s'
then g (A=>B) 6 s. By the proof of condition 2, then, e s
and so B 6 sg . So, B 6 s n sg
,
i.e. B e s' .
( iii ) = [s']: If A e sg
,
then e s .
If A e [s'], then A e s' or ->A s s'; if A
€ s '
,
then e s;
if ->A e s'
,
then <T->A e s, and by proof of cons it ion 2, %A 6
s. So, in either case <?A E s and A e sg .
(iv) EJ-(s) c s': If A e ' ( s ) , then Qa e s . So, Da e
P s(a) (s) and by the proof of condition 2, (Qa => A) e Ps(a) (s)
and (QA => <?A) 6 PSla, (s) . We know, by axiom T:
b(OA ^ A)
So, an application of Corollary 3 gives us that A e s. We
also know, by axiom «?, that:
h(QA =5 gh)
So, another application of Corollary 3 gives us that &A e s,
so A e sg . Since s' = s n sg
,
Acs'.
Condition 6.: Suppose V(OA, s) = 1, and <s, s’> 6 As(a> and A
6 xs(a) (s' ) . Then OA 6 s and therefore OA 6 Ps(a) (s) . By the
proof of condition 2, then, OA => 0(^A OA) e PS(a) (s) . We
know, by axiom S5 ' that:
hOA ^ Q (g’A ^ OA) ,
so, an application of Corollary 3 gives us that Q(^A => OA)
e s. Since <s, s’> are in As(a) , then Q"(s) c s' . So, («Ta
OA) 6 s'. But, since A 6 Xs<0,) (s'), then ITa 6 s'. So, by
Mpclosure, OA 6 s', and thus V(OA, s') = 1.
This completes the proof of the Completeness Lemma. We
conclude this section with a proof of the completeness of
BML . We need just one additional lemma:
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LEMMA 6: Every O-consistent sentence is a member of some
maximal O-consistent set.
PROOF: Only a sketch of the proof need be provided. Via a
construction similar to that used in the proof of Lemma 4,
we enumerate and then add into our "root" set, at each'
stage of the construction, the next sentence in the
enumeration, so long as the result is O-consistent. The
resulting infinite union will be both O-consistent itself
and maximal
.
THE COMPLETENESS THEOREM: For any sentence A, A is BML-valid
only if A is a theorem of BML.
PROOF: This statement is equivalent ot the statement that if
A is not a theorem of BML then it is not BML-valid. Suppose
A is not a theorem, then ->A is O-consistent. By Lemma 6,
every O-consistent sentence is a member of some maximal 0-
consistent set a. Consider the C-model generated by a.
Since ->A is in a, V(^A, a) = 1. So, V(A, a) = 0. So, since
every C-model is a BML model, there is a BML-model in which
A is not true. Thus, A is not BML-valid.
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A .
4
Soundness of BML(P)
I present here only a sketch of the soundness proof for
BML, relative to the semantics.
Axiom K. Assume, for the purposes of a reductio
,
that K is
not true in every model. Then there is some model M such
that D(P ^ Q) and DP are true at aM , and DQ is false at aM .
But, then Q is not true at some world w accessible from aM ,
and since the projections of w are identical to the
existents of aM , and Q is among the existents of w, then Q
is false at w. But, (P 3 Q) and P are true at each world
accessible from aM , and so at w. So, Q is true at w.
Contradiction
.
Axiom T . Suppose that T is not true in every model. Then it
is not true at some cxM in some model M. So, since every
sentence is either true or false at the actual world of each
model, then T is false at aM . So, DP is true at aM , and P
is false at aM . Since dP is true at aM , P is true at every
world accessible from aM . According to semantic condition
5
,
one of these accessible worlds is a world w in which each
sentence among the existents of aM , and thus each sentence,
has the same truth value that it has at aM . But, then P is
false at w. Contradiction.
Axiom D
.
(Right to left) Assume OP is true at aM , for some
arbitrary model M. Then P is true at some world w
accessible from aM . So, ->P is not true at w, and then CbP
is not true at aM . Since every sentence is either true or
false at aM , then Cbp is false at aM . So, ->[Ibp is true at
aM . (Left to right direction recapitualtes this reasoning in
reverse)
.
Axiom S 5 ' . Suppose, for reductio, that OP 3 (^’P 3 OP) is
not true at some aM , for some model M. Then, since every
sentence is true or false at aM , OP is true at aM , and D(^P
3 OP) is false at aM . So, there is a world w, accessible
from aM , such that P is true at w and (^P 3 OP) is not true
at w. Since every sentence is in the projections of all
worlds accessible from the actual world, then (^P 3 OP) is
false at w. So, ^P is true at w and OP is false at w.
But, by condition 6 , since OP is true at aM , and w is
accessible from aM , then OP is true at w. Contradiction.
Schema . Suppose the schema is false for some sentences A
and B containing the same proposition letters. Then there
is a model M and world w in M, accessible from aM , such that
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t?A
-
'
is not true at w. Since, every sentence is in theprojections of any world accessible from aM , then isfalse at w. Assume £a is true and is false at w. Then
A is in the existents of w, and by condition 2
,
all of the
letters in A are in the existents of w, and since these are
the same letters as in B, B is in the existents of w and
is true at w. Contradiction. Parallel reasoning applies to
the assumption that is false and is true.
Schema DPC
. Condition 4 has the result that every PC wff A
is true at every world in which it is among the projections.
Since, for every model M, all sentences are in the
projections of any world accessible from oM , then A is true
at each such world. Hence, by condition 4h, QA is true at
aM in every model.
RSN. Suppose A is true at aM for each model M. And
suppose, for reductio, that D[^A 3 A) is not true at aM in
every model M. Then there is a model M, such that (g’A 3
A) is false at aM in M. Then (&K 3 A) is not true at some
world w accessible from aM . Since every sentence is in the
projections of any world accessible from aM , then (&A 3 A)
is false at w. So, %A is true at w and A is false at w.
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